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Abstract
This research is focused on three food multiple retailers, Sainsbury pic, Tesco pic, and 
Safeway pic. The research is designed to e3q>lore the relationship between technology 
and strategy in these organisations. The currently held view among the researchers and 
managers of these organisations is that technology has a limited impact on the processes 
that formulate strategy, and as such may be regarded as having an enabling role. This 
thesis proposes that while this view may have been correct in the past it is so no longer, 
and that technology is not following strategy but leading strategy in the food retailers 
examined.
In order to confirm this thesis the history, technical development and technical structure 
of the three retailers was investigated. The results of this research was subsequently 
analysed and the following conclusions were made:
a. Technology has a much greater inq)act on the strategy of multiple food retailers than 
has been previously thought. Technology defines the boundaries of operational
activities,
and, through controlling a substantial proportion of the information that managers use
in
the strategy making process, technology de fecto if not de jure greatly influences 
the retailers strategies, and in some cases may actually lead them.
b. The food multiples, in not appreciating the extent to which their fete is tied iq) with 
the information technology they are using, are foiling to educate and train the general 
management of the organisations technologically.
c. Technological progress is widening the gap between the general management and 
technical management, and in the long run this will cause serious strategic problems 
unless this g ^  is closed through positive action.
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Chqpter 1
Introduction to the th^is and to ike United Kingdom 
retail environment
L I General introduction
At a conceptual level the job of a food retailer is sinq>le. Determine i^iat the customer 
wants; find a source of supply; negotiate an acceptable price; tranqwrt and displ^ the 
goods; sell the goods at a profit; use the mon^r fit>m the transactions to buy more 
produce and to pay for running costs. Retained profits are used for dividends, taxes and 
future investmenL As long as these tasks are associated with a small number of stores in 
a small geogr^hical area, a limited number of product lines, few siqipliers and a small 
distribution system, control can be effected through simple manual systems. Growth in 
the size and geogrqfoical coverage of a food retailer greatly increases the conq>lexity of 
the control problems. Manual control systems become increasingly ineffective for several 
reasons:
1. The amount of p^)erwork to be manually processed increases 
rapidfy (e.g. orders, invoices, stock records and store activity records).
2. The conplexities of the supply chain becomes difficult to control
3. The accurate delivery of produce to multÿle outlets fiom the supply chain 
becomes difficult to maintain.
4. The location of produce within the siq>ply chain becomes difficult to 
trace - a key issue for perishable goods.
5. Maintaining an accurate relationdiq) between the buying price and the 
selling price becomes very difficult and this can threaten the gross margin 
of the business.
6. Control data required to monitor store and supply chain operational
activities is not available to managers quick^ enough.
The food retailer finds the advantages associated with growing in size, for exanq>le lower 
purchase prices gained trough bulk buying, are offeet by increases in oveAead costs and 
an overall decline in efficiency. To regain control and inqnove efficiency most food 
retailers look to information technology to find answers to their problems. It will be 
subsequent]  ^ be demonstrated that a common qqnoach to the ear^ stages of 
conqputerisatlon in food retailing has been to convert individual manual systems such as 
order processing, stock control and accounting fimctions. Robson (1994, p.9) suggests 
that this piecemeal (Approach can often be attributed to managers of the business needing 
to leam how to use the eonqniter systems effective^ and to trust the system outputs in 
controlling their business» White these indhidual control and information systems remain 
unlinked, it win be shown that they have little effect on strategic decision making, and the 
conq>uter system installation - usually located centrally in the organisation - remains a 
siqqwrt ftmction.
As the retail business grows to r^ional, national or international proportions, operational 
pressures associated with the need to improve efficiency increases. These pressures are 
related to three foctors. The first is the need to maintain control of the business as the 
volume and variety of produce in the siqq>  ^chain increases. The second is the increasing 
conplexity of the sqq)^ diain because of the larger geognqfoical r^ion to be serviced, 
and the third foctor is the need to inqnovo the control of the operational fimctions in the 
siqq>ly chain and in the individual stores. These three Actors eventually combine to make 
mamial control of the individual conqmt^ system either inefficient, due to the large 
number of people needed to process the relevant control pq)erworit, or ineffective 
because of the errors to vfoich manual systems are prone. Subsequmt food retailing
systems integration becomes focused on measuring the performance of the operational 
aq)ects of the retailer at all levels, automating and optimising the distribution chain, and 
on the inte^ation of head office fonctions» It is vital that these operational competences 
are optimised as they> form the basis o f the eompetitive stratèges o f the food multiple 
retailers in an intensely competitive market place. Failure to integrate the head office 
systems would prevent further growth, and it is growth, usual^ eiqnessed in terms of 
market share, that is the und^lying strat^y of most of the large food retailing multqiles.
In the food retailers the operational reasons for uring information systems has led to the 
view that technology has an enabling or tactical role in the business of food retailing 
muhÿles - a view still widely held by many working and researching the retail 
environmenL This view is typified by Hasty & Rearden (1997, p.39) v/bo comment - 
" {irformation) technology will play a aitical role in strengthening... 
logistics, inqxroving service levels, direct communication (with 
customers and supplieri)^ communications and control, eliminating 
repetitive ta<ks, handling financial issues."
This view does not suggest that information technology infiuences retail strategies in any 
substantive way. This research challenges this assumption and seeks to demonstrate 
that in die case o f the multiple food retailers as well as enabling retailing strategies, 
information technology is now beginning to lead retailing strategies as it transcends 
the role o f processing operational performance data, and moves to providing 
knowle^e iqfon which nunu^ement are basb^ their future strat^ ies.
In order to achieve this task this research has been structured as follows:
Chqjter 1. The remainder of this introduction will discuss the nomenclature
of retailing and the development of. the general retailing environment 
between 1980 and 1990 - a period of great information tedmology 
change.
Chapter 2 is a review of the strategy, technology-organisation, performance 
measurement, and distribution literature in order to identify i^iere 
this research fits in to the established theory and how it makes an 
original contribution to this theory.
Ch^xter 3 is a descrqxtion ofthe design and inqxlanentation of the research 
programme used to gather quantarive and qualitative data associated 
with the objective of this research.
Quqxter 4 is a conqxrdxensive analysis of the information systems 
currentfy used by the food multqxle retailers in terms of hardware, 
software and system ftmctionality. This is the first ofthe results 
chsqxters.
Chsqxt  ^5 is an anafysis ofthe strategic development of Sainsbury, Tesco 
and Safeway* that identifies how these food retailers have 
developed in response to each other and the developing food 
muhqxle market place. This information will be used to develop 
a phase model of ftxxd multqxle retailer development. This is the 
second ofthe results chsqxters. (* The choice of these companies 
is esqxkdned in Chapter 3.)
Chiqxter 6 anafyses the development of the performance measurement 
systems throughout the multiple food retailer's organisation in 
relation to the phase development model defined in Chsqxter 4.
This chapter ties together the development ofthe operational strategies.
the technology systems analysed in Ch^xter 4, and the strategic 
systems. This is the third of the results ch^xters.
Chapter 7 summarises the research and concludes the thesis.
This chapter now continues with a descrÿtkxn of the nomenclature associated with the 
food retailing environment and a review of the main retail market developments during 
the period 1980 to 1990.
L2 Nomenclature
Retaking, in common with maiy other businesses, has developed a nomenclature of its 
own. The nomenclature relates to the classification of the types of food retailer and to 
the size ofthe food retaihng outlet. These classifications are widely used within the food 
retailing business and by the government statistical agencies.
Independent food retailers are usualfy owned ly  a sole trader md foey wsy or may not 
be trading as a limited liability conqxany. They are typified by the traditional comer shop 
offering a limited range of produce, or perluqxs the niche market ^ p  that specialised in 
only one type of product This category of retailer fiom both an historic and current 
point of view has the greatest number of shops. However, these numbers have been in a 
steady decline each year. Between 1971 and 1992 the numbers reduced by an average 
of 2.6% per year (fiom 86,565 in 1971 to 32,662 in 1992 - Table 1.1). During the same 
period the independait retailers share of the overall mariœt has also dropped fiom 42.5% 
to 11.8% (Table 1.1). In characterising the independent retailer Cox and Brittain (1991, 
p. 12) suggest that the advantages that they have are personal relationshqxs with their 
customers, convenient comer shop locations, flexible merchandising policies, longer
opening hours, lower overheads, and sometimes enhanced buying and advertising 
arranged through membersbq) of voluntary trading groups. These advantages are often 
offeet by intense price competition from the mukqxle retailers, lack of qxecialist exqxertise, 
lack of exqxansion cqxital, being situated away fiom high volume pedestrian traffic, and, 
the changing  shopping habits associated with out of town shopping centres.
Multiple retailers (multqxles) are usually joint stock organisations owned ly  private or 
public investors. The number of shops that constitutes a mukqxle is not clearfy dejfined 
although it is widely accepted that the mmimum number is in the order of tens and the 
maximum number may be hundreds. The multiples that are in the lower range tend to 
operate locally or r^ionally, the multqxles in the higher range are usually approaching 
national coverage. (It should be noted that co-operatives are excluded from this 
category.) The evolution of the muhples is driven by economies of scale. T h^ usualfy 
have a strong corporate identity and a highly centralised control and decision making 
structure. In general the gross jnofit margin m much retailing (and particularly on food) 
is low and therefore the multples tend to concentrate on fost moving produce. Buying is 
centralised to improve margins through bulk purchasing and corporate image is often 
promoted through 'own brand' products. This is som etimes  carried to the point in 
nonrfbod multples '^xere ojûy own brand products are sold, for instance S t MSchael as 
the own brand of Marks & Spencer. The overhead costs associated with running a retail 
outlet do not increase linearfy with size (Table 1.6). This has been an incentive for the 
multples to sell their smaller in-town outlets and replace them with larger outlets - often 
in out of town locations. While sole traders tend to d^ fîm» service in terms of 
interpersonal relationshps, multples tend to define service in terms of value for money, 
low prices or one-stop^shopping. As a formula for success the food multiple has worked
well In 1971 multples had 44.3% of the food market, by 1992 this had risen to 77.8% 
(Table 1.1). This growth in market share was not acconpanied by an increase in the 
number of stores. In Act they fell from 10,937 in 1971 to 4,577 in 1992. Waterson 
(1993) explains that although the number of stores declined the average size of mdividual 
stores increased - a phenomenon that will be explored later in this chpter.
Co-operative societies are the third category of food retailer. They trace their origin to 
Rochdale when in 1844 the first co-operative (Co-op) was formed. Since then the Co-op 
has become a British institution and can be found in the m ^rity  of towns and cities in 
the country. Winstanley (1983, p.37) describes the co-operative movement as being 
rooted in the Owemte Socialism ofthe 1820s and 1830s and founded on the princples of 
a voluntary membershp, democratic control ly  and through the trading partners, limited 
interest on capital, and proA allocated for the development of the co-operative, the 
common good (the Divf as it was known), or in proportion to the members transactions.
The evolution of the Co-operative movement since 1844 led to geogrphical groipings 
(societies) that were independently managed although still affiliated to, and woridng 
under, the National Co-opaafive Movement banner. To the extent that the Co-operative 
Movement provided inproved purdiasing power on a geographical basis it has bear 
successful Unfortunately the lack of an integrated highly professional centralised 
management structure, uncoordinated marketing and the proliferation of societies and 
shops, have aH led to an increasingly poor competitive maritet position conpared with 
the multples (Cox and Brittain, 1991, p.l5). Between 1971 and 1991 the co-operative 
share of the retail market declined from 13.2% to 10.4%, and the number of outlets
decfined fiom 7,745 to 2,481. The relative performance of the Independents, Multples 
and Co-operatives is illustrated in Table 1.1.
No. ofoudets 
1971
No.ofoati(ds
1992
% ahmreof 
commodity 
turnover 1971
% share of 
commodity 
turnover 1992
Independents 86,565 32,662 42.5 11.8
Multples 10,937 4,577 44J 77.8
Cooperatives 7,745 2,481 13.2 11.8
Totab 105,283 39,720 100 100
(Source: Waterson, 1993, pJ2)
Table 1.1 Estimated number of shops and turnover shares by types of retail
organisation
In addition to defining the types of retailer it is also useful to define some of the terms 
that are widefy used to describe the kind of outlets that food multples trade iiL Gty 
(1994, p. 12) suggested a he%)ful classification vdnch is illustrated in Figure 1.1. There 
are two basic retail forms - the single building and the grotp of buildings. Under these 
two cat^ories it is possible to trace aU of the mam retail configurations commonly 
encountered in the UK. Guy sugge^ that the main food multples usually operate under 
the categories of Tree Standing Store', "Retail Park' and Tocused Centre'. Tl^ thin these 
categories will be found the siq>ermarket with a fioor pace of less than 25,000 sq. ft.; 
the superstore with a fioor space between 25,000 and 50,000 sq. ft.; and the hypermarket 
with a floor space greater than 50,000 sq. ft. The warehouse, which is generalfy a 
rx>nrfi)od retail outlet, usually equates in size to either the superstore or hypermarket 
The warehouse will not of course be fitted internally to the same standard as the normal 
food retail outlets. (N.B.. This classification is onfy valid for the UK.)
Sin^e
buflding
Group of 
bmldmgs
One 
occupier
Several AU 
smaU: im  occiroiers ll large! T ^ i \  I
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Fig 1.1 Guy's classification of retail development
The retail market has many fecets that reflect the way in winch it has developed These 
developments have been, driven ly  the intensefy competitive qxirit of retailing 
entrepreneurs and their individual re fu se s  to changing customers needs and the 
economic environmenL This point wiU be examined in greater detail i^hen considering 
the conpany histories. The focus for this introduction continues by examining foe 
activities within the retail environment during and around the period 1980 to 1990.
13 TJie retail envinmment 1980 to 1990
The market environment of the food multples during this period was dominated by four 
Actors:
a. retail concentration in the UK;
b. demographic and lifest^  changes among consumers;
c. the geogrphical growth and distribution of large stores in the UK; and.
d. changes in international patterns of retail activity.
1.3.1 Retail concentration in the UK
The general concentration in retailing between 1971 and 1992 from 105^83 outlets to 
39,720 outlets (IGD Research Services), has hem fr>Dowed by the grocery sector of the 
food madceL Figure 1.2 illustrates the emerging dominance of the fr>od multÿles since 
the 1960s.
100
GO
40
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
(Sources: Nidsen, 1995, pl28; B.O.T., 1995)
Figure 1.2 Percentage of grocery sales through multiples 1900 - 1992
The reason for this success is e?q>lained ly  the trading format that the multÿles have 
adopted - larger and more efOcient stores, more efBdent distribution systems, bulk 
purchasing and better management control systems. Because of these Actors the large 
food multiples were consistœtly more profitable than smaller traders throughout the 
1980s. Table 1.2 shows that between 1981 and 1990 the large fr>od muhÿles managed 
to increase their weekly sales by an average of 6.36%, Wiereas small frxxi retailers only 
managed to increase their weekly sales by an average of 1.73%. The Retail Price Index 
(RPI) figures give an indication of how the overall price of fr>od was changing on a year
10
% change in % diange in RPI 
value of pound (annual averages) 
by year
%changein 
average total 
retail sales
% change in 
average weekly 
sales of small 
food retailers
%chan^in 
average weekly 
sales of large 
food retailers
1981-1982 -2 -429 4 3 . 5
1982-1983 -1 -4.07 4:9 1 5
1983-1984 -1 035 4.7 2 5
1984-1985 -2 1.05 5.7 2 5
1985-1986 0 -2.58 6 2 6
1986-1987 -1 0.71 5.8 2 5
1987-1988 -1 0.77 7.8 2 6
1988-1989 -1 2.9 5.9 5 7
1989-1990 -2 1.65 6.5 4 9
1990-1991 -1 1.78 4.7 1 9
1991-1992 0 -2.17 3.8 -3 8
Average -0.73 -035 3.8 1.73 6.36
(Sources; AtmiMl Abstract of Statistics. 1994: TU. 112,
Social Trends. 1995: TUs. 527 & 6.13, N.B.. Index 100 set in 1983 )
T&bk 12 Comparative amaiysis of percentage changes in value of the pound, RPI
and retail performance 1981-1992
year basis. It will be seen that the average price of food was tailing tfaroug^ut this 
period (-0.35%), but the cost of mqx>rts - an indicator of raw material costs (a 
proportion of \riûch are associated with the Aod chain) - rose by an average o f429% 
for the same period. The consequence of this increase was to squeeze retail margins and 
the small retailer, as a price taker, struggled. The large retailers with better bargaining 
power were able to reduce the impact of price rises on their margins and to inq)rove their 
overall trading position. These rather har^ trading conditions provided an incentive to 
inqirove efficiency throughout the food distribution chain in order to restore margins -
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and inçrovmg efficiency was a constant strategic theme in the multiples throughout the 
1980s. The casualties of these economic forces either left the madret or were taken over 
by the more successful multÿles.
1.3.2 Demogrcphic and lifestyle changes in the UK
The population of the United Kingdom has grown sbw ^ in recent years. Table 1.3 
illustrates the changes that have taken place between 1961 and 1993 (with projections up 
to 2031). It win be seen that between 1961 and 1993 the overaft population on^ grew 
by 927% (an average of 0.3% per annum), and it was this that effective]  ^set the limit on 
the growth of the retail market as a wdiole. If retailers wished to grow within the United 
Kingdom they could only do so by getting a larger share of an established madcet place 
(take-overs), ly  buying a share of a market place that has some retail synergy with 
existing operations (horizontal or vertical integration), or ly  finding a previous^ 
une3q)bited market niche or product range (diversification). The alternative for the large 
food m uffles was to seek growth overseas, and this will be discussed later in this 
chapter. AH of these options offer opportunities for growth on the same cost base.
Two other Actors that are of importance to retailers, and i^ Aich often dictated strategies 
for geogrz^hkal eqxmsion within the UK, were population concentration and population 
migratinn I q the UK population concentration has traditionally been influenced by the 
concentration of enq>k>yers and the availability of ençloyment Consequently the mam 
clusters of population are to be found in the industrial conurbations centred on London, 
Greater Manchester, West Midlands Bristol, HaliAx, Glasgow, Tyneside, Nottingham 
and Liverpool Since the 1960s a imgor influence on population redistribution has beoi
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1961 1971 1981 1991 1992 1993 2031
England 43,561 46,412 46,821 48208 48278 48233 52,435
Wales 2,635 2,740 2,813 2,891 2,899 2206 2277
Scotland 5,184 5236 5,180 5,107 5,111 5,120 4298
Northern kL 1,427 1 ^ 1238 1,601 1,618 1,632 1,831
Ikiited Kingdom 52,807 55228 56252 57208 58,006 58491 62241
(Source: Office of PocHilation rengw «nd Surveys: Government ArhaWs DeoartmenL General Regg^y 
Office (Scotland!. General Register Office (Northern TrelanA^
Table 13 Population of the United Kingdom 1961 -1993 with projections to 2031
(Excepting dates, numbers in Aousands)
changes in the road and motorway infirastructure. As a result the motorway corridor 
towns such as Reading, Swindon, Milton Keynes, Northampton, Cambridge and 
Peterborou^ have been the focus for business re-location and population concentration 
(Nielsen, 1995, p l6). Table 1.4 illustrates the regional population changes for the period 
1981 to 1993.
The movement of population foom North to South was primarily due to the search for 
enployment as the heavy engineering, shpbuilding and mining industries of the North 
closed. The depressed economk areas in the North created in the wake of these closures 
proved to be fertile ground for the low cost retailers. These economic conditions 
restricted the ix>rthem migration of the larger food multpl^ ^x> positioned themselves 
at the middle or higher end of the market. This is reflected in the growth patterns of the 
large food multples, subsequently discussed in this chapter and in Appendix 1, and the 
low daisity of these large middle to high market food multiples above a line drawn 
between Manchester and Yoric.
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Resident Popahrtion Change in *000s
Northwest -17332
North -76.56
Scotland -60
Yorks. & Humberside -37.92
West Midlands -7.68
East Midlands 106.08
Wales 93
Northern Irdand 94
East Anglia 168
South West 286.56
South East 43536
(Sources; Office of Population Census and Surveys: Government Actaarv*s Department General 
Register Office (Scotland .^ General Register Office (Northern Ireland))
Table 1.4 Regional population changes 1981 to 1993
In addition to the migration of people in search of woik there was also a change in the 
structure of the woridng population in the UK illustrated in Figure 13. While overall 
imemplnyment fluctuated between 7 and 11% of the working population between 1980 
and 1994 (peaking at 11% in 1986), the total number of people in enployment has been 
Airly steady at approximately 27.5nL Of this relatively stable woik force there have been 
gignifirflnt shifts m the balance of the work force. Between 1980 and 1994 the full 
tiwiemale work forced dropped by 10.3% (14.36m to 12.87m) part time male 
enployment increased by 59.4% (0.40m to 0.99m). In conparison Amale employment 
has increased. Full tim e tèmale enpbyment has risen by 19.4% (5.14m to 6.13m) and 
part time female CTployment has risen by 32.5% (3.97m to 536m) (Social Trends , 
1990, TbL 4.4 and 1995, TbL 4.4]. Townsend (1986) suggested that the overall increase
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in part time ençbyment experienced during the early 1980s was probably due to the 
increase in size of the retail sector. This is difficult to verify as the food multq>les quote
30mr
People in employment
Sm
Peq>le unemployed
2m
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
(Sources: Social Trends ,1990, Tbls. 4.12 & 4.28; 1995, Tbls. 4.12 & 4.18)
Figure 13 Employment and unemployment in the UK 1980 to 1994
their en^loymrait statistics in terms of Full Time Equivalents (PT E )  - however, it does 
seem likely that they had some influmce on these statistics. Those in en^loyment, either 
foil or part time, found that the traditional opening hours of the food nndtÿles were 
inconvenient and this put pressure on the retailers to increase their opening hours to 
include evenings. The Sunday Trading Act (1993) made seven day trading a possibility 
and the majority of the mukÿles now open seven days a week. It seans probable that 
this trend to increasing trading hours will continue if UK retail trading patterns follows 
those of the USA, \^iere 24 hour trading is becoming the norm.
The changes in enq>loyment patterns wa^ acconq)anied by changes in shopping patterns. 
Table 1.5 clearly indicates that there was a significant move away fix>m the woman as the
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dominant shopper, to women and men sharing the reqwnsibiHty for shopping. Again, 
this had an effect on the food multÿles as traditional merchandising strategies tended to 
be based tqx>n the premise of the woman as the main shoppy. As enq>toyment patterns 
changed during the 1980s so did the patterns of disposable income. ^^ %h an index set at 
100 in 1990, real household diqx)sable income has risen 30 points fiom 70 in 1980 
(Social Trends , 1985, TbL 5.1, 1990, TbL 5.1). In part this is ejçlained by wage 
settlements being higher than the rate of inflation during this period and in part by the 
feet that on average there were more wage earners per household as women were
Mainfyman Mainly woman Shared equally
1983 5 51 44
1991 8 45 47
(Source: Social Trends. 1995: TbL 2.7)
Table 1.5 The percentage of men and women doing household shopping
undertaking fiill or part time work. The effect of this increase in di^sable income was 
to increase q>ending on non essential or luxury items. Car ownershÿ increased between 
1980 and 1990 from 60.3% to 67.0% of households. More significant than this is that 
the households with more than one car rose flom 152% to 24% (Family Kxpenditiire 
Surveys. 1990). In maiy cases the second car owner was the woman of the house. The 
increased mobility that the second car provided made shopping in a wider geogr^hical 
area a possibility. The increased affluence also allowed people to buy other luxury items. 
One of the most significant for the food multÿles was ownershq) of refrigerator - 
freezers that grew ffom 36% to 50% of households between 1980 and 1990 (GFK. 
Marketing Services, 1992). So, not only could the shopper get to t k  iKW stores that
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were being buA on the edge of towns, but they could also buy in bulk, transport and 
store the food for longer periods of time. This pattern of shopping was ideal for the 
siqierstore format and enabled much of the esqiansion that took place either in the huge 
edge of town stores or in the shopping centres based near motorways. Two exançles of 
this kind of development are Milton Keynes and Brent Cross.
The age structure of the population changed significant^ between 1981 and 1993. The 
under 16 age groiq) declined fiom 22.3% to 20.6% of the population; the 16 to 39 age 
groiq) has remained more or less static at 34.9% of the population; the 40 to 64 age 
groiq) has increased fiom 27.8% to 28.8% of the population; the over 65 age groiq) has 
increased fixim 14% to 15.8% of the populatbn (Social Trends. 1995: pl7). As the 
population age profile changes the retailers must respond. The abnormal increase in 
births in the period immediately afier World War Two œ ated a large population in the 
age range 30 to 40 during the 1980s. Astute retailers fixnised their merchandising 
strategies on this high qxnding age group. However, changing age patterns 
continuously create new challenges for the retailers. During the 1980s an increasing 
proportion of the population became elderly. This meant that their diqx)sable income and 
mobility dropped and large edge of town stores did not attract the elderly customers vfbo 
have to refy on public transport Some retailers thought that this would not have a large 
inq>act iq)on their trading. However, this age groiq) tend to rix>p at times vhen other 
age groiq>s are working and can he%) to cover some of the overiiead costs during quiet 
periods. Partfy in reqwnse to the elderfy group of customers; partly to attract the lunch 
time and 'going home' rimpper; and partly because the availability of large edge of town 
sites was b^inning to decline, food retailers reconsidered the inner dty sites they 
previously ignored. Sainsbury are reconfiguring some existing town centre stores to
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sites was beginmng to decline, food retailers reconsidered the inner city sites they 
previously ignored. Sainsbury are reconfiguring some existing town centre stores to 
cater for these new shopping patterns and call the new format Sainsbury'CentraT. Tesco 
have a similar trading format called the 'Metro* store.
1.3.3 The distribution o f stores
The location and number of stores is driven by the availability of land, infiastructure and 
a suitable population ra+cbment area. The numeric growth of the larger stores began in 
the 1970s when Asda, copying the American superstore trading format, began to build 
larger stores. At the tim e the UK was suffering from the combined effect of a recession 
and an oil supply crisis and this caused cost inflation in the retail environment at a time 
when the retailers w ae not able to increase prices (if anything the recession put pressure 
on the retailers to reduce prices). The large store format offered the retailers economies 
of scale and better inrstore efBciency, foctors that the fixxl multples were quick to 
recognise as they turned to building stores in the new large format An exanple of 
comparative Actors related to store size is shown in Table 1.6 ^nch clearfy illustrates 
that the large stores have 33% lower labour costs, 13% higher sales per sq. ft., and 48% 
higher operating margins pro rata than the smaller diop formats.
During the 1970s the availability of suitable edge of town sites was curtailed by planning 
legislation and the relatively strong political loWy of in-town traders. However, during 
the earfy 1980s the Government relaxed the planning regulations and this enabled a 
period of retail building. The large edge of town stores (those with a square footage 
greater than 10,000 sq. ft.) increased from 19% of all stores in 1980 to 78.5% of all
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stores in 1993 - a growth fiom 239 to 644 stores ( IGD Research, 1995; Neflsen, 1995, 
p47). Since 1990 the rate of growth of new l^ge store building has slowed ooBsidcrabfy.
Store size 
(sq. ft. sales area) Wage costs Saks per sq. f t
Operating
margias
less than 15,000 124 95 66
15,000 - 25,000 102 95 96
more than 25,000 91 108 114
Company average 100 100 100
(Source: Richards & ^ cNeary, 1991, TaWe 2.8 - fir J. Sain^xiry)
Table 1.6 Comparative wage costs, sales intensity and operating margins
by size of store
A tightening o f  planning regulatbns by the Government, a diminishing number of suitable 
sites and madcet saturation in the most populous geogr^hical areas have all been 
contributory Actors. During the 1980s the rate of growth of these large stores has not 
been umfbim across the UK. Table 1.7 rix>ws the r^ional variation for superstore 
opening b e tw ^  1980 and 1990 and also clearfy indicates the regional variations and 
highlights the popularity of the South East (33.6% of all opanngs) as a location for large 
stores. This is primaiify due to the high population concentration in this area. 
Converse^, East Angha, an area with a relatively low population density, had fewest 
store openings. Although the South East emerged as the area with the largest number of 
new large stores overall, it is noticeable that the earfy 1980s were marked by the growth 
in large store numbers in the North. This is explained by the Act that Asda, foe group 
vfoo were first to exploit the n e^  large store format, were based in the North. Also,
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many of the councils in the South East resisted the development of the superstores 
preferring medium sized super markets (Airey, 1993, pl5).
Year
Scot North Yorks.
&
Ihimbs
North
West
East
Mids.
West
Mids.
Wales East
Anglia
South
West
Soudi
East T(Aal
1980 4 2 1 2 3 4 3 - 3 8 30
1981 3 1 4 2 - 5 2 - 2 9 28
1982 - 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 8 12 31
1983 3 1 4 3 3 3 1 1 - 9 28
1984 2 1 7 2 3 1 4 - 1 5 26
1985 - 3 3 4 2 2 1 1 3 11 30
1986 1 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 13 40
1987 2 1 - - 2 - - - 2 5 12
1988 1 7 3 8 3 5 2 3 3 11 46
1989 2 1 6 4 7 6 1 1 11 35 74
1990 3 5 6 9 2 10 -1 8 2 19 63
Total 21 28 38 39 32 41 18 17 38 137 408
(Source: IGD Researdi Services)
Table 1.7 Multiple superstores opened between 1980 and 1990
by region
1.3.4 International activities and influences
During the 1980s many of the more successfiil UK retaüas looked abroad for esqpansion. 
The UK market provided fewer opportunities for growth through acquisition, and with a 
more or less statfe population the overall UK market size was not growing significantly. 
Most of the. retailers soug^ to fpply their formula for success in the UK maiket to 
overseas markets - the food mukples were no exception. McGokkick (1995, p8)
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identified six *producf or format' led approaches taken by the retailers to the 
internationalisation process. The first is licensing in wdiich the conpany sells an overseas 
organisation sole rights to products made by the licenser. This arrangement usualfy 
involves the organisations woddng at arms length with little investment required by either 
party and no exchange of equity. It is a low risk, low cost strategy for the licenser but 
has the disadvantage of giving little control in the overseas operation. McGoldrick points 
out that licensing is relatively unusual among UK retailers.
The second approach is that of concessions. In this approach the organisation seeks to 
transfer an established trading format into an overseas organisation and might, for 
instance, hire or bi^ square footage in an established store or chain of stores. The 
exanple quoted by McGoldrick is that of Burton (the clothes retailer) and Galeria 
Predados in Spain. This is a method of overseas operations fovoured by many retailers 
of luxury products for vdiom format is an important consideration. Again this is a low 
ride, low cost strategy for the retailer but it has the advantage of greater control
The third category of international operations is franchising in wdiich the whole trading 
format (Le. store design, equpment, materials and products, livery, etc.) is installed and 
leased to a foreign organisation or individuaL As the lessee usualfy pays for the 
franchise^  mudi of foe Cfpital risk associated with the venture is removed and profit 
sharing usualfy ensures continued income without the associated management costs. The 
franchise qproach has been used extensively in clothes and health care retailing (e.g. 
Benneton and The Body Shop).
2 1
Joint ventures is the fourth of McGoldrick's cat^oiies. In this approach the organisation 
seeks a partner femiliar with, and operating in, the market in i^nch it wishes to enter. A 
conpaiQr is formed in which both partners invest risk cpital and jointly own shares. The 
benefit of this form of arrangement is that market penetration can be quick and less risky 
because of the overseas partners kwwiedge of the local maricets. The joint ownerdip of 
the enterprise increases control but also financial risks. As will be illustrated in a later 
chapter dealing with the history of J. Sainsbury, many of these partnerdbps prove 
difficult to mamtam in the long run and are often dissolved, or one partn^ buys out the 
other’s diares and takes conplete control This is not entirefy surprising as most retailers 
have a strong sense of corporate identity and are often managed ly  entrepreneurs with a 
singular view of business and how it should be managed.
The fifth spproadi to internationalisation is acquisition. This approach is often ftivoured 
by successful UK retailers wix> are seeking to establish an overseas presence quickly. 
Tbe cost and risk associated with this fpproach are high because the target for the 
acquisition is often an organisation that is trouble. The risk may also be associated with 
cultural issues and the acquirer's belief that the formula for success in one country will 
work in another. A good exanple of this approach was observed when Maiks and 
Spencer took over Brooks Brothers and Kings Supermarkets in the USA. It was several 
years before these enterprises made a contributfon to Madrs and Spencer's profits, 
^ th in  this strategic qproach may be part-acquisition as was the case ^ben Tesco took 
a significant foare of the Global food retail chain in Hungary.
The last of these international entry strategies is that of self-start entry. In this qproach 
the organisation starts fiom scratch and seeks to grow in reqx)nse to local maiket
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demands and opportunities. This is the highest risk option althou^ costs can be limited 
by restricting the size of the initial venture. Clearly this is not a strategy that would be 
pursued if an organisation were seeking rapid overseas maricet penetration. It does 
however give time to acquire knowledge of the overseas market and develop people to 
manage the overseas operations. Often quoted examples of this pattern of development 
are the early activities of Woolworth's in the UK and of Laura Ashley in the USA.
The strategies that McGoldrick outlines are essentially those of movement of either all or 
part of a trading format into the overseas market Other qproaches to 
internationalisation involve cross border trading alliances that are formed for other 
purposes (e.g. continent wide purchasing, logistical optimisation, product development 
or political lobbying). These alliances have been a feature of the development of the EC. 
A good exanple of such an alliance was described ly  Robinson and darke-EQU (1993, 
1995) and is shown in Figure 1.4 The main pardcpants in this alliance are the Argyll 
Group pic (Safbway), Ahold of the Netherlands and Group Casino of France. When the 
alliance was formed these three organisations exchanged shares (shown in percentages) 
of more or less equal value. Then together they ft>rmed the ERA (European Retail 
Alliance) with equal ownership, and in turn this took a 60% share in AMS (Associated 
Marketing Services). Considering the trading turnover of these three organisations, this 
alliance has very large buying power that is put to its member's advantage. Since its 
inception AMS has grown considerably and now has eight other organisations affiliated 
to it (Le. AUkauf (Germany), Superquinn (Ireland), Rinascente (Itafy), Kesco (Finland), 
Mercadona (Spam), J. M. R. Mariins (Ireland), Hagen (Norwfy) and ICA (Sweden)). 
Other alliance that involve UK ft>od retailers are BIGS (Spar UK), CEM (Booker), EMD 
(NISA), NAF (CWS UBp and SEDD (J. Sainsbury) [Source: Nielsen, 1995]. Because of
23
the cross share holding arrangements Robson and Cladce-HDl define these alliances as 
tight' alliances. Other looser' alliances are often associated with existing trading 
relatîonshÿs or because of the diversification and acquisitions that maiy of the large 
fixxl multÿles have undertaken. For exanple Sainsbury has a tight* alliance with 
Essehmga, Delhaize and Docks in SEDD. It also has loose' arrangements with the Retail 
Consortium (UK trading), the IGD (political lobbying) and GB Irmo of Belgium (DIŸ 
joint venturing within the Homebase fi>rmat). Full ownershq> of Shaws and partial
Ahold
3.8%
4.0%1.6%
1.6%
Group CasinoArgyll Group pic ^ _____
3 3 ^  33%
4.0%
33%
European Retail 
Association (ERA)
60%
Associated Marketing 
Services (AMS)
(Source: Robmscn & Clarke-Hill 1993)
Figure 1.4 The European Retail Alliance
ownershÿ of Giant in the USA gives it access to buying aDimces in the USA. Vlthinthe 
Homebase trading organisatmn there is also another loose co-marketing arrangement 
with Laura Ashlçy ftimishings. The alliance patterns of J. Sainsbury are not untypical of 
the conq)lexity of national and international trading that has been and continues to 
develop in the retailing business.
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L4 Summary
This introductory ch ^ e r clearty illustrates the con^lexity of the environment that 
influences the activity of the food retailing multçles. Internally the need to preserve 
margins by focusing on efSciency has been, and continues to be, a constant theme. 
Inqiroved margins means money for investors and money for development. Even though 
the traditional trading margin in the food retailer are low, the monies that pass through 
the multÿle food retailing system is huge. In 1994 Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway had a 
collective turnover of £24,572,000,000, with gross profit margins of £1,742,000,000 
(Source: Con^pany Reports and Accounts, 1994) - and even a small increase in efficiency 
will save a great deal of money. Investment in system efficiencies has historically given 
operational efficiency gams and inevitab^ this has meant an increase in productivity 
either through increasing t rading on the same number of enq>byees and sites, or 
maintaining the same level of trading with fewer enq>loyees. In the case of the food 
multÿles investmCTt in information systems technology has also been the base on i^nch 
overall growth has been built, maintained and controlled.
From a market point of view the food multÿles have been subject to both macro 
economic, micro economic and demogr^hic effects. It has been shown that changes in 
population density and location have greatly influenced the geogrsq)hical development of 
the food multiples. It has also been shown that the food multÿles have substantially 
changed the nature of many town centres as they have moved to edge of town or out of 
town locations. By making these changes in trading location the food multq>les have 
created new opportunities to broaden their food product and non food ranges. However, 
these opportunities have been led by the customer and changes in the customers life style. 
Clearty an astute marketing strategy is needed to respond to the changes and, as will be
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demonstrated in subsequent chapters, it is technology that siq>pHes the information to 
accurately monitor the changes as and vdien they occur.
By the 1980s the UK food retail market was sq>proaching saturation. The food retailing 
multq)les began to look abroad to achieve substantive growth. The ^>proach to 
internationalisation has been varied and usually focused on the perceived strengths of the 
individual multÿle. Sainsbury and Tesco have adopted an acquisition sqjproach in the 
belief that the formula for success in the UK would work on the continent and in the 
USA. In both cases severe losses were incurred and retail tactics had to be adapted to 
countries that were geographically larger, had lower gross margins and which had very 
different cultural traditions. Safeway chose a different route, fogtftaH of trying to trade 
abroad they used purchasing networks in the EC, and in doing so inproved their trading 
margins in the UK. Whatever the mistakes of the past when venturing abroad the 
continued pressure for growth is hkety to make international activities a substantial part 
of the food retailers strategy.
The public foce of the retailers is vàxat we can all see and judge, we know vhat attracts 
us to one retailer as opposed to another and we are c^)able of making subjective 
judgemoots, that are, after all, vhen collectively viewed, vhat constitutes a market The 
private fece of the retailers is very different and can be difficult to access. Within this 
private world conpetition is fierce with market share and profit performance the sulgect 
of intense scrutiny by the financial institutions and other shareholders. Food retailer 
strat^ies in particular are closely guarded secrets and these strategies must be designed 
to reqx)nd to the kinds of change and challenge that have been described in the final part 
of this chapter. These strategies, that allow a food retailer to exploit their maiket are
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expressed in several ways: the maiket sector or segment th ^  choose to trade in; yfbat 
kind of buildings and locations they use; the product mix they develop; the distribution 
systems they use; international activities; and of course the information systems they use 
to control and sipport their operational strategies and measure their core competences. 
The correct focus and the combination of these elements within an overall strategy can 
make a retailer successfiü nationally, but such success may be fleeting because the real 
retail battle is increasingly being fought locaiy as the laige food retailers vie for our 
individual custom. What will be subsequently be demonstrated, is how information 
technology has allowed general strategy to be deployed effectively vhËe at the same time 
maintaining the overall system operational efficiency and the advantages of economies of 
scale.
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Ck(g>ter2 
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews four broad areas of literature that are relevant to this research and 
to the business and operations of the food retailing muhples. The objectives o f this 
literature review are to identify the academic context within which this research sits, to 
provide evidence o f the originality o f this research, and to provide a conceptual 
frameworkfor the design o f the methodology.
The review begins by considering strategy as a broad directional concept derived in 
response to the maiket place, then strategy is considered in the context of a tool to 
develop core conpetences and conpetitive reponses. Finaiy strategy is examined ftom 
an operational point of view within the context of the food retailing environment. This 
part of the literature review provides a background against Wnch the strategic activities 
of the food multples may be evaluated. The second area of literature examined 
considers the relationshp between technology in a general sense and different apects of 
organisations. This literature is of value m evaluating the observations about 
technological developments in the different food retail multples and together with the 
literature on strategy it forms the main theoretical underpinning of the research. The 
third area of literature reviewed is that of performance measuremenL This wîU trace the 
way in vdnch the philosophy and practice of perfoimanceu measurement has changed. 
Given that performance measurement is a reflection of the strategy and objectives of an 
organisation (Neely, et al, 1996), this apect of the literature review will act as a useful 
flamewoik to understand the evolution of operational control systems that are a central 
to the retailers operational strategies and to this research. The fourth area of literature
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reviewed is that of the development of distribution systems. These systems are central 
to the operations of the food retailing multples, and an examination of the issues that are 
raised by this literature is an inportant background to the anaysis of the development of 
the retail control systems. The choice of literature reviewed in each of these areas is 
driven either by the need to establish a general intellectual ftamework for this research, 
or because the literature has a direct bearing on the structure of the research programme 
itself
Z2A review o f die literature on strategy
2.2.1 The evolution o f strategic concepts.
Strategy is a word derived from the Greek stratégia, meaning generalshp. A dictionary 
definition of strategy is -
"...the art of war, (the) management ofan army or armies in a campaign, 
art of so moving or disposing troops or shps or aircrafi; as to inpose 
ipon the enemy the place and time and conditions for fighting 
preferred by oneself"
(Concise Oxford English Dictionaiy, 1978, p. 1138)
The military context of the word strategy has been adapted within the past 30 years to 
include the activities of organisations in the business environment. In a recent definitfon 
of busings strat^y by Mintzberg and (ÿiinn (1991, p.5) the enemy has been iplaeed hy 
competitors in a maiket place, troops etc. have been rplaced by resources, but the focus 
of an opponent remains -
"...A strategy is a pattern or plan that integrates an organisation's major 
goals, policies, and action sequences into a cohesive i^ I e . A well 
formulated strategy hefos to marshall and allocate an organisation's
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resources into a unique and viable posture based on relative internal 
competencies and shortcoming, anticpated changes in the environment, 
and contingent moves by intelligent opponents j*
V%hin these definitions there are several in-built assumptions. The first is that there is a 
cohesive and normative control structure; the second is that the field of operations can be 
cleary defined; the third is that an organisation can effect outcomes in the environment m 
which it operates; the fourth is that the environment in which the organisation operates 
is governed by the rule of logic; and finaiy that cause and effect within the environment 
can be measured. The extent to winch these assunptions are true has a great inpact 
ipon the nature of the strategy that an organisation pursues.
The military context of the definition of strategy invokes the idea of the great fixed piece 
battles of the past - Agincourt, Waterloo, the Somme - in \rinch generals positioned 
troops and resources to gain the best attacking position and make best use of their 
resources. When the battle began the cohesion oftfae general strategy often deteriorated 
as hand to hand fighting commenced. What mattered then was the General's tactical 
ability to read events and repond in an ppropriate way (Keegan, 1978, pp.45-54). Are 
these mftitaiy patterns of réponse of relevance to the organisations who operate in 
competitive market environments?
The answer to this question for the eary business strategy theorists seemed to be yes. 
Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965), Sloan (1963), and more latey Porter (1980, 1985) are 
all in the Classical traditfon of strategic theorists. This has beai described by 
Whittington (1994) as being rooted in the formal tradition of business and being driven 
ly  a profit maximisation rationale. Within this perpective the focus for strategy is the
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internal working of the organisation and a rational planning process that is influenced 
greatly by an analytical-economic perspective. Chandler and Ansoffi with their 
intellectual roots in America's Ivy League colleges, and Sloan influenced by his 
eperience in the ipper realms of big business, were attracted by the view that strategic 
planning was to be undertaken away flom the workplace, just as the military might plan 
their canpaigns away flom the battlefield. Porter is included with the classical strategy 
theorists because his "value chain analysis" approach to creatmg conpetitive advantage 
relies greatly upon a mechanistic view of internal systems and an underlying assunption 
of rational-economic behaviour within the system and in the maiket place. ^%h 
hindsight the main shortcoming of the classical strategists is the naive and deterministic 
view they took of the social side of organisations.
By the late 1960s academics were seriously questioning the classical approach to strategy 
and Ansoff (1967) began to distance himself fium some of his eary writing. Vider 
observafions of managers, organisations and markets that were centred on research by 
the American Carnegie School, led to a view that organisations are very conplex social 
entities often defying rational analysis. The Carnegie School of researchers concluded 
that it is the maiket environment that determines strategy rather than managers. The 
classical view of strategy was also challenged by Cyert and March as earfy as 1963, who, 
together with Herbert Simon, developed vdiat subsequaity became known as the 
Processucd approach to strategy. Vlthin this perpective the view of the strategist 
changed from someone who can anafyse and mould the future with certainty to someone 
Wx) works within the Kmit o f  his or her own abilities, accepting reasonable solutions 
rather than ideal solutions, and being led by their own biases rather than some Ofynpian 
ideal Strategy generated within this perpective becomes a "micro-political' conpromise
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that satisfices rather tlm  proft maximises and ^ hich exists as'adptive rationality. This 
theme has continued to attract the attention of strategists and the expression logical 
incrementaHsm' was coined ly  Quinn (1980) to describe this process of strategic 
plamnng. Nelson and Vinter (1982) further developed the adptive rationality theme 
and suggested that the compromise process, over time, becomes an "heuristic programme' 
within the psyche of the management team. This heuristic programme is bounded hy an 
organisations routines and norms eventualfy leading to the state where it is the 
programme that dictates strategy rather than individual decisions. Mintri)erg (1987) 
likened this process to that of a craftsman moulding clay to form a vessel The craftsman 
moulds the clay using intellect and hands in harmony in a process of constant adaptatioiL 
He argued that the world is too full of change and surprises to have a fixed strategy and a 
long term plan.
Qosefy allied to the Processucd pproach to strategy is the Evolutionary pproach that 
influenced much of the academic thiniring in the 1980s. As with the processual theorists 
the underfying belief in this philosophy is that it is markets not managers ^ u> determine 
strategy. However, the Evolutionists have a more fetahstic view of the market place and 
insist that in a Darwinian sense only the fittest survive. This philosophy owes much to 
the economist's view of the maiket place (Hall & Ifitch, 1939, Alchian, 1950, Friedman, 
1953, Henderson, 1979) in which survival depends ipon the successful exploitation of a 
market niche rather than a grand strategy. In this perpective the role of the manager 
becomes that of maiket interpreter, monitor of internal processes and selector of the 
"fittest' (however that is iuterpieted). Henderson eventually became one of the founders 
of the mfluenrifl] Bostou Consulting Groip (BCG), i^iose matrix relatiog maiket share to
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Figure 2.1 The Boston Consulting Group Matrix
mariœt growth (Fig. 2.1), infiuenced much strategic thiniring in the 1980s. This matrix 
enabled managers to analyse organisations, recognise their current state of evolution (Le. 
Dogs (about to expire). Cash Cows (to be milked). Rising Stars (to be encouraged) and 
Question Maries (needing direction)), and manage the next transition.
The Evolutionary view of strategy is inherently pessimistic and paints a picture of 
organisations as transient entities that survive and prosper only as long they can exploit a 
marieet niche. This view has a resonance with the Boston Matrix philosophy and is 
described by Whittington (1994, p.20) in the following way:
".. JSvohitionists not only insist that markets are typical^ too 
conq)etitive for expensive strategizing and too predictable to 
outguess. They also hold that markets are too efBcient to 
permit the creation of any sustainable advantage. In a 
conq>etitive environment, elaborate strategies can only deliver 
a tenoporary advantage: competitors wiH be quick to imitatft
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and erode ear^ benefits."
This reductionist view inevitably leads to a downgrading of strategy per se and rplaces it 
with a relativistic view of the organisation and the environment WîlKamsnn (1991) 
epitomised this view vfoen he suggested that economy is the best strategy and that the 
only real conpetitive advantage an organisation can have in a given market niche is to be 
more efScient than its conpetitors.
A fourth view of strategy that has been hrfluential among the strategists in the 1990s is 
the Systemic approach. Central to this view of strategy is Granovetter (1985), Swedberg 
et al (1987) and Whittington's (1992) theories that as people woric and live in a social 
web of relationshps tha t not only involve their immediate work and fondly connections, 
but also wider relationships involving the state, professional, educational, religious and 
ethnic connections. The Systemicists argue that the concept of right and wrong 
behaviour, of appropriateness of goals and of concepts of good and bad strategies can 
only have any meaning within the overall social framework in which organisations and 
people operate. This is certainly an interesting view and ample evidence can be found to 
sipport their contention. For instance it was noted ly  Logothesis (1992, pp.20-21) how 
difficult it has been to transfer some Japanese business methods (e.g. Total Quality 
Managemmit) to western conpanies and Pascale (1982) pointed out that the Japanese do 
not have a phrase for 'corporate strategy* and that as a concept it may only be a 
phenomenon of western cultures. Boyacigiller and Adler (1991) enphasised this '^ foen 
they suggested that strategy can not have any true meaning in societies such as 
fimdHTTientjiKsA MusKms \vho belfeve that life follows a preordained path set by God, or 
the Chinese vfbo believe in 'Joss' - a combination of hick and fote. This is not to suggest 
that aU organisations or individuals within any given system will behave in the same way.
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rather it would suggest that pluralism creates unique opportunities and markets that can 
be exploited by those with the resources and inclination to do so.
The Classical, Processual, Evolutionary and Systemic qproaches to strategy parallel the 
shift in general management theory fiom the unitary to pluralistic view of organisational 
life. However, they are not the only way of analysing strategy. Bailey and Johnson (see 
Faulkner and Johnson, 1992, pl47 et seq.) identified two other approaches - the Political 
and the Visionary views. The Political view, that has its roots in the work of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), Jemison (1981) and Freeman (1984), suggests that m most 
organisations strategy is influenced by the interplay between the internal and external 
stake-holders. The extent to vdnch external stake-holders can influence strategy depends 
ipon power relationships that may not sioply be economic (e.g. shareholders), they may 
also be political in the broadest sense (e.g. legiriation). The Political view of strat^y 
intellectually sits between the Processual and Systemic views of strategy. Finally comes 
the Visionary view of strategy that draws on the work of Trice and Beyer (1986), 
Conger and Canungo (1987) and Bennis and Nanus (1985). The Visionary view 
postulates that strategies are often the result of an individual view of the future. The 
'view* may be derived fiom entrepreneuriaHsm or fiom a perspective that challenges 
accepted norms. However it is generated, it becomes adopted ly  the management of the 
oigansation, and can beneficially affect that organisation's market performance. As a 
theory of strategy this is difficult to place accurately although it most logically sits 
between the Systemic and Evolutionary views.
Taken as a vdiole it is clear that the view of strategy has changed quite radically fiom the 
1960s. There has been a move away from the comforting view that life can be planned
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and organised, and will unfold in a predictable way, to a view that organisations respond 
to the market in unpredictable ways. This latter uncertainty has caused many theorists to 
question i^iiether there is such a thing a strategy at all Henry hûotzberg (1994, p.416), 
concludes:
"...Through all the 61se starts and excessive Aetoric, we have 
certainly learnt i^iat planning is not and ^ la t it cannot do. But 
we also have learned vâist planning is and can do, and perhaps 
of greater use, what planners can do beyond planning. We have 
also learned about our need to solidify our descrÿtive 
understanding of complex phenomena - and to 6ce iq) to our 
ignorance about them - before we go into prescrqytioiL"
Bailey and Johnson (see Faulkener and Johnson, 1992) are more positive than Mintd)erg 
and suggest that strategies are rarely rooted in a single strategic philosophy but in foct 
often enconq>ass elements ftom several philosophies in different measures. They 
represent this diagrammatically in Figure 2.2.
In Figure 2.2 the terms ^Political' and Wisionarÿ have already been described. Other 
terms have a direct equivalence to concepts already discussed. For ^Logical 
incrementalism' read Trocessual', for 'Cultural' read 'Systemic', for 'Natural Selection' 
read "Evolutionaiÿ and for Tlanning' read 'Classic'. For a given company, this diagram is 
constructed following the conq>letion of a management questionnaire. The relative 
position of the points either side of the 'zero' circle indicates the propensity of the 
management team to embrace or eschew a particular strategic phftDsoplgr. The overall 
profQe (shown as a dotted fine) gives an indication of the dominant strategic style of the
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organisation at a point in time. Clearfy this pragmatic view leads to the conclusion that 
strategy will change as managers change and as organisations evolve through time.
Logical Incrementalism
14
Planning
Natural
Selection
Political
Cultural
Visionary
The dotted line defines the organisation 
strategic profile
Source : Bailey & Johnson (op d t, pl50)
Figure 2.2. Strat^c dedsion-makiug profile
In contrast to many of the strategic theories that have been previously described, and 
which are predicated on a dominant relationship between the organisation strategy and 
the market environment, in recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in 
strategies that are based on internal competencies and resources. This interest has been 
stimulated by the observations of Prahalad and Hamel (1989) of the success of 
companies such as Honda, K Mart, Canon and 3M. These companies derived much of 
their success hy developing and e3q>biting distinctive or core concpetenc^ and resources 
that competitors find difficult to emulate. For instance  Canon sell their laser engine to 
many makers of laser printers. Because they can make the laser engine cheaper and more
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reliable, due to core conpetences in electronics and laser technology, laser printer 
manu&cturers would find it sinpfy not worth making the investment to develop this 
technology themselves. Therefore Canon dominate this particular market.
The definition of distinctive or core competence varies greatly. Andrews (in Learned et 
al 1969, pp.179-182) defined distinctive conpetence as:
"... The 'distinctive conpetence' competence of an organisation is more 
than vâaat it can do; it is i%hat it can do particular^ well"
Prahalad and Hamel (1996, p.223) defined it as:
"... a bundle ofddDs and technologies... it represents the sum of learning 
across individual skill sets and individual organisational units"
At a conceptual level these definitions are easy enough to understand although Mintzberg 
(1994) criticised them as being too vague. He argued that ^ la t might constitute a core 
conpetence in one set of circumstances may be a weakness in another set of 
circumstances. Qrant (1991, pp.124-127), recognising the same problem proposed that 
the concept of core competence needs to be refined. He suggested a combination of 
durability, transforaWhty, tranq)arency and replicability , were the keys to conpedtive 
advantage:
1. Durability - the rate at i^nch an organisations resources and 
cspabilities dqxredate or become obsolete.
2. Transferability - imitation requires resources and capabilities 
that can be fixmsed on a market for a competitive challeDge.
Most resources and capabilities are not fi»efy transforable.
3. Transparency - the ability of the firm to maintain conpetitive 
advantage depends ipon the speed at i^ dnch opponents can
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assess an organisations conpetitive advantage and how it is 
being achieved.
4. Replicability - an organisation may acquire resources or 
capabilities through internal investment, but it is harder to 
acquire cspabOities based on highly complex organisational 
routines.
Coincident with these concepts of core conpetence is the resource theory of the firm. 
Originally the resource theory of the firm was based in the thinking of the Austrian 
school of the 1870s and of Schunpeter (1934). The general argument of the Austrian 
school was that competitive advantage rose fix>m the market processes and market 
dynamics. It focused on entrqneneurial discovery, disequilibrium in markets, and time 
related difierences of firm's perceptions of sources of profit - particular^ those Actors 
that were specific and unobservable. Penrose (1959, p.l37) argibd strongly that it was a 
combination of productive resources and management e3q>erience that defines the 
resource base of an organisation!
"... In the bng run profitability, survival and growth of a firm does 
not depend so much on efficiency with vrinch it is abb to organise the 
productbn of even a widely diversified range of products as it does on 
the ability to estabHA... wide and relafivefy inpr^nabb "bases" fix>m 
which it can a d ^  and extend its opérations... to a changing world.
It is not the scab of production nor even, within limits, the size of the 
firm, that are the most inportant considerations, but rather the basb 
positbn it is abb to establish for itself"
This theme was echoed by Peteraf who in 1993 suggested that sustainabb conpetitive 
advantage came through establishing resources and systems that cannot be fully imitateH
39
or substituted; ensuring the tntrinsic nature of the firms resources are based on tacit 
knowledge that is not fiilfy mobile; and, Wiere there is limited conpetition the firm has 
the hick or foresight in generating the resource. Clearfy the concqit of the'resource'was 
becoming better understood in two senses. The first was the strategic importance of the 
"unique resource' as an eaploitable feature of the organisation in giving conpetitive 
advantage, and the second was a better understanding of Wiat "uniqueness' actually was. 
These ideas are refined by the work of Teece et al (1992) in what they called the dynamic 
capabilities approach. The dynamic capabilities approach clarifies the relationships 
between the various internally fi>cused strategic elements, and identifies the inportance 
of developing resources and conpetences to maintain or inprove a market positioii. The 
definitions that Teece et al proposed are summarised in Table 2.1.
Factors of 
production
These are process inputs that are available in a disaggr^ated form in factor 
markets wifo non-specific use, e.g. land, unskilled labour, monqr.
Resources Resources are hear unique' organisation pacific assets foat are not easily 
transferred because of cost or tacit knowledge^  e.g. patents, tradenunks, 
experienced engineers, specialised production or service facilities.
Competences When organisation specific assets are int^rated to perform distinctive activities, 
then faese activities are organisational competences, e.g. pedal quality cpability, 
miniaturisation, systems int%ration.
Core conpetences Gore conpdences are those associated with die survival of the organisation. IhQ^  
tend to define, and be defined by the market in which the organisation operate.
Dynamic
cpabOities
The ability of the organisation to renew, augment or adopt rt*s core competences 
overtime.
Products 
(or services)
These are the outputs of the organisation fiiat are based on utilising the 
competences it has. Conpetitive position will depend upon how wdl the 
competences are u ^  in comparison to competitors vfao source in foe same 
markets.
(Adapted from Teece et al, 1992)
Table 2.1. Competence and related definitions
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NfiDs (1996, p. 10) observed that one of the values of Teece et al's q>proach is that the 
definition of the product (or service) is useful in defining i^iat resources, conpetences 
and cpabOities are not
When considering the strategy creation concepts and processes two underlying themes 
are evident. The first is that strategy is not an abstract construct, it exists because a 
groip of people or an organisation wish to change, to grow, or to survive in a market 
The strategy is a rough, long term plan that tries to make the best use of internal 
resources (e.g. people, technology, systems), and competences (core or otherwise) to 
exploit market opportunities that are coincident with their objectives. Because the 
strategy is by nature a long term phenomenon, and because resources and conpetences 
change with time, it is vital for management to constant^ tppraise and ipdate internal 
and external dianges with long term corporate objectives in mm&
The second theme that emerges is that whatever the philosophical belief that is used in 
the process of constructing a strategy it cannot be divorced fix)m the core c^>abilities of 
the orgazdsatioiL Meyer and Utterbeck (1993) defined these as:
1. Product (or service) technology cspability.
2. Customer needs understanding capability.
3. Distribution charnel c%»bility.
4. Manu&cturing (or service delivery) ctpabOity.
Strong capabilities lead to strong products and services, weak cpabilities lead to weak 
products and services. The inpHcation o f this that organisational c^xibiHties and 
conp^ences wiU shape strategy and enable strategy. This is one of the central concepts 
at the heart of this research.
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2.2.2 The background to retailing stratèges.
Although the concept of trading is based in antiquity, the concept of the modem retailer 
selling ftom a shop rather than^a madcet stall began in the earfy hftddle Ages (circa 1000 
AD.) in the UK. Urbanisation created towns and cities and an emergent merchant class 
Wio bought, tranported and sold commodities. Prior to this period the primary means 
of exchanging goods was the weekfy market or annual Airs at i^bich bartering or 
exchange took place. Once established, the merchants traded m a wide range of 
commodities. As sources of sippfy became more reliable, pecialist shops began to 
emerge and even to cluster geographically in large conurbations. Davis (1966) pointed 
out that it was not unusual to find ten or twenty shops selling one product or service in a 
street - a pattern still found today in some cities such as London (e.g. the tailors of 
SaviHe Row, shirt makers of Jermyn Street and doctors in Harley Street). There are still 
roads named after the pedaHsts who pHed their trade in the middle ages. In London 
there is Butchers Row, Poultry Lane and Bread Street; in Northanpton, Gold Street; and 
in Chester, Weavers Street. Similar examples can be found in medieval towns 
throughout the UK This pattern of penalisation has survived to the present day the 
onfy difiEerence being that modem peciaHsts are often national rather than local 
enterprises.
From these earfy beginnings through to the late Victorian tsnes, the concpt of a retail 
strategy would have been considered bizarre by the majority of retailers. Strategies were 
essentially military phenomena and strategic wisdom confined to the depbyment of 
armies and conquaing or deciding countries. Ownershp o f  shops often remained m the 
hands of one Annfy for generations and earfy retaS. devebpment usually took place 
around the traditional market place with shop owners often having stalls on the market
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(Wild and Shaw, 1979, pp.35-44; Philips, 1992). Occasionally in a large city one person 
may have owned two or three shops. Sometimes people owned shops in adjacent cities 
and towns. But these were the exception rather than the rule. For the most part shops 
remained a small unit in a retail cluster or on a thorough&re, with the owner living above 
the shop. Because of this parochial view (and limited opposition), retailers rarely 
required more than a tactical ppreciation of what distant opponents were doing.
The core of retailing never changes - buying chep and selling dear - but the mechanisms 
of retailing do and the first changes to herald the modem retailing were threefold. Carter 
and Lewis (1990, p54 et seq.) defined these as the emergence of the lock-p riiop that 
was not the residence of the owner, the department store; and, the multple retailer. 
Jeffreys (1954, p.l5) found that by 1911, continuing a trends that had been ongoing for 
at least half a century, 28 percent of retail premises were lock-p shops that could be 
fieefy traded as going concerns or as premises for speculation. This condition permitted 
the breakdown of traditional owner-occupier trading patterns allowing growth through 
amalgamation and acquisitioiL Around the end of the 1800s, at the same time as the 
owner-occtpier pattem was breaking down, new retail formats were being tried. One of 
the most interesting was that of the department store. Shaw (1992) identified two basic 
configurations. The first was of a collection of independent retailers trading under one 
roof The second was a single owner operating different retail apects in different part of 
a building. Some of these dpartment stores grew very large indeed and the 'shopping 
under one roof formula proved to be enduring. Most msyor cities still have department 
stores that can trace their origins back to this period in retail history, for exanple 
Owen-Owen, Harrods, Fenwicks, Dickens & Jones, Marshall & SneHgrove and the John 
Lewis Partnershp. Multple retailers (multples) emerged around the mid 1800s usually
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as the result of. retail families setting p  shops in close geogrphical proximity. This 
pattem of shop ownershp was in evidence during the earfy stages of Sainsbury's 
development (Appendix 1). By and large these early multples were general grocery 
stores (e.g. Lptons and Home & Colomal), but the patterns of pecialisation emerged 
and by the end of the 19th century there were well established multiples operating in as 
diverse field as footwear - Freeman, Hardy & ^MUis, and proprietary medicines - Jesse 
Boot the Chemist. As a retail format multples have undoubtedly been the most 
successfiil aixi enduring.
Of these three retail formats it is probably the growth of multples, particular^ in the post 
World War 2 periods, that has stimulated the need for retail strategies. The reason for 
this lies in the presence of large and well organised opposition, particularly in the food 
retail sector. Wth such opposition it was no longer possible to rely on tactics for 
survivaL
2.2.3 Emergpigfood multiple retail strategies
Powell (1991, p.155-157) argued that there could only be three retailing strategies. 
Expansion in one market sector, diversification between market sectors, or a combination 
of both. In making this assertion Powell was echoing the early woric of Ansoff (1965), 
and, it could be argued, oversinplifying the nature of retail strategies. In truth, PowelTs 
assertion has some validity iMken considered in the light of the early development of 
multple fixxl retailing. Indeed a conparison of the development of Tesco and J. 
Sainsbury ip  to 1950 (Appendix 1) would tend to confirm this view. Knee and Walters 
(1985, pp. 1-9), in exploring the work of Yavitz and Newman (1982), Shirley et al (1981)
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and Hofer and Schendel (1978), suggest that a more acceptable (and subtle) definition of 
retail strategy is a combination o£
a. a predetermined direction by i^hich short term fluctuations 
might be avoided,
b. a qualitative statement concerning the 'quality and texture' 
of the business,
c. a longer term plan that sets the direction and tone of riiorter 
range plans,
d. a means of integrating functional activities, setting priorities 
and weighing risks,
e. a statement wfrdch must communicate and motivate as well 
as integrate fimctional activities.
In short, they argue, strategies must define an organisation's relationshp with it's 
environment in terms of customer mix, product mix, the geographical Kmits of operation, 
the organisation's conpetitive emphasis, and finally the performance criteria by wfoich it 
is to be judged. Contextually the ^nft in emphasis between Powell and Knee and Walters 
is that between the Classical and Processual qproaches to strategy.
An additional issue that Knee and Walters raise in the retailing context is the need to 
differentiate between strategy and policy in retailing. They suggest that there is a great 
deal of confusion between these two concepts in the retail environment Conventional 
wisdom, perceives policy as "the nature of a firm's involvement with its environment". 
Policy would nommlly address issues such as market portioning, operational control, 
geogr^hical coverage, outlet size and location, financing, growth, merchandising, 
pricing, advertising and promotion. Clearly all of these policies cannot have the same
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weighting and it may he necessary to subdivide these policies into corporate policies that 
dictate an organisation's position in a market, and fimctional policies that create a 
fiamework in wfoich operating decisions can be evaluated. In general, corporate policies 
will dictate overall direction for an organisation, wfoereas fimctional policies will dictate 
the approach to some of the tactical issues such as merchandising and advertising. In a 
nutshell then, strategy is related to targets, and policy is how you achieve them. The 
outcome of strat%y is success in your chosen market, the outcome of policy is the 
harmonious and efficient rise of resources to realise the strategy.
The great problem in ascribing strategies to the large food retailers is that they are very 
reluctant to discuss (except at a very general level) what their precise strategies are at 
any given time. Fortunately Tesco, J. Sainsbury and the Argyll Groip are all large 
corporations and fix>m direct and indirect sources it is possible to deduce in fairly broad 
terms what their strategies probably are. Also, because they are such inportant 
organisatfons, their activities and market place attracts the attention of marry informed 
researchers, observers and aiiafysts. These people and organisations (e.g. the IGD) 
publish literature and market analyses that enables realistic estimates about retailer 
strategies to be made. Historically this has not always been the case and the strategies 
that were pursed by the retailers in question (assuming they actually had a strategy) can 
onfy be reahsticalfy deduced through a stwfy of their history.
2.2.4 Searching for retail stratèges
The histories of J. Sainsbiny, Tesco and the Argyll Groip are very different, although 
th ^  have aH ended conpeting in the same market segment and all have a substantial 
share of this market An examination of the growth patterns (Figure 2.3) of the three
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companies reveals some of the strategic problems the companies have been 6cing as they 
have developed. Up to 1940 Sainsbury had been growing quite steadily but this growth 
was disnqjted by the war. Austerity after the war held back Anther growth and then the 
need to modernise in the 1950s and 1960s took most of the company’s development 
capital In this period Sainsbury must have been well aware of Tesco's meteoric growth 
(in the number of shops but not in turnover terms). The gravest danger this represented 
to Sainsbmÿs was that Tesco, in acquiring a large number of stores, was in effect sitting 
on a vast capital reserve that was rapidly increasing in value. Clearly when this capital 
was released Tesco would be able to fimd expansion without significant borrowing. This 
would certainly wrong-foot Sainsbury strategically at a tim e wfoen the cost of each new 
store was increasing r^ndly and there was an urgent need to obtain coital for growth.
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Fig. 23  Growth patterns of Salnsbaiy, Tesco and Argyll
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Substantial borrowing would have eroded the profit margin of the conçany and foflure to 
invest would have opened the market door to Tesco and the emerging Safeway. It is 
probably significant that in the early 1970s many of the old directors of Sainsbury retired 
paving the way fer the sale of 10m Sainsbury pic shares that raised £450m in growth 
co ital This money was used to fund the growth and diversificatioiL In particular the 
conpaiiy wished to begin an internationalisation programme through the acquisition of 
Shaw’s in the USA.
Tesco early growth fe&owed a gtmibir pattem to that of Sainsbury fiom 1920 to 1940. 
However, the War that severely afiected Sainsbury did not have such a pronounced 
effect on Tesco as they had fewer stores. In 1950 Tesco began aggressively acquiring 
other multÿle retailers. Most of the acquisitions were achieved through share issues. 
Although these had the effect of diluting the ownershÿ of Tesco, Cohen (the Managing 
Director and founder of Tesco) near^ atws^ made sure that the majority shareholders 
became executives in the Tesco entire. This had two effects. The first was the removal 
of the threat of a groiq) of e3q>erienced people setting iq) in opposition to Tesco. The 
second effect was to inqx>rt entrepreneurial and administrative skills in to the conq)any. 
By 1970 Tesco owned over 834 stores. Unfortunately many of these stores were not 
suitable for the modem srpermadtet format of trading, but their disposal provided capital 
for subsequent store and infiastructure renovation during the 1970s. Sales of older 
stores and the building of new stores continued into the 1980s and 1990s and ly  1996 
Tesco had overtaken Sainsbury to become market sector leader.
Although Safeway/Arg)dl on^ began trading in the 1960s, they achieved a significant 
market position in a remarkabfy short time. The origins of the Argjdl Grotq) are
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complicated and begin in the early 1970s wben Oriel Foods Ltd. - food manufacturer was 
formed. Through a series of sales and acquisitions (described in detail in Chapter 4) 
Safeway pic emerged. Considering the supermarket base fiom which they started (8 
stores in 1971 that traded under the Safeway name), Argyll have managed to erqrand the 
Safeway format stores remarkably quickly. The cash base for these activities seems to 
have been derived fiom general share issues and this is refected in the make of the 
shareholders (see Table 2.2). It would seem that the banks have been instrumental in the 
growth of the Argyll Group and this ought not to be too surprising when one consideFS 
the amount of money the retailers in general handle each year.
Shardidder
categoiy
Sainsbury
%
Tesco
%
Argyfl
%
Banks 3331 5.5* 68.1
Insurance Companies 5.69 10* 102
Investment Companies 0.06 60* 02
Other Companies 5.76 8* 8.5
Pension Funds 4.54 4* 43
Universities etc. 3.4
Individuals 50.64 12.5 5.3
(Source: Company Rqxxts and Accounts)
* Estimated on the basis of previous annual rqxHts and the 'Size of Share holding' analysis
Table 2.2 Share holding ana^is 1994
The patterns of development of the three conq>anies refect the broad changes that were 
taking place in the food retailing maricet place and the ever mcreasing variety of produce 
sold. The vagaries of growth are more attributable to the managers of the conpanies 
than any other single fector. In strategic terms it appears that Sainsbury's strategies were 
initially of the Visionary type and subsequently became Processual wfoen John Sainsbury 
relinquished control to his family as the conpany and market matured. A snnilar pattern
49
of strategy development can be observed with Tesco except that Jack Cohen did not 
leave his enpire to a dynasty. However, the directors who took over in Cohen's wake 
behaved in a similar way to Sainsbury by instituting a broad based Board to guide the 
conpany into the fidure. The strategy of Argyll is more puzzling. It was not dominated 
by one person but was driven by a team of people with a strong formula for success. In 
many respects the early pattem of development is reminiscent of the Classical strategists. 
In later times the strategy has become more Processual as the conparÿs activides have 
become more dominated by the activities of the Safeway stores. From time to timft it has 
seemed that other generic strategies have been in evidence but more often than not this 
has been a reflection of the operational strategies that the companies have been pursuing.
2.2.5 Retailing operational stratèges
Assuming that growth is the generic strategy that paints broad brush strokes on the 
canvass of multple retailing, the operational strategies fiU in the detail to complete the 
picture. Operational strategies are required to establish a ftmcrional ftamework for these 
very large organisations and to guide medium to ^ r t  term responses to market changes. 
Walters (1988, p.ll2) suggested that conpetitive advantage in retailing relies to a 
greater extent upon relative difierentiation in two broad areas - productivity and 
marketing. He argues that most retailers wiU align their medium and short term 
strategies within these two broad parameters according to the degree of risk foey 
consider to be acceptable. Productivity differentiation strat^ies he identifles as low risk 
because they address internal issues that are broadly within managerial control 
Marketing differentiation stratèges he considers to be higher risk as the elements in the 
trading environment they address are inherently mpredictable. Productivity 
differentiation can include:
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a. cost management and tigjbtly controlled budgets,
b. efficient distribution systems,
c. effective sipph^ chain management,
d. optimal store design,
e. use of economies of scale.
Mariœting differentiation can include -
L using customer information to refine market approach,
Ü matching product profiles to customer requirements, 
in. pricing policy,
iv. value adding customer services,
V. niche market location, 
v i strong customer fianchise, 
vn. location advantage,
viiL market share volume that discourages competitive challenges.
In itttlrirtg these assertions Walters is following in the tradition of Davidson and Doody 
(1966) and Ansoff (1965) v/bo linked ride with differentiation in the market place. The 
difference between Walters and Ansoff revolvps around their interpretation of the 
managanent of ride. Ansoff in the Classical strategic tradition believed that risk could 
be contained by managing the internal organisation processes, whereas Walters was 
clearly havering between the Processualists and the Evolutionists in believing that risk 
can be managed by identifying and defending a market niche. The problem to be 
resolved in practical terms is how much risk can be tolerated by the retailer and i^iat the 
risk -p^ff matrix looks like in the real world. Knee and Walters (1985) suggested that 
risk increases in predictable ways depending upon the size of the planning g ^  (strategy 
shift) fiiat was being contemplated. Their ideas are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
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Fignre 2.4. Alternative methods of fUHng the planning gap
The matrix on the left hand size of Figure 2.4 identifies the main options that retailers 
have in the short and medium temL Tactics associated with increasing volume are 
decreasing costs, decreasing prices, or, outlet rationalisation. Tactics to achieve margin 
inqnevements are decreasing costs, increasing prices and rationalising product ranges. 
These are low to medium risk strategies and tactics that will oniy partially close the 
planning gap ly  meeting current planning requirements, consolidating market position 
and inqïroving productivity. If these tactics and strat^ies wiU not close the planning 
gap, then more extreme measures wiU be needed - and of course higher risks will have to 
taken. On one hand they suggest that change can be driven by product producers, and 
on the other driven by maricet segmentation. The outcome of either of these wiU result 
initially in market repositioning, and if carried to the logical conclusion, in 
diversification. Diversifcation may require a conq>letely new organisation and outlet
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oetwoik, or extensive ledefimtioii of current operations. These are high risk options. A 
neutral and medium risk option that is often used hy retailers is to partial^ adjust their 
product and market position more or less contirruous^rixaintairmiga satisficing profile.
Target oistoniergqup
Merchandising
strategy
Added
Trading
style/
format
[Strategy
Company’s
market
positicniing
service
strategy
Customer
communications
strategy
Target customer grotq>
(Source: Walters 1988, p.ll9)
Figure 2.5 Relationship between market positioning, added value and (sub)
strategic decision areas
The structure of the sub-strategies is of critical importance-in addressing the scope and 
range of change. The precise mix of sub-strat^ies an organisation chooses is determined 
by the market niche the retailer is addressmg. By optimising the sub-strategies on a 
target customer groiq> a retailer is optimising value added ft>r retailer and customer, and
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at the same time effective^ precluding a competitor fiom entering the market niche. 
Waters proposes a model based on four sub-strategies and this is illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
The four sub-strategies are customer communications, customer service, trading style 
and merchandising. Customer cointnunications deal with the ways in vdnch the 
organisation informs the customer about the availability of products and services 
(advertising, promotions, and media management). Trading style deals with the physical 
image of foe company (house livery, store layout and store locations). Customer service 
deals with additional services that can be ofiered within the same retailing format 
(pharmacy, dry cleaning, post offices, bakery, delicatessen, petrol station and coffee 
shop). Merchandising deals with the range and presentation of the products offered to 
the customer. The better these foctors are co-ordinated, the stronger the conq)aiÿs 
market position and the better the value added profile becomes.
2.2.6 Summary
One remaricahle aspect of the general literature on strategy is how little debate has 
centred on the inq)act of technology on strategy. In the military context the technology 
of war has changed strategy consistently. The long bow gave the English arrry a 
significant advantage at the Battle of Agincourt; the flintlock gave Cromwell a significant 
advantage over the slow fuse muskets of the Royalists; history is littered with similar 
examples. Each of these technological developments changed the ways battles were 
structured and fo u ^  by giving one side a marginal advantage that could be successful^ 
eq)loited by an astute general Even though parallel exairples exist in the commercial 
milieu - the evolution of the production line; the irrvention of plastics; the transistor; the 
integrated circuit - the strategic theorists until recently have chosen to interpret these 
innovations as being enabling rather than driving strategy. Reality is somewhat different
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and it can be demonstrated that many of these innovations either created new markets or 
stimulated the evolution of older markets, and as such promoted new strategies rather 
than enabled old strategies.
Anotha explanation of the apparent disinterest of researchers on the technology - 
strategy relationship may be that much of the strategic theory is about the process of 
making strategy rather than strategic outcomes. From this perpective prevailing 
attitudes are more understandable as technology is likely to be viewed as a tool rather 
than a diaper of strategy. While this attitude is understandable in the historic context 
Wien technology was unsophisticated, it is less understandaWe today when technology is 
used to create and manage the multi-million dollar businesses, and new concepts of 
business based not on a real world but on a virtual world of the Internet These 
innovations are challenging the very concept of strategy that is predicated on the 
traditional ideas of an organisation.
The second aspect of the literature review examined the way in which retailers have 
translated strategic thought into generic strategies and eventual^ operational strategies. 
Observations based on the history of Sainsbury, Tesco and the Argyll Group indicate the 
inportance of the ability (or hick) of management and of vision. Vision seems to play a 
large role in whether or not a retailer succeeds or fails, but this vision needs to be 
tenpered by a detailed understanding of the market place and of the customer's needs. It 
seems clear that good management by itself is not sufficient The web of inter-linked 
operational strategics needs to be elose^ controlled and tuned if it is to succeed. 
Whatever the faults of John Sainsbury or Jack (üohen, they had this vision, Wnch coupled 
with hard work and tenacity built up large food retailing enpires. ArgylTs place in the
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triumvirate of large food retailers is very much the result of a more modem management 
style. Their moves have been at times been carefoUy plotted and at other times 
opportunistic. The unseen players Arg}dl's success are the banking shareholders Wk> 
allowed them to issue shares (and dilute ownafop) to fond expansion deals.
In the formative years of all three companies the underpinning strategy of the 
organisations was growth in the UK. In more recent years the emphasis has been upon 
growth in international markets as the home market became saturated. While Sainsbury 
have looked to the USA., Tesco and the Argyfl Group have concentrated upon the EC. 
At the time of writing these initiatives have met with mixced success. It is probably still 
too ear^ to be sure about next igrowth moves although they are most likefy to be 
intemationaL
Since 1990 the UK. multple food retaflers have seen significant changes to the 
operational information systems and technology available. Considering the esteem in 
Wnch Waiters is held in the retafling sector, it is interesting to note how little emphasis 
be placed ipon the impact of technology on the retailers. He must have been aware of 
the changes that EPoS was making on the fabric of the retaflers but chose not to explore 
it in any detafl. This review will not omit this consideration and the nexct part of this 
chapter considers foe rebrtionsbp betwew technology ai^ organisations.
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2.3 Food retailmg technology and information systems 
2.3.1 Technological issues
Technology may be dejfined as any artefact (or groip of artefacts) that does not occur 
naturally in the environment, that is fabricated ly  man, and that is used by man as a part 
of a process. Technology by itself and in isolation is neutral - it has no meaning or value 
except in use; it has no autonomous existence. However, once someone, a groip of 
people, or a corporate body, makes use of the technology it ceases to be neutral, and the 
issues that surround the use and ownershp of technology can be conplex. Use o ( 
ownershp or access to technology may confer a financial, social, power or knoWedge 
advantages to a person or group of people. Conversely non ownershp, or a lack of 
access to technology, may place a person or groip at a disadvantage. The use and 
ownershp issues are gr^hicaDy illustrated in the economic differences that exist between 
high technology societies (the first world) and low technology societies (the third world). 
Of course it would be naive to suggest that technology is the only reason that economic 
differences exist between the first and third worlds. Other factors also play a part, for 
exanple availability of natural resources, climate, geogrtphical location and political 
stability. However, Pearce and Stewart (1992, p.239 et seq) in their study of British 
economic history between 1867 and 1995 point out that it has been the ownershp and 
use of technology that has been an inportant differentiator between social groips, and 
also suggest that technology has also acted as a c a ta ^  for economic and social change.
While technology may in itself be neutral, it is difficult for people to be neutral about 
technology because it affects us as individuals and it can highlight our relationships with 
our surrounding society. Evidence for this was offered ly  Pelto (1973) in his study of 
Skolt Inlanders. He observed that when the mowmobile was adopted ly  the Skolt it
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brought mary advantages to their society in terms of access to a wide range of goods and 
services previous^ unavailable. However, the snowmobiles were difficult to handle and 
it was only the younger men who could cope with them. Because the younger men 
effective^ controlled access to the new goods and services, their status in the Skolt 
society became enhanced. The influence of the tribal elders, Wiose status was based on 
the traditional ways of life rooted in the utilisation of their reindeer, declined. These 
changes had two effects. The first was a rp id  decline in the birthrrate of the tribe's 
reindeer herds because the snowmobile's noise caused the female reindeer to abort. The 
second was an increase in dependency on external^ provided goods and services. 
Neither of these effects could have been expected from seemingly neutral technology.
Similar changes in social structure have been noted by Clegg (1972) and Mathias (1969) 
when describing the effects of the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom between 
the imd eighteenth and mid znneteenth centuries. In this period the social structure of the 
United Kingdom was radical^ changed fixxm being agriculturally oriented to being 
technologically oriented. The technology was not in common ownershp and those &w 
Who controlled it became rich and powerful MeanWhile, as de TocqueviHe (1835) 
observed, the mzyority of the industrial working population lived in relative squalor and 
poverty. These inequalities and deprivations brought about social conflict, for exanple 
the Luddite movement of 1812, agrarian violence in 1816 and 1830, Peterloo in 1819, 
the Rebecca Riots of 1839-9 and Chartism; and tip creation of new social power 
structures, the trade unions for example, that were an attempt to redress the balance of 
power, de Tocqueville (see Martin and Scharfo, 1970) writing some time afl^ the 
period of unrest in 1853, considered what the events of the previous forty years as a 
normal, if somewhat regrettable, state of affeirs, and regarded those who exploited
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productive resources as following natural economic growth opportunities. Marx (1887) 
on the other hand saw the ownershp of productive resources inà wider political contexL 
He argued that the worker, disenfranchised of the means to create wealth (in part 
because of technology); lacking control over the means to dipose of his efforts; and 
finding no meaning in his work, would experience alienation. (Marx called this 
Entfiremdung - estrangemenL) This alienation created a class division based on the 
 ^ inequitable ownerfop of productive resources, in the same way that previous class 
divisions had exdsted through the inequitable ownershp of land. This argument 
eventually led Marx to conclude that those alienated would (and should) combine to 
create a more equitable society based on communal ownerfop of economic resources, 
and through the process of revolution a communist state. While Marx never specificalfy 
mentioned technology in his debate about class (other than by inplication), his 
intellectual successors such as Braverman (1974) and Hyman (1975) developed Marx's 
social themes to suggest that it was the control of increasingly sophisticated technology, 
owned by capitalists, that took power away from woricers by de-skUling work.
The technology / power debate has threaded its way through industrial relations research 
for many years with opinions varying considerab^ about the true inpact and inportance 
of technology in power relationships. Braverman and Hyman of the Marxdst school 
cleariy consider technology (directly or indirect^) to be a m^or factor, other researchers 
such as Brown et al (1978) argue that technology, Wide influential, was not as inportant 
as the size of an organisation in determimng the nature of industrial relations. Yet others, 
such as Barrat Brown (1968), hardly give technology a mention when considering 
industrial power relationshps, preferring to concentrate upon the issues of ownerfop of 
the means of production rather than political motivation. The truth about the relationshp
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between technology and power na^ never be fully defined or understood the
issues are constantly changing as society and technology evolves.
During the industrial revolution the entrepreneurs who founded organisations were 
usually in close contact with the people they enptoyed and the technology they used. It 
was relatively easy for Marx to identify the differences between the owners of enterprises 
and workers. In the ensuing 150 years the ownershp of most substantial organisations 
has become diffuse. Today the large pension funds are often the substantive owners of 
many enterprises and tte  board of directors of most organisations are largefy up of 
managers of the various functions within the oi^anisation. More often than not ordinary 
managers are enployees rather than owners and most work people in the first world no 
longer have to suffer grinding poverty as a result of exploitation. The differentials 
between work people and the ordinary managers are certainly not as great as in the past, 
but the increasing isolation of the owners of organisations often means that m contrast to 
the Qwncis of enteiprises during the industrial evolution they have little appreciation of 
the social issues that the increasing use of technology raise.
23.2 Technology and organisations
^^thin organisations the relationshps between workers, managers, work and technology 
have been a subject ofmterest for maiy years. Adam Smith (1776) was one of the first 
to anafyse the labour processes. His suggestion of taeakmg down conplex processes 
into their constituent parts as a way of inproving performance has been adapted and
apphed in many organisations. Smith said that the division of labour in processes gave 
three advantages:
6 0
a. through specialisation individuais increased their dexterity,
b. through careful work design time that is wasted because 
of needless passing of work from one woik position to 
another can be avoided,
c. new machinery could be designed to inqnove individual 
productivity and enable one man to do the work of many.
In his frmous discussion in the first chapter of Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (pp.4-5) he uses the exan^le of pin making to illustrate his point- 
"...One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third 
cut it, a fourth points it, a fifrh grinds it at the top fi>r receiving 
the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct 
operations; to put it on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins 
is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the p2g)er; 
and the in^rtant business of making pins is, in this manner 
divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which in some 
manufrictories, are aH performed by distinct hands, though in 
others the same man win perform two or three of them."
Clearly Smith did not equate process division with de-sJdDîng but with productivity; 
however, Babbage (1832) points out that the corollary of Smith's subdivision of process 
was a saving in cost through o ^  having to employ people with limited ddU (and at 
lower wage) to do some of the trivial jobs in the process. These early ideas were iK>t 
wasted on later analysers of work and builders of industry vho found that skilled work 
could often be analysed and reduced to sinqjle elements and as a consequence wages 
were reduced i^hile productivity was maintained or improved.
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The start of process reducdonisai (in conceptual rather than in practical terms) began 
with Tajdor (1947) started a movement known as 'Scientific Management' (or 
Taylorism) [n.b. The book Scientific Management conqmses Taylor's 3 other books - 
Shop Management (1903), Principles o f Scientfic Management (1911) and Hearings 
Before Special Committee o f the House o f Representatives to Investigate the Taylor and 
Other Systems o f Shop Management (1912)]. Stiicth  ^speaking T^lorism is associated 
with the development of management techn^ues rather than technology. However, it 
was out of maz^ of the ideas of Taylorism that the modem production environment 
developed. Taylor's basic tenet was that " The princçal object of management should be 
to secure the maximum prosperity for the en^loyer, coiq>led with the maximum 
prosperity for the employee." He argued that this could be accomplished b3r: 
i  defining vfbat is meant by a 'foir d ^ s  work' so that en^byers 
and enpbyees knew where they were, 
iL selecting and training every worker so that th ^  could operate 
^  eam at the highest rate of which tb ^  were cspable, 
in. use work an a^^  as ameans of establisfainjg the woric content 
and wodt rates for jobs, and, 
iv. managers and workers sharing work and reqx)nsibility on an 
eqmtabk basis.
The concept of maximum speciahsatbn for both woikers and managers as a prerequisite 
for process output maximisation was widefy misunderstood at the time. Critics of Taybr 
pointed to the production sweat shops in which work was reduced to trivial elements that 
w ae boring ^id for i^ dnch workers were very poor^ paid. In fiict this criticism is more 
of the owners of these enterprises rather than Tajdor. A more realistic criticism of Taylor 
is his naive view that managers would behave &ir^ m distributing their profits i^ien they
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had an abundance of cheq) immigrant labour vriio could do the simple tasks that came 
about as the result of work analysis. Others in the ‘work anaÿsis' school of thinking 
included Gantt, Gdbreth, Bedaux, Rowan and Halsl^. They laid down the princÿles and 
practices of ^ la t is now known as industrial engineering and production engineering.
At the same time as Taylor was developing his ideas (circa 1880 - 1900) American 
industry was already developing methods for producing in large quantities. Lacey (1986, 
p.88), when describing the earfy manufacturing activities of Henry Ford, writes of mass 
production as being a "long establiifoed tradition in American industry: Singer sewing 
machines^  McT!nrmick reapers, the small arms manufacturer Samuel Polt" It was tO this 
tradition that Ford looked when he began to design the production system for the model 
T Ford motor car in 1906 and it is clear that Ford was rx)t, as some people have 
suggested, the inventor of the production line. Ford's real innovations were twofold. 
The first was that he succeeded in refining control of the siqyply chain to the extent that 
he could build a motor car, from nimmg ore to final assembfy, in about 30  hours. The 
second was that he managed to control the cycle times within the process accurately ty  
designing the work content of individual work stations to be balanced throughout the 
vfaole system Through these innovations Ford produced an attractive^ priced and 
durable motor car every 2 minutes for a market that was growing.
Both Taylor and Ford have been heavily criticised by more recent writers for reducing 
workers to 'mindless machines'. In truth, a careful reading of Taylor’s work shows that 
he believed that people should have meaningfiil work and that qxcialisarion should be a 
way of enriching work. The same is true of Ford (1929) vfao professed a sincere belief 
in the humanity of the worker and the need for the worker to be a thinking being'. A
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more realistic criticism of Ta^dor and Ford is that their individual belief systems were 
rooted in a unitary view of life (managerial determinism) and that they failed to involve 
work people in the management process (pluralism). These differences were crystallised 
by Matthews (1989) and are shown in Table 2.3.
Unitary point of view Mnralht point of view
Management assmnptkms Workers cannot be trusted and must 
be controlled by a stpervisory 
hierarchy
Workers desire diallenging work 
and want to make a contribution
Management stmctnres T<p down hierarchy of command 
with workers simply obeying orders
Flexible and flat decision 
structure wifli an Ampbasis na 
co-ordination and control based 
on project teams
Job design Work is fragmented and de-ddlled; 
jobs narrow, coocqition is divorced 
from execution
Work is int%rated vertically and 
horizontal^; muM-skiiled and 
performed by teams
ISdll formation Skills are bou^t from an external 
labour markeL Workers are 
replaceable and are made redundant 
at an economic downturn; jobs are 
defined by operations and machines
Skills are nourished by an 
internal labour market; job 
securi^ and traming are a part of 
flie employment package; jobs 
are defined by skills
(Source: Matthews, 1989)
Table 23  A comparison of Unitary and Pluralist management beliefs
In forming these divisions Matthews projected an idealistic and ratl^r extremist view of 
umtarism and pluralism for the sake of effect The reality of industrial and commercial 
life is that a balance is struck between these two extremes in which managers and 
woikers achieve reasonable outcomes. The exact balance at any point in time is usually a 
reflection of wider issues than those contained in the relationshq) between woikers and 
managers in a single organisation.
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It seems to be reasonably clear that most of the early industrialists did not set out to use 
technology as à philosophical (and practical) tool to dominate workers. In these early 
industrial days technology was a means to an end, and that end was the satisfaction of 
maiket demand. It was not until much later in the late 1950s that academics became 
really interested in the relationshÿ between technology and woik.
Joan Woodward a sociologist by profession and her teams of researchers at South - East 
Essex Technical College, and later at Imperial College, are credited with opening the 
debate on technological determinism in the management context Woodward (1958) lead 
her team in an investigation of a hundred firms in the Essex region. In examining the 
organisations they sought to identify the relationship between organisation size, number 
of levels of management, the span of managerial control at each level, the ways in which 
work role are defined, the nature of and amount of written communications^ and the 
extent of the divisions of fimctions among specialists. In addition they investigated the 
histories of the conpanies to seek out causal relationships The results of these 
investigations were inconclusive until they examined the technology the conpanies used. 
Then they feund that there was a relationship between the objectives of a company 
(defined as vdbat they make and fer what maiket) and the technology (defined 1^ the 
production system) they used. Woodward never claimed that this was a definitive or an 
exclusive relationshp, onfy that it seemed more consistent than other relationshps in 
organisations. The Woodward classification identified three types of production system - 
unit and small batch, large batch and mass production, and, process production. These 
production systems had increasing levels of conplexity in technological terms and 
Woodward concluded that to be successful management had to adopt an appropriate
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kind of management control system. Reeves and Woodward (1970) eventual^ published 
this proposition as a management control typology illustrated in Figure 2.6.
They suggested that firms i^io had a unit or small batch production system would most 
likely be successful if they adopted a control system that had an integrated and personal 
characteristics (position Al); firms that had large batch or mass production would most 
likely be successfiil if they adopted either a personal fiagmented or a mechanical 
fiagmented control system (positions B1 and B2); firms that had process production 
would be most likely to be successful if they adopted an integrated mechanical control
Imiegrated
A l A2
MechanicalPersonal
B2
Fragmented
Source: Reeves & Woodward (1970)
Figure 2.6 Types of Management Control System
system. [The term integrated inq>hes control ly  a central authority; fragmented control 
by individual departments; personal control by some one; and mechanical control ly  
procedures or technical devices.] While Woodward's work undoubted^ moved the 
debate about technology on, it was criticised as being too sin^listic by several 
contenqx)raiy and subsequent researchers (e.g. Dawson and Wedderbum [1980],
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W^Ddnson [1983], Süveiman [1970] and Rose [1988]). These criticisms centred on three 
issues. The first was Woodward's lack of e]q)loration of the wider social issues that 
afifect the wotic place; the second was that the role of management in the selection and 
application of tedbnology was hugely ignored; and finally that Woodward did not cs^loro 
the divisions of opinion that existed between management and work people with respect 
to technology and assumed some kind of consensus. However, it is worth noting in 
passing that research in the adjacent academic field of operations management by Platts 
and Gregory (1990), Hm (1993), and Slack (1995) all identify technology as a msyor 
Actor in a successful operations strategy. Also McLoghlin and Clark (1994) make the 
point that the recent development in the £q>plication of conqjuter technology to the 
automation of organisations is tending to support Woodward's contingency view of 
organisations and her prescrqttion for effective managerial styles in relation to the type of 
technology being used by an organisation.
There is no doubt that Woodward's work was something of a milepost in organisational 
research and her work seems to have stimulated several other aspects of organisational 
analysis. Research by the Aston Groiq) (Pugh, 1976 and 1977) fixmsed on a multivariate 
anafysis that sought to understand the relatk>nshq>s that exist between the ways in vdnch 
an organisation is structured and functions, the ways in vdnch grotq)s interact within an 
organisation, and the ways in vinch individuals act and behave. Their ^qxroach was 
rooted in the wori: of Weber (1947) and Fayol (1949) that examined the nature and 
extent of bureaucratic influences within organisational power structures. The Aston 
Group catne to two fundamental, conclusions. The first was that the contingency 
^yproach (isolating fiictors such as technology, ownershq), etc.) did little to e3q>lain the 
way in vrinch organisations woiked. The second was that organisation size and
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dependence iqx>n other organisations had a great effect iqx)n organisational structure, 
particular^ in the level of specialisation encountered and the nature of the bureaucracies 
observed. In respect to this latter Actor the Aston Groiq> refined the taxonony of 
bureaucracy to include. fi>ur m ^ r  categories that were defined in temgs of the 
concentration of authority and the ways in vAich the activities of the organisation were 
structured:-
workflow bureaucracies, typically Aund in large commercial 
organisations, m i^iich the concentration of authority was low 
but activities were highfy structured;
personnel bureaucracies, Aund m public sector organisations, 
that were not highly structured m a global sense but vdnch 
fi>cused on personnel activities (e.g. hiring and firing) and 
bad highly concentrated authority;
fu ll bureaucracies, Aund m smaller units of larger organisations, 
with high work flow structuring and highly concentrated authority; and, 
non-bureaucracies, typicalfy Aund in small organisations, m vAich 
the concentration of authority is Aw and the structuring of activities 
is Aw.
The nrportance of the Aston woric is two Aid. The first is that it was based on relatively 
large sanq)te rizes and sound statistical techniques. The second was that it confirmed 
that the holistA zqfproach to researching organisatAns gave sensAA outcomes. Although 
the Aston work can be criticised as being high on descrqrtAn and Aw on prescrqjtAn, m 
practice it validated the work of prevAus researchers (e.g. Weber and Fayol) who had 
qyproached the research of organisations m a phenomenoAgAal and holistA manner. In 
this latter respect they were implicitly to criticise the fqqnoach taken by Woodward and
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the contingency school of thought as being too smq>listic. Even so, the Aston Group did 
not entirely ignore or negate Woodward's work. Hickson in particular (an inqx>rtant 
member of the Aston Groiq)) maintained that a q)ccialist department's influence on an 
organisation was proportional to its knowledge and skills (Hickson et al, 1971), and this 
is clearly an observation that can be linked to the contingency philosophy.
Other research into organisations took different paths: the organisational 
environmentalists (e.g. Bums, [1966], Lawrence and Lorsch, [1967], Hannan and 
Freeman, [1988]) took the view that organisations were shzqped by their market 
environment rather than sh^nng their market environment; the managerial structuralists 
(e.g. Simon [1960], Cyert and March [1963], Vroom and Yetton [1973], Tannenbaum 
[1968]) sought to understand organisations in terms of management structures, styles 
and decision making; and, the humanists (e.g. Mayo [1949], McGregor[1960], Argyris 
and Schon [1978], Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman [1959], Fiedler [1967]) vAo 
eq)Ared the organisation in terms of people and their need Ar meaningful relationships 
and motivatAn. In spite of aH of these alternative fq)proaches to analysing organisations 
the issue of technoAgy and its influence on organisatAns did not die. It has returned m 
several organisatAnal contexts. Twiss and Goodridge (1989) examined technoAgical 
change m the context of its roA m maintaining competitive advantage. They suggested 
that: technoAgical change, as a part of a strategy to improve competitive perAzmance, 
should not be managed soAly by technoAgical specialists - to do so would Ase a 
balanced view that took wider maiket and commercial issues into consideratAn; 
innovation (technical change) must be pursued as a part of cohesve strategy designed to 
encourage an organisatAn to inqxrove and renew itseh; technoAgical change m an 
organisation must be planned m relatAn to all other systems within an organisation and
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managed by xnulti-flmctional teams to avoid organisational bias or distortion; a critical 
Actor in the success of organisations is its ability to c^jture and transfer technical 
knowledge to its empAyees; peopA m an organisatAn should have a common language 
that embraces, among other tilings, the technoAgy that an organisation uses; that 
technical change cannot be divorced feom organisational change; and finally that cultural 
and organisatioiAl changes are more difficult than the mechanistic aspects of technical 
change.
The suggestAn that organisations need to change technoAgy to maintain market 
conqietitiveness was hardly new. These ideas built on prevAus arguments forwarded by 
Fisher and Pry (1971) and Twiss (1986). This prevAus research linked technoAgy used 
m processes to the market maturity 'S' curve (widely used to describe product life cycles 
m the marketing context). Twiss m particular suggested that the product life cycA was 
inextricabfy linked to the technoAgy used m a process. As the technoAgy ages so the 
process becomes Ass efficient A relatAn to similar processes that use newer technoAgy. 
In turn this gives the newer processes a competitive edge as tim e goes on (even though 
they may not be quite so competitive at the early part of the new process life cycA), 
leading to the decline of the older process. This is illustrated m Figure 2.7. The natural 
corollary of this coiqecture is that to remam competitive an organisation must constantly 
watch new technoAgical deveApments insoAr as they affect their processes, and change 
technoAgies at the îçpropriate time withm the process life cycA m order to maintain a 
competitive edge. CAarly these authors are bridging the g ^  that had emerged between 
Woodward and Puÿi by showing that strategy and performance are constrained by 
technoAgy and that changing or deveAping technoAgy can liberate strat^y and enhance  
performance.
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Fig. 2.7 Changing technologies and the 'S' curve
In addition to the inqiact of technoAgy on organisatAns m a corporate sense, it is clear 
that technoAgy has had an inpact on managers and the process of management. 
Historically the rote of managers has been to plan work, organise resources, motivate 
peopA and to control processes. In this roA the manager has been the primary conduit 
of mArmation withm organisatAns. In the past, infbrmatAn has largely been transferred 
either m writing or by word of mouth. By controlling these communicatAns 
management have been abA to maintam their hierarchical situatAn and power. However, 
with Ae advent of che^ conputing, powerfiil software, enhanced communiKitAn 
systems and automation, these traditAnal ro As have progressively changed.
In manufacturing enviiumuents nearfy all of the traditAnal management roAs, with the 
exception of peopA motivatAn, can be done by integrated conputer software such as 
Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP H). TechimAgy, and conputer technoAgy m
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particular, has given managers greater access to information withm and about the 
organisation. In turn this has given the individual manager the opportunity to inprove 
their effectiveness and efBknency. Conputer hardware has got cheaper and more 
powerful, and at the same time this increase m processing power has allowed more and 
more sophisticated software to be written (Bell, 1985).
Clarke et al (1988) identified other integrated software and/or automation systems m a 
wide variety of other environments. In design and manufacture: Conputer aided design 
and drafting (CAD); Quantitative anafysis; Interactive conputer gr^hics; Conputer 
aided manufacture (CAhQ; Conputer numeric control (CMC); Robotics; FlexibA 
manufacturing systems (FMS); Conputer integrated manufacture (QM); Conputer 
aided design and manufacture (CAD/CAM); Conputer aided production planning 
(CAPP); Conputer aided measurement and test (CAMT); Materials requirement 
planning (MRP); Just-in-time & Total quality management (JIT & TQM). In 
administration: Real time management information systems (MIS); Word processors and 
personal computers (PC's); Intelligent knowledge based systems (IKBS); Eiqprt systems; 
Telecommunications & electronic mail; 'Viewdata and on-line databases; Private 
automatic branch exchanges (PABX); Local and wide area networks (LAN & WAN); 
Broadcast (optical fibre broadband communications). In Finance: Automated telling 
machines (ATM); Electronic funds transfer (EFT); Itnegrated circuit 'smart' cards. In 
retailing: Electronic Point of Sale (EPoS); Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale 
(EFTPoS); Electronic Data Interchange (EDI); Distribution Resource Planning (DRP); 
Direct Product Profitability (DPP). As these systems have developed they have 
permitted progressive automation of apects of woticm different enviroments. Beginning 
with the automation of hand work (e.g. robotisation), proceeding to the automation of
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the integration of hand work (e.g. CAPP), then to the automation of administrative work 
(e.g. Epert Systems), on to the automation of the integration of administrative work 
(e.g. EDI), and finally the automation of management decision making (e.g. FMS).
The progression of automation has extended the inpact of technoAgy fiom being only a 
shop floor and administratAn phenomenon to affecting every level m an organisatAn. It 
has made possAA radical restructuring of organisations m their entirety. Business 
Process Reengineering [BPR] (Hammer and Chanpey, 1993; Daveiport, 1993, 
Scott-Morton, 1994), uses the integratAn of corporate data m conputer systems as the 
mechanism for replacing traditional hierarchical management structures with flatter 
structures, less bureaucracy and Awer organisatAnal inertia. Within the BPR concept 
the process becomes focused on the customer and process control is achieved through 
integrated conputer systems with common access by a broadly skilled woric force. 
'Mthm the phiAsopfay of BPR the oA concept of managerial power by virtue of positAn 
and control o f  inforniatAn is leplaced with power that is 'earned' or Normative' and 
vdnch is gained through the efBcient servicing of an enpowered team who control the 
process. Oram and WelHns (1995) argued that because this management power is 
normative managers m BPR organisatAn have more rather than less power. A 
conparison of traditAnal and BPR management structures is illustrated m Figure 2.8. 
The range and conplexity of technoAgy used m all organisatAns is increasing and can 
present a challaige to management Canphell and Warner (see 1990, pp 111-121) 
suggested that as process automatAn and conputer technoAgy becomes more 
sophisticated peopA who design, maintain and control the technoAgy used by an 
organisatAn take some control away flom managers (de flurto if not de jure). This
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Figure 2.8 Traditional and BPR management structures compared
control, nominally residing with the technologists, unless suitably directed, msy cause the 
technological systems to become dysfunctional and to meet the organisations 
objectives. This problem can be overcome if managers acquire sufficient techmcal 
knoi^ ^edge to communicate effectively with technologists and conversely that 
technologists do not use technical jargon. Rothwell (1984) and Handy et al (1987) 
observed that in the short term the challenge of maintaining good communication 
between manager and technologist can only be overcome by training managers to 
understand the technology; and that in the long term they are likely acquire technical 
0 q)ertise before they move into management roles. Clearly the issue of the balance of 
power between the manager and the technologist is of great ingxirtance. Scarborough 
and Corbett (1992) suggest that it is creating a professional interdependence that is 
influencing Options for change in organisations. They call this phenomenon the 
Technological Power Loop and this is illustrated diagramatically in Figure 2.9. It can be 
seen that unless managers can effectively contribute to the loop they will not be able to
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exert the necessary influence on technological development. However, it should be borne 
in mind that management are rare^ bystanders in the process of introducing new 
technology, and it is their responsibility to ensure that the priorities and purposes of their 
organisation are well served (Guide, 1985).
Inftm au^
Expertise ^
Development of 
technology
Shapes
D^mes
Control of 
technology
Source: Scarborough & Corbett, 1992, p. 46 
Figure 2.9 The technological power loop
Whatever problems and opportunities technology offers management, wodcers have 
related problems and opportunities. Technology is often blamed for maiQr organisation 
problems and can be a convenient scape goat for inqjt management It is often 
management's lack of marketing ability, organisational skills and vision that causes 
conqiany foilures rather than technology.
While technolo^r has often been blamed for the reductions in manufocturing marpower, 
the reality of the situation is more complicated. At the macro level the décliné in the 
manufacturing wo A force has resulted fiom several fectors. In part the decline has been 
due to a reduction in the overall number of manufacturing conpanies - because they lost 
markets by being unconpetitive; in part because many of the clerical and bureaucratic 
jobs have been rq>laced by conputer systems; and in part because of wider demographic 
changes - an overall reduction in younger people choosing manufacturing as a career. In
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the successful manufacturing conpanks that have survived, investment in technology has 
been a key strategy in inproving productivity and conpetitiveness. For the operator this 
has meant that new skills have had to be acquired and new working patterns adopted to 
accommodate new technology. It has also meant that the growth in the complexity of 
manufacturing technology has been matched by a growth in people needed to programme 
and maintain systems and equpment: The more conplex the system the more the 
organisation relies on these "technocrats', and of course the more relative power they 
have. If a manufacturing organisation does not have a growing maiket place, then 
technology can mean unenployment as fewer people are needed for the same output. In 
this case, ^Hd (1995) suggests the overall pattern will be for the migration of skilled 
operatives to smaller organisations that still retain manual or sani-automatic labour 
intensive methods of production. This cycle is driven by relatively simple economics that 
are governed by the volume of throughput and variety of products made or services 
provided (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). At low volume production the pattern of 
production is characterised by a wide variety of woric, a large number of changeovers 
between batches, singk purpose machines (e.g. manual or send- automatic lathes or 
milling machines), and a highly skilled and flexible bhie collar work force. As the volume 
of production increases so the variety of work and number of batches and changeovers 
tends to drop. It becomes more economic to use more sophisticated machinery (e.g. 
machining cen#es), and because the machinery can be programmed away fl:om the 
worlplace by i^ faite collar technologists, blue collar workers with a lower level of skill (in 
the craft sense) are required - but with a wider of ancillary skills (e.g. more responsibility 
for quality controQ. Uhkuatety as volum es increase the use of automation and 
sophisticated line oriented production systems become economically necessary. In these
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systems bhie collar skills are usually low but the sipportizig white collar technological 
skills are usually high. This natural nodgrsdion pattern is illustrated in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10 Throughput volume and technology relationships
Similar patterns of change have been observed in i^nte collar organisations such as 
banks, insurance conpanies and stockbroking. In these and similar environments, 
technology, and in particular computer technology, has been one of main engines of 
change. Conputers are particularly suited to repetitive bureaucratic tadcs such as data 
collection, processing and retrieval As small computers have become less expensive and 
more powerflil (Table 2.4) th ^  have become widety used as intelligent terminals 
connected to mini and mainframe computers or as stand alone processors. Better and 
more powerful software allows these small conputers, or Personal Conputers (PC) as 
they are widely known, to perform an increasingly wide variety of tasks. Functionality
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within software has inproved and off-the-shelf software can perft>rm the nsgority of 
office functions such as word processing, database work, spreadsheets, drawing and 
presentations, etc. The microprocessor has also been at the centre of vbite collar 
automation with the use of Automatic Telling Machines in banks, and changes in the 
organisation structure such as those discussed in relation to BPR. In p ite of the
Micro-processor 8088 80286 80386 80486 CPUPentinm
Date of 
mtrodnction
1981 1984 1988 1990 1996
Normal RAM 
(max)
640 kB 4MB 16MB 32MB 128MB
Flippy disc 720kB 1.4MB 1.4MB 1.4MB 1.4MB
Fixed disc 
(normal)
10MB 30MB 300MB 500MB 5GB
Internal clock 
speed
4.88 MHz lOMHz 20MHz 66MHz >200MHz
Relative power 1 5 10 25 100
Unadjusted
cost
£1500 £1200 £1000 £1200 £1000
(Adpted from: Bell 1990,128; IBM PC SpedficaticQ, 1996)
Table 2.4 PC comparative performance data
proliferation of office conputers automation has not realty made a serious inroad into 
the ftice-to-face service encounter situations. It seems that people still wish to interact 
with people when they go to the doctors, lawyers, hairdressers. However, the people 
i^K) provide these services are retying to an increasing extent on conputers to access 
information about treatment, personal records, and so on.
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If technology is changing how we organise work and work people it is also changing the 
nature of the overall organisation in the way it manifests human values. Where people 
are located and their surroundings were a metaphor of perceived status and power in an 
organisation. As people moved ip  the hierarchy so they often moved to higher floors in 
ofiBce blocks and the trppings of their office grew more lavish. In the civil service it was 
possible to determine the seniority of a person by the size and quality of their carpet In 
commerce a persons status could easily be determined by the size of their conpany car 
and the limit of their expense account Technology is beginning to break these traditional 
diflferentials down and even create new status symbols itself It breaks the traditional 
status symbols by creating the possibility of new work patterns, fer example home 
working or remote working. Here the need fer offices may be reduced to a small 
building in which there are a collection of meeting places in which people meet clients or 
colleagues. A current exanple of this is Directory Enquiries in British 
Telecommunications (BT), where a large number of operators are based at home with a 
PC, a conpact disc database of telephone numbers, and a BT netwoik connection. 
Enquiries are automatically routed to a flee number in the network Other than fer 
appraisal, training or fece-to-ftice encounters the enquiry operators may never go to aBT 
office. Technology is also becoming a symbol in itself For instance in many 
organisations the type and power of a person's PC, together with the level of security 
access they have in large systems, is set by seniority.
What may be concluded from this review is that in many modem organisations 
technology is a part of a conplex web of relationshps. The more conplex the 
technology becomes and the more it replaces the activities of managers and work people 
the harder it seems to define in a concise way. Individual pieces of equpment are often
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required to compty with the requirements of surrounding equpment, and while 
unconnected do not remain unaffected by this equpment For exanple a PC when 
unconnected with a system is ostensibty a well defined stand alone piece of technology. 
However, if any output from that conputer is to be transferred to a system then it must 
conply with the system iiput requirements. The same would be true if a worker or 
manager wishes to communicate with a conputer system. They also have to taught to 
interface in an effective way. The reverse is also true and the design and development of 
the systems require man-machine interactions to be well defined and achievable in normal 
operational environments with a wide variety of users.
In many advanced systems, as is the case with the multple fi>od retailers, the systems are 
so pervasive that the organisation could not function without it's technology. In these 
cases it becomes difficult to unravel precise boundaries and consequently the 
conventional concept of technology defined as individual pieces or even connected pieces 
of eqidpment becomes tentative. What is required is a broader concept of 'system' and 
just such a concept has been suggested by WQd (1990, p.l09):
"... technology is a Q s^tems concept. It is not a simple 
dimension, but rather a cluster or matrix o f  things! materials, 
processes, software, practices, etc. The extent and manner 
of the usage of new technologies may be different in each 
part of the organisation. The rates of change may differ.
Furthermore, each part of the organisation. Le. companies, 
departments, divisions, sections, areas, etc., may be run in 
a different manner, and may relate differently to technological 
change. So there can be no sinple "rule of thumb' to relate
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technology to organisation. For this reason, as managers or 
technologists we can only realisdcalty hope to be aware of 
some things that might influence the Tclatinnship and SOme 
of the common features of the relationshps, in order to be 
able to adequatety deal with that part of the organisation 
in vdnch we are involved or fer which we are reponsible."
On this basis it is unlikely that any investigation into the relationshp between technology 
and strategy will be sinple or even definitive. What must be examined are basic 
relationshps - man/ system, technobgy / system and strategy / systems - and fix>m these 
it win be possible to gain a reasonable Understanding of the technology / strategy 
dynamics in the food mukples.
Clearly these relationshps are important as they he%) in the understanding of 
organisations. However, technology in the ferm of operations monitoring systems are 
also of great significance in the retail environment. The next part of this charter 
therefere, considers the evolution of perfermance measurement in organisations.
8 1
2.4 Perfonnance Measurement
The issue of perfonnance measurement is critical for msay organisations. Having set 
both strategic and tactical targets management must know what progress is being made 
and the organisations performance measurement systems (PMS) are i^iat enable this to 
be done. In recent years, as new ideas about how organisations woric and how they 
should be organised have emerged, epecialty in the operational aspect of organisations, 
PMS have increasingty been challenged. Morgan (1996), in descriWng Business Process 
Reengineering as a radical qproach to change, was not alone in crystallising problems 
with PMS. Oakland (1995) identified the problems of PMS in the Total Quality 
Management (TQM) context, Harrison (1992) in the Just in Time (JIT) context, and 
Luscombe (1993) in the Manufacturing Resource Planmng (MRPII) context. To 
suggest that these radical ^proaches are solety responsible for highlighting problems 
with PMS would be misleading. For some time the traditional concepts of performance 
measurement, rooted in Management Accounting, have been challenged by accounting 
professionals and academics alike. In the mid 1980's Johnson and K^lan (1987) drew 
several contemporary arguments together to demonstrate that traditional organisational 
performance measures either had lost, or were npidly losing, relevance to modem 
organisations. They argued that the traditional performance measures were rooted in the 
industrial revolution and reflected a control system for radically different ma&ets and 
organisations to those found in modem society. To continue to use these methods of 
measuring performance was to shackle modem management with an unwieldy set of 
tools that - decreases managerial productivity because of the time needed to gather, 
process and present information (often on relativety uninportant factors); fails to provide 
accurate product costs because of the averaging process used to allocate costs and
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overheads; and, finally, encouraged managers to take a short term view of the business 
that is frequently distorted due to the mix of long and short term pending requirements. 
What seems clear is that while historical information forms the basis of a PMS it is 
difficult for managers to avoid reactive behaviour. The underlying reason for forming a 
PMS on historical information is that this data is usually gathered as a side effect of 
normal trading activities. For exanple the data gathered in most financial systems, when
Financial OpenrtioBS Marketing Quality
Creditor days Ops. lead time Maiket riiare %rewoik
Debtor days Inveotoiy Orders on hand %rgects
Dividand cover Stock mm Order lead time %oonfrrmance
Stock turnover Set-up time No. of complaints %scrap
ratio Labour utility New product intro. QuaL admin, costs
Net asset turnover Machine utility Rpeat orders Recall costs
R.O.CÆ. Work in progress Delivery perf Lialnlity costs
R.OÆ. Employee to. Time to maiket Perf penalties
Current ratio Direct Product^ Warranty claims %errors
Gross profit Indirect product^ Returns Prevention costs
R.O.OJL Siq)plierpeff Service visits QuaL tr'g costs
Return on sales Variances First pick % Product testing
Sales/sq. m. Process time First drop % Perf testing
Gearing No. ofaoddeots Tranport utility Laboratory costs
Tabk 2.5 A selection of traditional historic performance measures
processed, forms the basis for performance reporting required and is used ly  the banking, 
investment and share holding fiatemities. The value of this data for proactive 
management is «mall, it does however provide a yardstick to judge how closely 
management have been able to manage to their declared strategy. It also is a consistent 
standard across marry different organisations. Other historical data may be gathered in 
noDrfinancial areas of the organisation and Table 2.5 is a sanple of the kind of
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performance measures that may be found in many manufacturing and service 
organisations.
Leaving the financial measure in Table 2.5 aside (because arguably they are so 
entrenched that they would never be replaced), it is useful to examine the other 
performance measures to see how good they really are in terms of hetying management 
to adopt a proactive posture. In most cases it must be said that the item measured will 
trigger a management response that will be too late in terms of either the internal or 
external customer. This of course raises two inportant questions -
a. i^iat is a good performance measure? and,
b. what system of performance measurement is most
likety to produce conditions conducive to proactive management?
Neety et al (1995) identify no less than 22 qualifications defining a performance 
measure's goodness'. They include a clear Knk between the performance measure and 
the organisation strategy; being simple to understand; being able to be controlled by the 
either the person doing the measurement or their close associates; being defined by the 
sippher and the consumer; providing timefy and accurate feedback about realistic 
targets; being clearly defined and visible; be a part of a feedback loop and be presented in 
a clear and consistent format; data should be presented in terms of trends rather than 
absolutes and in tarns of information rather than opinion or raw data; being based on an 
agreed understanding of what is being measured; and, if possible use data that is 
automaticalfy gathered as a part of the process. Clearfy the issue of'goodness' as qplied 
to performance measures is far fiom simple and this e)q)lains, at least in part, why many 
organisations feel the need to invent their own non-fmancial performance measures.
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The second of these questions has evoked a series of altemative qiproaches to PMS. 
These alternative systems have tried to break the stranglehold of the traditional PMS 
with varying degrees of success. Goldratt (1984), a physicist originalty, and used to 
logical physical systems of measurement, was unluqipy with the inqxecision of many 
concepts and words used in conventional cost accounting systems. The word 'cost' in 
particular he found had maiy meaningR that changed and overiqiped - investment cost, 
operating cost, absorption costs, opportunity cost, variable cost, fixed cost and product 
cost. Claiming that this kind of nomenclature only confused most managers, he 
suggested that the most productive iqiproach was to concentrate on the process itself and 
use measures that concentrate on physical rather than financial items. This approach led 
to the Theory of Constraints (TOC) and the concept of managing the process constraints, 
or bottlenecks, efiectivety. By concentrating on increasing througlq>ut - defined as the 
value taken onty at sale of a product or service - decreasing operating expensGS (fixed 
costs) and decreasing investment (reducing inventories), he argued that profitability will 
increase. Certainly Tbrouglqmt Accounting (TA) is conceptualty sinq>ler than 
management accounting in that it treats direct labour and variable overhead, 
conventionally defined, as an operating cxpenss. If this makes it more accessible to 
managers so much the better.
While Goldratt and his subsequent interpreters concentrated on the undertyiog metric 
problems of management accounting, they are stiU operate within vdiat is a fundamentally 
unitary concept of management. Once the need arises to define performance in other than 
readity measurable terms, and this is ofim the case in service environments and with 
savice strategies, the magnitude of difficulty rises. Kapbn and Norton (1992) and 
subsequentty Kiq>lan (1993) suggested that a PMS needs additional vectors that reflect
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the wider environment in ^dnch organisations exist These were customer related 
measures that sedc to define wiiat a customer values fiom an organisation; internal global 
process measures that seek to measure the efEectiveness of the organisation in meeting 
its* financial objectives; learning measures to examine if an organisation can develop in 
order to create future value; and, measures that test whether an organisation is creating 
value for its' shareholders. Kt^lan calls this approach to PMS the "Balanced Scorecard', 
and if  nothing else it does represent a move towards a pluralistic view of the 
organisatioiL These view was reinforced with respect to the service sector by Armistead 
(1994, p .ll) who wrote:
"... It is necessary to establish the standards of performance 
for each of the customer service dimensions either with quantitative 
expressions for firm dimensions {tangible aspects o f the services) 
and qualitative descrÿtions for the soft dimensions {intangible aspects 
o f the service); these are effectively the quality standards for the 
service package(s)."
K^lan and Cooper (1987), like Goldratt, were also unea^ with some of the traditional 
approaches of management accounting to costing. They argued that indirect costs o u ^  
not to treated as global quantities but needed to be analysed accurate^ and qqxntioned 
to the cost profile of those activities in an organisation that use the overhead. This 
overall approach is called Activity Based Costing (ABC) and has attracted much interest. 
Maskell (1991) in particular suggests that one of the strengths of ABC is that it allows 
for flexibility, conqjlexity and continual improvement - features that are important within 
the context of organisational change philosophies.
8 6
To some extent the debate about the validity of the management accounting tqiproach is 
irrelevant to PMS. Whatever management accounting system is used (traditional, new, 
or, yet-to-be-invented), the ingwrtant issues are: whether or not the PMS siqiports an 
organisation in its current activities in a consistent and reliable manner; vd&ether or not it 
will retain validity with the passage of time; whether or not it provides management with 
a balance of information that is relevant to the organisation's activities; and finally, 
whether or not management use the information it provides in a proactive as well as a 
reactive WE^ .
The PMS issue has been of central concern to the retailers as they have developed. The 
role of technology in the evolution of their PMS will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Meanvhile the literature review continues with an examination of distribution systems - 
an issue of central importance to aU multÿle retailers.
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2.5 Retail distribution systems
2.5.1 The development o f retail distribution systems since 1850
Although the development of trading and distribution systems can be traced back to the 
emergence of the civilised world at about 5000 BC. in Mesopotamia, the period of 
relevance to this research is from the 1850 onwards, for about this time John Sainsbury 
began trading in London. The traditional v^lesale channels of distribution in the towns 
and cities, vidch had been in operation for several centuries, had been growing to 
accommodate a widening variety of produce coming to the market. Winstanley (1983) 
points out that in 1850 the traditional markets with their itinerant traders still flourished, 
that the preponderance of shops were trading flom converted ordinary houses with very 
fow retailers owning more than one drop. Up to 1850 the wholesale distribution network 
had serviced the needs of this traditional single shop retailer, but by the late 1800s the 
emergence of the food retail multples required a significant adjustment of the supply 
channels. ^%h enhanced buying power the multples demanded fresher produce, quicker 
delivery and argued aggressively for volume discounts. Some even set iq> supply channels 
to service their own shops vdrere existing wholesale arrangements were inadequate 
(Williams, 1995).
Early fr>od multple growth is best understood in the contexts of convenience for the 
consumer and value for money. The location of diops was inportant for an eiqianding 
town and city population who usually lived near to their place of work. Often the only 
means of transport for these work people was foot or bicycle, and convenience in terms 
of geographical location and long trading hours was essential To meet these needs the 
early multples often e^qanded their geogrphical cover%e by taking over ordinary
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houses in the locality of their customers and converting them to shops. These shops 
were often situated a few streets away from one another and could be easily serviced by 
horse drawn tr a n ^ r t This network offered the consumer a consistent shopping format 
and product range. Very often these multples specialised in a specific food range that 
was augmented by ancillary products. J. Sainsbury for instance began ly  pedalising in 
dairy products and augmented these core lines with cooked mgats and some prepared 
butchery items. The combination of a convenient shopping location, bulk buying and 
often a self controlled distribution system gave the food multples a cost advantage over 
the traditional single food retailer who had to bty through wholesalers (Fubp, 1964). 
Entrepreneurs such as Lpton and Sainsbury were quick to eipbit these advantages by 
building retail enpires that quickly pread fix>m local to regional or national networks of 
shops and traded on a formula that offered the customer quality produce at conpetitive 
prices (Jeffreys, 1954).
The food mukples did not have unopposed growth. When the independent retailers 
b%anto lose custom to the mukples they formed collectives in order to improve buying 
power and trading margins. These collectives established their own distribution chain 
with exclusive i^iolesale fimctions. However, unea^ administrative relationshps and 
the inevitable tension between entrepreneurially oriented individuals often meant that 
these retailer / wholesaler organisations often dlsintegFated into their conporKut parts. 
This is not to suggest that the collectives disappeared or were wholly unsuccessful 
Some still exist today. SPAR and MACE are examples ofindqiendent retailer collective 
organisation, the Co-op an exanple of nonrindependart retailer collective organisation. 
In addition to the retailers organising to defend their market share some i^iolesalers also 
responded to the threat of the mukple chains by opening their own retail outlets. A
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miDrfood exanple of this latter phenomenon is Halfords who began as a wholesaler of 
ironmongery and bicycle parts and grew to be a successful retailer (Jeffreys: 1950, 
Jones: 1982).
The constant jockeying for position between the indqiendent food retailers, the multple 
food retailers and the wholesalers continued throughout the late 1800s and into the 
1900s. By the ear^  ^1900s it was clear that the star of the food mukples was rising and 
of the independent retailer falling - a trend that has continued to the present day. The 
mdpoident retailer and the wholMaler were not the only or^misations to be squeezed 
by the food mukples. Food manufacturers found that the wholesalers tried to maintain 
their margins by demanding lower prices. Their answer was to eliminate the wholesalers 
and move to direct delivery in towns and cities where k was economic to do so 
(McKiimon, 1981). Peak Frean were regular^ delivering biscuits to 40,000 retail outlets 
in 1922 (Corley, 1972), Cadbury Brothers were delivering confectionery to 100,000 
outlets by 1938 (Cadbury Bros., 1945). For a while this strategy inproved the food 
manufacturers margins but k became increasingly inappropriate as distribution costs 
spiralled when petrol prices rose during after the Suez crisis. The power of the mukples 
was unstoppable and in the period 1938 to 1983 they came to dominate the distribution 
chain as illustrated in Figure 2.11.
McKinnon (1989) indicated that ly  1989 the percentage of direct sales from food 
supplier to the food mukples had risen to 60% and tins continues to rise. During the 
1980s and 1990s food distribution channels have continued to evolve. There has been a 
continued drive to inprove the efSciency of the distribution chain and to drive down 
costs. This has led to new configurations in warehouses and in control systems, to a
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reduction o f  own' warehouses and delivery fleets, and to an increase in control through 
new warehousing technology and conqsuter systems.
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Figure 2.11 Analysis of retail sales through marketing channels:
1938 and 1983
The ing)ortance of the distribution chain and its inq)act on the economics of retailing has 
only been really appreciated in the past 50 years, and understood in the past 15 years. 
The key that has unlocked this understanding has been the availability of accurate data 
and the systems to use and interpret this data. For the fi>od multÿle retailer this 
inproving control has allowed the reduction of inventory and the costs associated with it. 
At the current time the use of Just-in-Time purchasing systems have reduced overall
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inventory in the Tesco distribution chain flom two months in the 1950 to 14 days in 1995 
(Tesco, Reports & Accounts, 1995). The control of these systems rests with the food 
multÿles and through these systems the fbodmultÿles control the distribution rhain
Z5»2 Distribution namenclatttre
The purpose of a retail distribution system is to get produce flom one geographical 
situation to another in a timely manner and at the rmnimiim cost. A seemingh'^  ample 
task until one considers that a modem multyle food retailer nuy have iqwvaids o f25,000 
individual product hues ranging flom fl!^h flint to baby clothK. A AmAll proportion of 
this produce may be siçplied by local organisations but the majority wiH have come 
throu^ a distribution chain that m ^  have begun on the other side of the world.
When examining distribution systems it is as well to be clear about the nomenclature used 
to describe them. Figure 2.12 illustrates the various links that may be found in a siq^^ 
and distribution system. Purchase and siq^ty management relates to an organisations 
interface with its suppliers. Physical distribution management is usually ^ipHed to the 
relationship between an organisation and its immediate customers. Logistics, a word 
commonly misused, {ppHes to the i^hole of the distribution chain flx>m the organisation 
to its customers. Materials management is the phrase used to describe the chain between 
first tier siqipliers and first tier customers. Finalÿ, siqipty chain management is the 
phrase used to describe the complete distribution chain
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Figure 2.12 Supply chain terminology
2.5.5 The deveUqmtent of modem food nuddple distribution systems
Food retailers have always understood the mqx)rtance of efficient and effective 
distribution systems in terms of its inq)act on cost and food freshness. Indeed the 
evolution of retailers such as J. Sainsbury was closety tied up to the evolution of their 
distributfon systems. However, distribu^n activités have not always been accorded 
such ingx)rtance. Some early writers on management (Drucker, 1962; Warman, 1971; 
Alexander, 1969) regarded distribution as of second order inqx>rtance - something to be
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mentioned in passing but hardly w ortly  of serious consideration in the debate on 
management strategy. To some extent this point of view was understandable as much of 
the early research undertaken on distribution systems was in the fields of operations 
research and mathematics. The early techniques of distribution analysis, such as Itnear 
programming and transportation modelling, were ofien inaccessible to many managers 
i^ dio had nonrnumerate backgrounds - and this was the rule rather than the exception in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. Precisely what changed these management attitudes to 
those of today, where the distribution chain is regarded as being extremely hrportant, is 
difficult to say. McKinnon (1989, p.2) describes this change in attitude as "the 
revolution in physical distribution", but this is probabfy overstating the situation. 
However, at tins time researchers such as Stewart (1965) and Kotler (1967) were 
developing new ideas about the nature of enterprise. They suggested that for an 
enterprise to be effective in the market place the manufocturing and distribution systems 
had to optimised. The problem that organisations foced was that they sinq)ty had not 
been systematically gathering data about their distribution systems. There were of course 
a fow notable exceptions. Stac^ and Wilson (1958) described how Unilever in 1955 had 
identified that a single days delay in their distribution cycle would cost them £5m in 
additional working capital; and that 13 man days were required to produce a ton of 
washing powder but 19 man days were required to distribute it. But in the early 1960s 
the m^ority of orgaoisstions would not be able to umkrtake an analysis of this kind. 
When the idea of the integrated enterprise did eventua% gain common management 
acceptance it was against a background of increased economic activity, growing and 
diveisij^ing maikets, aixd o f  money being available for the kind o f  investment needed in 
the distribution infiastructure (Hill, 1966).
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From the hegmmhg of the 1960s the food multÿles entered a period of constant change. 
The early changes were associated with the transition from the small store format to the 
siqiermaiket format and this was acconqiamed by a very r^ id  increase in the number of 
lines available within the store. For exanple in J. Sainsbury average store size grew 
from 3,300 sq. f t in 1950 to 10,200 sq.ft. by the beginning of the 1970. During the same 
period the number of product lines rose from 550 to 4,000 . In the following 15 years 
the changes were associated with the transition from supermarket to hypermarket. The 
average Sainsbury store increased in size to 30,000 sq. fr., and in lines on offer to 19,000 
(Williams, 1995, p.219). This pattern of growth was echoed or exceeded in most of the 
other food multÿles, and the distribution system - both retailer owned and sub-contract - 
had to reqx)nd to large increases in both volume and variety. In the early 1960s the 
distribution system, that had not been ingrroved since the Second World War, was 
already under pressure. New, and larger, focilities were planned to cope with changes in 
demand patterns and volumes that few had predicted. Where to put these new fricOities 
and how to service them stimulated much thought, although the problems were hardly 
new and had been conten^lated in one form or another for the preceding two or three 
centuries (Coopar, 1963).
A survey of the published research during the 30 years that q>an 1960 to 1990 identifies 
several themes that have received varying degrees of attention. Some of these foanes 
have been foirly general in nature (e.g. the nature of marketing channels), other themes 
such as cost minimisation in the distribution chain, stock control and international 
sourcing are of direct relevance to the efBciaicy of the food multÿles. These issues are 
now given further consideratioiL
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It has already been demonstrated in Figure 2.11 that between the mid 1800s and mid 
1900s there was a steady decrease in the use of general wholesalers by the food 
multÿles. This was acconçanied by a steady increase in the use of direct delivery from 
manufacturers by the fr>od multÿles. In part this is eiqplained by the increasing buying 
power of the food mukples due to size and market concentration, and in part by the need 
to tightly control a distribution system that was adjusting to r^ndly increasing variety and 
volumes of products. As food producers margins b^an to be squeezed by the multq>les 
they realised that deliveries from factories to individual retail outlets were becomiog 
increasingly uneconomic. The food producers reqwnse was to store produce at 
strategically placed dqx>ts and deliver from the depots on receqrt of order. The 
economics of this arrangement are quite self evident and are illustrated in Figure 2.13.
NSiqpliers N Sippliers
MStores 
Number of joumies= N X M
MStores 
Number joumies = N + M
(Source: Adipted from Artie & Berghmd, 1959)
Figure 2.13 Distribution systems with and without depot
By adopting this simple strategy, and in effect rq>lacing the role of the traditional 
wholesaler, substantial savings were made. In this illustration the number of journeys 
would drop from (M x M) to (N + M). Using the same model cost could be saved in
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other ways. By increasing the size of the delivery to dqx>t fewer deliveries needed to be 
made from the factory. Examining this area of operations Williams (1975) demonstrated 
that the relationdig) between delivery cost and the size of a consignment follows a 
negative eiqponential curve. The corollary of this finding was for fr>od producers to 
reduce small deliveries to retailer or wholesaler depots, or altemativelÿ introduce a 'small 
delivery' surcharge (Walters, 1976; Lambert et al, 1983). An alternative approach to 
overcoming the diseconomies of distributing small quantities was to aggr^ate orders for 
groups of geographically close dqx>ts in orders to fully bad a vehbb. These orders 
could then be collected fix>m the depot ly^  the individual customers. The scab of the 
problem faced by the produce in the frK)d chain in 1979 is illustrated in Tabb 2.6.
Organisation A^ranmate nnmbmr 
ofshops
Approximate number 
of warehouses
% of turnover 
direct from 
supplier
Mukples 7,000 100 27
CtHjperative Whdesale 6,000 150 8
and Retail Societies
Whdesalers 21,000 240 3
(Delivered Trade)
Cash and Cany 52,000 590 3
Whdesalers
(Sources: Mmtd. 1979; IGD, 1980; Economist btdligence IMt, 1980; McKinnon, 1989, p62) 
Tabb 2,6 Number of groceiy shops and warehouses, together with tiie proportion
of trade handled, 1979
The princq>b of aggregation, or mOie accurately le-aggregatbn, as a means of cost 
reduction had been in use by the food multqibs for as bug as they have operated the 
depot system. By accqiting bulk deliveries, food multÿbs negotiated for higher
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discounts - usuaiy 1 to 2% of the selling price of produce. The cost of disaggregation of 
bulk mto individual store orders and re-aggregation for subsequent delivery costs the 
food multiples about 3 to 4% of their turnover (Thorpe and Shepherd, 1977). Clearly 
the reasons for pursuing this strategy must generate other financial benefits. With labour 
cost £q>proximately 50% of the costs of a store (Dawson, 1982) time wasted handling 
and stacking produce needs to be carefiiiy controlled. Kiriy (1975) conpared the 
uipacking time associated with two delivery situations. The first situation involved one 
delivery of 500 packs. The second situation had five deliveries of 100 packs. He found 
that it was 31% quicker to assemble and 47% quicker to disassemble the single delivery. 
McKinnon (1989, p.67) cites a similar study that found in the case of one London 
sipermaiket a large consolidated load fiom a central warehouse took 45 minutes to off 
bad, the remaining 132 deliveries fiom direct sippHers to the sipermarket took 25 hours 
to unbad. Cbarly aggregatbn at depot level would not ony^  reduce handling costs at the 
store, but it would also permit more accurate control of the overall sto ^  level These 
kind of examples must be regarded with some cautbn as the 'greater' or consolidated 
bad' arguments have to be considered in relatbn to stockholding costs. There is littb 
point in increasing delivery sizes if stock deterbratbn or stock holding costs erode the 
benefits gained ty  pursuing the policy. Of course there are other less easily quantified 
benefits such as reducing the time management need to use in the sipervisbn of 
unpacking activities. Cbary this will free management for other control activities, but it 
will orUy have value if that is actuaiy ^ la t th y  do.
Controlling stock levels accuratey, and effidait ordomg sj^tcms, are two other ways of 
controfimg costs in the multpb retail distributbn chain. As has already been identified, 
unused or sbw moving stock is undesirabte in a business that typicaiy has bw  gross
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margins and food products have low margins that are typicaiy between 3% and 7%. 
This means that produce must be turned over quickly and that stock must be minimised^  
two clearly related phenomena. In ibs 1850s food distribution systems were still 
evolving. Waugh's (1951) account of the operations of Lpton during the 1800s suggests 
that shortages or stock outs were common and often due to food being spoiled in transit 
or to unreliable transport Both Lpton and Sainsbury addressed this problem directly by 
having their own tranport (WUiams, 1995). Within the shops fresh food could only be 
stored ft>r limited periods of time. So, in one way at least, stock-outs often meant that 
food on the shelves was relatively ftesh. Sainsbury in particulaf went to great lengths to 
keep ftxxi ftesh. He bought be and used it to cool his warehouse, his brries 
(forerunners of today's refrigerated vehbles) and in his shops to keep dairy produce cool 
These kinds of products were usuaiy delivered regulary.
Waugh and Williams suggest that the most commonly used system of stock control in the 
Victorian period was the two bin ystem. As produce was emptied fix)m the A elt a box 
or pack was opened and the shelf restocked. A replacement box or pack was then 
ordered. This kft the storekeeper with one package waiting to be used and one package 
on order. Providing the delivery occurred before both active and reserve stock was used 
there were no problems. This was a sinpb ystem to administer at the store level but 
subject to problems when there were sudden increases in demand, or alternatively i^hen 
over cautious store managers ordered before the stock on the shelf was used. The other 
problon with the two bin system was that a bin may hold slow moving that could take 
several months to use and consequmtly increase the stock holding costs.
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As distribution systems became more reliable it became possible to consider alternatives 
to the two bin system. In the early 1900s continuous review systems began to be used. 
In these systems usage of stock was monitored and the data gathered fix>m this exercise 
used to predict indien to order the next consignment of a product. Figure 2.14 illustrates 
the operation of such a system. The grsq)h indicates the predicted stock usage based on 
historical data. Before the stock foils to the minimum stock level (safety stock) an order 
must be placed in time for the goods to be delivered. The delivery time, known as the 
order lead time, is usually determined by rnonitoring siqyplier historical delivery 
performance. The reorder point must be set to reflect an acceptable risk level to avoid 
stock-out situations. It is never possible to entirely eliminate this risk without incurring 
a heavy economic penalty. In practice the risk of stock-out (due to demand or supply 
problems) is likely to follow a normal distribution curve.
Normal Stodc Rq>lenidimait Pattern
Stock
--ROL
--MSL
± 1 s-d. = 84% prob.
± 2 s-d. = 97.7% prob.
--------------- 1 - 2 s.d.
^ -------1 - 1 s.d.
Reorder Level (ROL)
Nfinimum Stodc Level
Safety Stock
^Time
e Reorder point
Q Stock rqdenishment 
pmnt
Order
Lead
Time
(Source: Adapted from Buxton, 1975)
Figure 2.14 Stock usage and reordering pattern with stock-out risk approximating
to a normal distribution.
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Buxton (1975) argued that hy setting the reorder level to one standard deviation, the risk 
of running out equated to the area under the normal curve above + 1 standard deviation 
(Le. 8% (Le. 100 - [50 + 42])). Should the reorder level be set to 2 standard deviations 
the risk of stock-out is reduced to 1.15% (Le. 100 - [50 + 48.85]). The problem with 
increasing safety stock is that the stock holding cost also increases and it has been shown 
that in practice reducing stock-out risk below 2% is rarely cost effective (Ray and 
Milhnan, 1979). If this level of 2% were translated into an order for 10 different lines 
there would only be a probability of 0.8171 (Le. [1 - 0.02]^ ° ) of getting a full order. (If ± 
2 s.d. were used the probability rises 0.8908.) Using this argument Christopher et al 
(1979) demonstrated that in a substantial order it is unHkety that the full order wîQ 
delivered. This sqiproach to ordering has also been criticised because of many of the 
assumptions that are made - that demand is known and predictable, that a product will 
always be available for delivery, that deliveries will not be q>lit ly  the siq>plier and that 
the method of delivery is reliable. In the real world few of these assunqrtions are true. 
However, in spite of this and of the possibility of shortages, this systems does reduce 
stock holding costs and as such is better than the two bin system.
The continuous review system has been criticised for failing to take aU costs into 
account. A more balanced view needs to consider financial costs, storage costs, and 
ordering costs (McClelland, 1960), Financial costs wiU include interest payable on 
woridng cental, depreciation and in some countries tax on the average stock value 
(Ballou, 1978). Storage costs will include the cost of maintaining and servking the 
storage system, shrinkage and qx>ilage, and stock obsolescence (e.g. changing tastes, 
food scares, out of date produce). Ordering costs are the costs of placing an order and 
will include stock monitoring costs, order aggregation costs, order preparation costs.
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printing, postage, etc. Dobler and Burt (1996) demonstrated that the point at i^nch the 
carrying costs (Le. financial costs and storage costs) are equal in value to the ordering 
costs is the point at which the most economical ordering quantity (per product) is 
defined. This is shown:
Carrying costs = average inventory x unit cost x inventory carrying
in units cost as a % of inventory
value
= [Q/2] X C X I 
(nb. Q for the order and delivery are assumed to be the same)
Order costs = number of orders placed x cost of order
per year 
= [U/Q] X  A
Economic order quantity occurs when the annual carrying cost 
equals the ordering costs - 
Le. [Q x C x l]/2  = [UA]/Q
Solving for Q
Q = [{2xUxA}/{CxI}]'H).5 
This nelatinmhip is gr^hically illustrated in Figure 2.15. The Total Cost curve is the 
summation of the Carrying Cost and Ordering Cost curves. The Economic Order 
(Quantity occurs at the nadir of the Total Cost Ctove and is shown by the dotted fine.
Both of these systems have been used at store level where demand patterns may be quite 
uzqjredictable for some it«ns. At the depot level, where many stores demand is 
aggregated, two effects can be observed. The first is that demand across maiy stores 
may be quite stable m spite ofthefoct that individual stores may be e3q>erienicing quite a
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Carrying
costI
Ordering
cost
Order or Ddivcry Quantity
(Source: Dobler and Birt, 1996, p 528)
Figure 2.15 The relationship between ordering cost, canying cost, 
total cost and economic order quantity
variation in demand (Scfaaiy, 1984). The second is that Wmn global demand inoeases at 
the store level consistently, then there is an anoplij^ ing effect on demand throug^ut the 
stçpÿr chain, Forrester (1961) demonstrated that a 10% increase in demand at store 
level could give rise to an increase in 16% of orders Aomthe depot (or warehouse) level 
In turn this generated a 28% increase in orders fiom the depot level and a subsequent 
40% increase in production. Forrester attributed much of this amplification 6ctor to the 
natural gearing of the system, arguing that it would be worst in channels where 
communications were poorest and order lead time longest
Where demand for a range of produce is relatively stable, communications channels 
effective, and order lead tim e short then it possible to consider using a technique called 
Distribution Requirements Planning (DRP). A DRP system takes usage and stock 
availability information fiom all parts of the distributfon chain, co-ordinates it with lead
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time information associated with movements between different parts of the distribution 
chain and the demand foreca^ to control order sequencing, volumes and stock 
movement throughout the whole of the distribution chain. In doing this the DRP system 
prevents over-ordering and minimises stock holding throughout the system. The 
operation of a DRP system is illustrated in Figure 2.16. The basic parameters that have 
to be defined in the system for each product is the minimum order, the level of safety 
stock and the order lead time. In more sophisticated systems the order level may be 
defined in volume / price break terms. On the basis of past demand patterns, and with 
reference to current merchandising activities, a demand forecast wiU be made for the 
product The length of time covered by the forecast varies according to the product It 
may be possible to forecast the demand for a stsq>le product, baked beans for exanÿle, 
for several months ahead. For other products that have a seasonal demand pattern, nuts 
for exanq>le it may ohiy be possible to forecast for a few weeks. The DRP system is 
hntiaHsed with the stock position at the beginning of the period and the actual demand 
(orders received for 150 units) for the first week. If a delivery is due during the first 
period, this is also registered by the system, although this wiU not be allocated into active 
stock until the beginning of the following week. It can be seen that end of the first week, 
all orders having been satisfied, leaves a week end stock of 50 units. This stock, phis the 
delivery stock wiU be carried forward to the following week. Looking ahead fix>m week 
1, if the forecast is met then a shortfeU will occur in week 4. To avoid the shortfell stock 
must be ordered in week 1 for delivery in week 3, to be allocated in week 4. At the start 
of wedc 1 only 50 units have been ordered for week two. During the first week further 
orders may be received that may reach or exceed the forecast, alternatively the forecast 
may be optimistic. The DRP system assumes at initialisation that the forecast will be 
met, but will adjust the ordering fiequency to reflect reality. In the exanq>le in Figure
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2.16, if the orders for week 2 did not reach the forecast level the DRP system may delay 
the order placement in week 3. If the orders exceeded forecast it may bring the order 
planned for week 3 forward to week 2. If demand was consistent^ higher than forecasts 
then the DRP system would increase the order quantity in vfoatever multÿles foe 
producer delivers.
Demand forecast
Orders received
Stock at week start
Stock at week CTd
Central delivery due 
fiommanuf 
Orders to be placed 
by DRP system
Wkl Wk2 Wk3 Wk4
150 150 100 220..
150 30 .... 180
200 350 200 400
s o 'y  200 looy  180
300 0 .3 0 0  0
300 0
M n order = 300 cases 
Safety stock = 50 cases 
Order lead time = 2 weeks
Product order 
characteristics
Figure 2.16 Stock movements In a DRP system
In a typical modem multiple retailer there are thousands of product lines that would 
require an army of people to progress in a manual system. DRP makes control of this 
number of items possible and DRP systems are always run on conqmters, usual^ a 
central function of the retailer's organisation (Orficky, 1975). The data required to 
inform the system about stock movements is usually gathered by reading bar coding 
either on the case or on the product within the distribution cycle. DRP is better than any 
of the systems previous^ discussed when gqyplied at depot level, and vhen it was
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introduced in the late 1970s to the distribution chain it had a rignificant inçact on stock 
holding. The main difBculty with the system in the ear^ days was the lag thne between 
the DRP system registering the need for an order and the order actually being despatched 
to the producer. This was because manual systems were still in use for actually placing 
orders. It took the evolution of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) for DRP to reach its 
full potendaL With EDI the retailer head office computer actual^ placed the order with 
the supplier without the need for manual intervention. (This process wiH be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4.) Unfortunately in the earfy 1980s the multq)le retailers were very 
slow to adopt this technology and it was not until the mid 1980s that the DRP systems 
realfy delivered the fon benefit to its users (Bamfield, 1993).
Stock turns p.a. 
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Tesco performance 
Average others performana
(Source : IGD Researdi Services, 1993)
Figure 2.17 A comparison of Tesco stock tnm to average others 
performance 1986 to 1992
Figure 2.17 illustrates the inq)act that DRP and related systems enhancements have had 
on the stock turn of Tesco in recent years:
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If inaccurate data is put in to the DRP system it has the potential to cause many 
problems. To avoid data inaccuracy regular audits of stock throughout the distribution 
system are required. These are cost^ and can negate some of the savings that the system 
makes. The other problem with DRP is that it operates at the depot (or warehouse) level 
in the distribution chain. It took the application of another technology. Electronic Point 
of Sale (EPoS), to extend the princÿle of automated ordering down to the store level 
(Femie, 1994). Like DRP, EPoS as a concept was developed in the mid 1970s. The 
EPoS technology allowed individual item bar codes to be scanned at the point of sale, 
and fiom this information item cost could be determined for billing purposes. Using the 
same information %gregated store usage levels could be also be determined. Even vhen 
bar coding had been standardised it was some time before it was extended fiom the case 
to individual items within the case. The effect of EPoS on the food mukgles operations 
was extensive. Initial^ EPoS was oniÿ used in store as a vmy of ensuring the correct 
price for products was charged and a small percentage of produce was scanned. 
Eventual^ this percentage grew to embrace iKarÿ aH of the produce sold. In 1983 
Sainsbury only scanned 1% of their products, by 1989 this had risen to 90% (Wrigley, 
1993). By the mid 1980s most of the multq>lc retailer's store computer systems had 
effective bi-directional cominumcatioiis links with head ofSce computers. Software 
systems were built that linked the data that was gathered as foe result of EPoS scanning 
to the ordering system. This was the link that was required to close the distribution 
control loop and for the first tinne the possibility of'Just in Time' (JIT) ordering became a 
practical possibility.
The pattern of evolution of stock control systems is defined by the ability to count stock 
accurately, to locate stock and trace its movements accurately, and to get information
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fiom the point of sale to the ordering mechanism. The better these fimctions work, the 
less stock is required. However, the inbuilt assunqjtions of the stock control systems 
examined so 6 r is that there will be stock in the system and that it will be static fi>r 
periods of time within the lead time cycle. Clearly if it were possible to keq) stock 
moving then storage savings could be made and depots could be reduced in size, or 
removed all together. Alternatively the same depots would be able to cope with a much 
larger volume of produce. The princÿle of keeping stock moving and synchronised to 
the actual demand patterns at the store level is the essence of JIT, and the multÿle 
retailers had exanq)les of JIT systems working in manu&cturing to consider.
In manu6cturi% JIT operates on the princq>le of 'demand pulT rather than 'inventory 
push'. In other words a conqx)nent or assembly is only ordered vfoen, and in the 
numbers it is required. When it is delivered it will be used or assembled within a short 
time, and it is ofien delivered direct^ to the point of use rather than into a storage 
system. In theory JIT can be efficient down to an order level of one, but in practice 
because of the costs associated with tranqx)rt, order levels usually reflect the demand fi>r 
a rinfi or woridng day. Where the supplier is geographically close and connected hy an 
EDI system it may be possible to reduce order levels and have several smaller orders 
delivered within each shift or working day (Logothetis, 1992). In Japan, vriiere JIT 
systems were first used by car and electronic manufacturers, many suppliers have their 
fectories or woikriiops adjacent to the main fectory. This made multple deliveries within 
the woridng day a practical possibility. In other parts of the world this situation is 
unusual and deliveries are usually made against a master schedule, usually having a two 
or three weeks time span, that will be tpdated on a weekly or daQy basis (Schonberger, 
1982). The other issue that is central to the efficient working of JIT systems in
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mamifacturipg is that of quality. Cleariy if no, or little, stock is kept in the system then 
each conponent or assemb^ must be 100% correct on delivery otherwise the 
manufacturing system will eventual^ stop because of shortages. Thus the quality system 
in sippfy chain processes must be c^iable of adnevfag fois high quality standard 
consistently and reliably. The need to achieve this standard has led to the development of 
the Total Quality Management (TQM) concept in vhich a wide range of quality 
techniques and methods have been developed that may be spplied to all parts of the 
suppty chain. The other issue that JIT system implementers had to face was that of 
sippUer relationships. For JIT to work the interface between the sipplier and the buyer 
had to change. The traditional 'arms length', adversarial relationfops in which sipphers 
were "played off against one another for price reductions was no longer appropriate. 
This was replaced by closer relationshps between the buyer and sipplier in vfoichm^ be 
almost symbiotic. This meant three things. Firstly, the number o f  stppliers were 
radical^ reduced - sometimes to single sourcing for individual components or assemblies. 
Secondly, the focus shifts ftom price to cost, vfaere cost is a composite "vfoole life' 
calculation (e.g. rework, shortages, scrp  and stock holding costs as well as the actual 
price of the product). Finally the sippher becomes involved within the design process of 
the product in order to pool knowledge and epertise with the general idea of producing 
a better product in the first place.
With the exanple of the benefits that manufacturing industries have achieved in terms of 
cost and pace reductions and quality inprovements, it is not surprising that the food 
mukples were interested in implementing JIT in their supply chain. Other reasons that 
must not be ignored are that of mariœt positioning and fiefoness policies. The food 
mukples in the UK have a higha: overhead profile than equivalent organisations in
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Europe or the US, primarity due to the higher cost of laud. Thus to maintain or inprove 
margins to cover these higher costs requires conpetitive strategies not to be based on 
price conpetition but on quality, variety, service, store image and efiSciency in the sipply 
chain. The net effect of these factors is to force the food multple ip  market away fiom 
the sector where conpetition is based on pricing (Weinstein, 1991). In these ipper 
market sectors the issues of quality and fioshness, particular^ for green grocery is very 
inportant. JIT sipply is the key to firesh produce availability and a consistent quality 
product range (e.g. being able to buy top quality salad products all year). Again, in terms 
of margin maintenance, green grocery margins are significant]  ^ higher than those of 
canned jfood (most green grocery products have a 35 - 45% profit margin, canned 
produce has a 5 to 7% profit margin), and green grocery can be responsible for ip  to 
10% of a stores sales and about a third of its gross profit (Brookes, 1995). CTearly a JIT 
sippÿ driven by actual sales is high^ desirable.
The JIT princple has been adopted by the food mukples under the title Quick Réponse 
(QR). In retailing k was not the fi>od mukples who were the first to explore QR - k was 
the fashion business in the US (General Electric, 1992 and 1993) vdio claimed 
pectacular reductions in inventory, customer service improvements and profitability 
(Walker, 1994; Fox, 1991; GUI, 1991). When the fix)d mukple retailers moved to 
adopting QR Whiteoak (1994) states the objectives were:
a. to eliminate unnecessary stock, double and trple handling 
and inefSdency in the sipply chain,
b. to eliminate unnec^saiy tasks through sinphfication and 
automation.
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c. to mqmove siqipHer - biryer relationsh^ and reduce the 
number of siqjpliers with all parties gaining benefits fix>m 
economies of scale.
What worked against the general desire to maximise product avafiahOhy and minimise 
costs and administrative effort were princq)a% history and inertia. The siqjphers were 
deeply suspicious Wien the food mukÿles began to discuss moving to QR. Whiteoak 
(1994, p.33) summarises a typical siq^plier's reqx)nse:
"... It is easy to talk in general terms about the princÿles of 
partnersh%). ... Débité increasing willingness to work 
together there remain many attitudes, prejudices, corporate 
cultures to be changed and hidden agendas to be e3qx)sed 
if the fill! range of possibilities are to be e3q>bred."
Clearly suppliers do not believe that the adversarial buying culture in the fi>od multiples 
win change quickfy and that buyers in the fi>od multÿles have much to unlearn. From a 
buying point of view the transition to a QR culture presents many challenges, l^ th  
peàxBps 20,000 to 25,000 items on the merchandise catalogue the transition to QR is 
bound to take a considerable time. The way in Wnch the processes of negotiation have 
to change are described by Dawson and Shaw (1990) in Figure 2.18. It will be seen that 
the transitions are 6 r fix>m simple and at each stage of the transition fiom adversarial 
relfltinnship to integrated relationshq) crises can, and do, occur. The ingx)rtant 
conclusion that may be drawn fix>m this transition process is not linear and will almost 
certainly take a considerable period of time. Evidence that siq^port this change model 
has been found by Malien, 1963; Frazior and Sheth, 1985; Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; 
Narus and Anderson, 1987; and, Reve and Stem, 1979. Where negotiations have been
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successfiil, as was the case with Tesco, Femie (1994) found that Tesco had managed to 
reduced their siq^lier base fiom 2,500 to 1,300 between 1990 and 1992.
PHASE ONE PHASE TWO
Crisis redeeemed by 
humanising systmns
PHASE THREE
INTEGRATE!
Crisis redeemed by 
ralimialising reiatkmshÿs
PIONEER
Dominant relationship 
Trading dominated by personal 
buying and selling
RATIONAL/
SCIENTIFIC
Dominant rdatiooship 
Negotiating characterised 
by distributive bargaining
1 Dominant relationshq) charactmised by joint problem solving
Crisis relati<mshq) 
Characterised by in-groiQ) 
out-groiq> conflict and 
manipulative n^otiation
Crisis rdationship 
Personal coercion characterised 
by individual conflicts
(Source: Dawson & Shaw, 1990, p 22)
Figure 2.18 Phases in the changing nature of retailer - manufacturer
relationships
QR is still an active issue in the food multçles. Most have a substantial proportion - 
between 60% and 80% - of their product line purchasing controlled ly  QR systems 
(IGD, 1993). Extending QR control to the whole product range is hankered by the 
development of the food producers - in particular those who are at the end of 
geogr^hjcaUy long distribution chains, or those vdm deliver fiom countries v^here the 
technological infiastructure is not well developed. The problems associated with 
geogr^hically remote sqq)liers are not new. The earfy histories of J. Sainsbury
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(^jpeodix 2), Lÿton (Waugh, 1951), and other Victorian muhçles (Barty-King, 1986) 
are littered with the difficulties of getting and maintaining siq>plies fiom abroad. During 
the late 1800s much of the meat inq>orted was salted and packed in barrels, and in this 
state could withstand extended voyages and siq>pfy lead times. Other products, in 
particular fi^sh soft fiuits and vegetables could not be sensib^ sourced fiom abroad. 
Where they were inserted they were usua% dried before despatch, for exanq>le 
currants, raisins and dried ^xricots, and bulk packed. Even products such as tea 
presented many problems because of the transit time fiom India and China and the 
propensity of cargo to get wet inmaiy of the old sailing shq)s. Gradually wooden sailing 
sh%)s were rq>laced ly  steel shq>s and the problems of spoilage (sometimes as high as 
30% to 40%) receded. Even so, the delivery lead time for fiesh finit was stOl too long 
and it required the development of refiigeration to make inciting  it a practkal 
proposition. By the early 1900s refiigerated shÿs were available and produce such as 
bananas changed fiom being a rarity to becoming a readi^ available commodity. Other 
products such as q>ples finm the southern hend^here became available vAjcd. UK 
supplies were not in season. Refiigerated shps also made inciting  cheq) fiozen meat 
fix>m Australia and New Zealand a practical possibility.
Sourcing strategies during the late 1800s and earfy and mid 1900s, excluding wars, 
tended to follow the season variations of the country in which the produce was grown. 
During the earty 1980s ««ting habits began to change and the demand for firesh fiuit and 
vegetables, especially salad produce, was year round. To meet this demand the multq>les 
began to develop proactive sourcing strategies that were tru^ international. Improved 
tranqx)rtation, eq>ecially air tranport, meant that produce picked on one day in the 
southern hemiq)here could be on the housewife's table in the UK two days later. This led
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the food mukpks to establish new sources of supph  ^for fiesh fiuit and vegetables in 
countries where particular products had not been traditional^ grown, and in volumes 
higher than that needed to sipply the local markets. Safow^, for example, source a Hgh 
proportion of their salad produce fiom Spain during the winter months. Conversely, the 
market that the food multples offer has encouraged remote countries to develop 
products designed to appeal to the European consumers palate. An exanple of this 
phenomenon would be wine being grown in countries such as Australia, New T^ afanH 
and South America. In line with this process of globalisation there has been an 
inprovement in the distribution chain with specialised tranport such as the refiigerated 
lorry, and in the quality of packaging. These iuprovanents keep produce fiesh and 
reduce wastage due to mishandling throughout the distribution chaiiL
The issues associated with distribution systems are conplex. Much energy in the food 
chain is eiqpended on getting the right food to the right place at the right time. When 
changes to the distribution chain have been made they have been done well and usually 
on a large scale. The drive for food multples to improve their distribution system has 
been prompted by their constant search for better customer service and increased 
efficiency. Tfarou^ inproving systems and resource utilisation they have kqA the 
system that delivers thousands of stock items under control - a nontrivial task As a 
leading edge user of the distribution system the fix>d multiple have been quick to exploit 
innovation and through their buying power encouraged others to innovate. They have 
not been innovators themselves.
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2.6 General conclusions
Having reviewed the literature associated with strategy, technology and organisations, 
performance measurement and finally distribution systems, three issues become clear.
Firstly it seems clear that the conplexity of an organsation arises not so much firom the 
task the organisation sets itself in market terms, but on how it organises itself for this 
task. Success in a market place similarly depends on maintaining a balance between an 
understanding of a customer's changing needs and on developing and maintaining an 
organisation's general and unique competitive resources to satisfy those needs.
Secondly the literature review has riiown that little research has been focused on the 
relationship between tedmobgy and strategy in food retailers. In undertaking the 
research for this thesis the author win therefore be making an original contribution to 
knowledge.
Thirdly it is clear that information systems play an essential role in the way in which the 
multple food retailer reponds to its customers needs, measures its performance, and 
controls its operations. It is a core competence. In examining the relationshp between 
the nniltple food retailers and the information technology they use this literature review 
highlights the following targets for the methodology:
L to gather information that will enable the anafysis of the 
histories of the food multiples in order to understand the 
mechanisms, phases and drivers of change; 
ii. to gather information that win enable the anafysis of the 
retailer information systems in order to understand
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the way in vshich they aie used in operatioiial and strategic
terms; and,
ill to gather information that will enable the analysis of the 
way in which information technology, operational and
strategic activities interact 
By gathering this information and anafysing it this research wfll be able to determine
vriiether or not technotogy is enabling or leading strategy in the food multiples.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 The tqqfFoach to Hie Investigation
During the research a mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques were used. The 
quantitative techniques were used to obtain conparative data i^œre it was available and 
relevant to the research (Le. the design and structure of the technology systems, financial 
and operational information). Qualitative tedmiques were used to establish a picture of 
events in the retailers during the period 1980 to 1990 and subsequentfy. The choice of a 
qualitative approach for fois aspect of the investigarion was pronpted by the following -
a. the situations being investigated were conplex involving 
organisations that enpby a large number of people, operate 
on a wide geographical basis and that use a wide variety of 
technology;
b. the number of data sources, epedally executives with the 
appropriate knowledge of the organisations, was very 
limited;
c. a purely quantitative approach could have missed information 
vital for understanding the events in the organisations.
Adopting this ^proach was following a well established tradition of organisational 
investigation identified by Bryman (1992). The qualitative qproach is widely used in the 
social sciences and has been described by many authors (e.g. Patton: 1990, Bogden & 
Bidden: 1992, Denzin: 1978). Its value is that it allows conplex issues to be addressed 
and personal opinion or interpretations to be given about a situation. The choice of data
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collection within this framewoik of enquiry is wide. Marshall and Rossman (1995) 
identify eig^ piiiiaiy methods of data collection.
Partîdpaûon - actively taking part in the situation being investigated 
and thmugh this particpation building an understanding of people 
and issues of ioportance. (Peko & Peko: 1978, Spradley: 1980,
Jorgensen: 1989, Van Manem 1990)
Observation - the systematic recording of events, artefects and 
situations in the social setting being observed. (Evertson & Green: 1985) 
In-depth interviewing - in^nchaform alor semi- formal 
structure is used to efick information about an organisation 
or skuadoiL (McCracken: 1988, Patton: 1990, Trpp: 1983)
Etiinographic interviewing -based onthe discplines of cognitive 
anthropology and used to gather cultural data. (Spradley: 1979,
Filstead: 1970, Wolcott: 1985)
Phenomenological interviewa^ - designed to explore and 
understand the view that a range of individuals have of their 
"world" and ^ bich is open ended in nature. (Patton: 1990,
Bogdan & Bidden: 1992, Taylor & Bogdan: 1984)
Etite (or expert) interviewa^ - cbsefy related to phenomenobgbal 
interviewing excqit that the interviews are restricted to those have a 
senbr poskbn in their organisatbn and vdx> have access to 
a wider range of informatbn that those bwer in organisatbns.
(Becker & Meyers: 1974, Marshall: 1984, Platt: 1981)
Focus groigf interviewing - often used in the marketing environment 
to determine the attitudes and opinbns of a like group of peopb,
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the review of documents - usually used as a way of sipplementing 
and confbming information gathered fiom the previously described 
methods. (Bim, Hague & Vangelden 1990, Krueger: 1988,
Morgan: 1988)
Sipplementaiy data associated with these primary methods can be attained via a wide 
range of devices - narrative anafysis, life history anafysis, environmental history anafysis, 
films videos and photogr^hs, Idnesics and proxemics, questionnaires and surveys, 
projective techniques and surveys, and repertory grid techniques. The choice ofi^nch of 
these is used will depend to a greater extent upon the situation and the people involved.
Marshall and Rossman indicate that to some extent these primary and sipplementary 
methods of gathering qualitative information all suffer fiom similar problems. They all 
have a danger ofpardcpant bias and influence; it is difficult to draw general conclusions 
fiom the results of these types of investigation; metrics are difficult .to construct and 
administer; th ^  are eiqiensive in terms of time; data recording can be difficult or 
inaccurate; and^  data may onfy have meaning in a pecific environmental context 
However, providing these limitations are borne in mind the qualitative approach offers a 
wkler and richer source of information than the quantitative approach.
The qualitative tecfaoiques used in this research were-
a. semirstructured eopert interviews in the retail organisations to 
c^ntalise on the detailed knowledge that interviewees had about 
the development of then organisations, strategies and systems,
b. semi-structured interviews with the technology systems sippHers to 
determine the philosophy and structure bdiind the design of
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the systems for the food retailers, and
c. structured interviews with stppliers of systems conponents 
(e.g. Bar Code Readers, Bar Code Printers, EPoS Terminals 
and Carii Registers) to determine how these system 
conponents have been, and are being developed and applied in 
the food mukple information technology environment 
The data gathered these techniques is summarised in the following three ch^iters
3.2  The choice of organisations studied
This research is focused on three mukple food retailers - J. Sainfoury, Tesco and the 
Safeway (Argyll Groip). There were five reasons for choosing these organisations:
1. T h^ are trading in the same segment ofthe food retail market (ipper quartfie).
2. They sell their produce to similar socio-economic groups (Table 3.1).
3. They have all been infiuenced by the same general economic changes at the same 
time; and this sinplifies the conp arative process by eliminating a major 
variable in the anafysis.
4. T h^ an invested heavily in technobgy during the period 1980 to 1990, and 
have continued to do so since this period.
5. They are among the most successful of the food retailing mukples in the UK. 
Tabb 3.1 is a conparative anafysis of key indicators associated with these three 
organisatbns. It gives an indicatbn of the similarities and differences to be found in the 
1996/97 trading year.
In addition to J. Sainsbury, Tesco and the Safeway as users of retail systems technobgy, 
three major UK based mukpb retail systems suppliers were selected - IBM, ICL and
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Siemens Nbddorf These systems suppliers were chosen because they were reponsible 
for supplying and maintaining the systems in the three food retailers being studied. By 
questionning these system stppHers it was possible to gain an understanding of many 
technical features of the systems, and to determine some of the technical and commercial 
constraints that influence retail systems design.
J. SainsiNiry pk Tesco pic Argyll Group pl«
Turnover £m ^
(Consolidated figs.)*
Pre-Tax Profit £m^
No. of Stores’
(Inchiding subsi(fs)
Average sales area 
sq. ft.*
No. of employees*
O^ ull Time Equivalent)
No. of product lines*
No. o f own lines* '
Customer sodo-eoonomic groip’
Av. customer pend per week*
Customer age^
No. ofdepots used for 
distribution*
Sippliers on EDI*
13,395
695
384
29,301
55,564
19,000 
9,500 
A,B,C1(60%) 
£22.93p 
56% 45 or over 
19
95%
13,387
774
566
24,531
71,467
38,969 
13,753 
C1,C2(54%) 
£23.04p 
61% 35 or over 
21
95%
6,589
462
487
19,536
47,950
20,000 
6,000 
A, B, Cl (56%) 
£17.12p 
25% 35-44 
12
95%
Sources: 1 -Company Rports and Accounts, 2 -Company rports and Accounts, 
IGD, 3 - AGB Siperpanel * Includes subsidiaries
Table 3.1 Comparative organisation statistics for J. Sainsbury pic, 
Tesco pic and Argyll (Safeway) Group pk 1996/1997
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3.3 The PUat Stiufy
A pilot study using the previousfy described quantarive and qualitative was undertaken to 
establish a feasible research strategy and to confirm that the research would make an 
original contribution to knowledge about the fi>od multiple retailer systems. The 
previousfy identified food retailers and systems suppliers were qproached in writing with 
an outline descrption of the research to determine if they would be prepared to 
co-operate. All six organisations indicated they were prepared to co-operate suhgect to 
receiving more information. Subsequentfymeetings were arranged with aH organisations. 
At these meetings the nature of the investigation was explained and undertaking* to 
preserve confidentiality given - a condition that all required. These interviews were not 
recorded on tape but notes were Isept throughout each interview and shortly after 
transcribed to reflect the full interview. A list of those interviewed during the pilot study 
is contained in Table 3.2.
Organisatkm Name PoaitloB Interview BO.
J. Saindwryplc C. &&mtagnon Wbrmation Systems Director JS:CM1:09:93
J. Sainsbury pic C. Baker Systems Development Manager JS:CB1:10:93
Tesco pic R. Rumbdlow Infennatioo Systems Officer TEdRR:10:93
Safeway pic M. Windi Information Systems Director SAdvIWlK)2:93
ICL pic P. Evans Technical Manager Retail Systems ICJ’E1:03:93
Retail Systems
IBM pic P. Rees Maiketing Manager Retail Systems IBd»Rl:05:93
Retail S<dutioas (Europe) -
Siemens Nixdorf L Stewart European Marketing SN:IS1.*05:93
Ret SysL Divn. Manager
Table 3.2 fenpb Interviewed during the pilot study 
N 3. Literview number is the transcribed note code-this identifies company: 
interviewee (1st, 2nd, ^  interview): monfii: year.
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Because the interviews were a precursor to the main study, cate was taken to avoid 
probing areas that the interviewees were uncomfortable with. A short questionnaire was 
used to ensure that the main areas of interest to the research were discussed:
a. Could you briefly explain how EPoS technology flt into your 
information and control systems? 
b Do you have any diagrams or technical speciflcations that 
describe your information and control system in terms of how 
it works, and is this information available for inspection?
c. Who would be the best people (person) to talk to about your 
information and control systems?
d. How important is technology for your operational systems - 
and why?
e. Do you think that tedmology affects your strategy?
N 3. Questions (d) and (e) were not given to the systems suppliers in this format T h^ 
were phrased in terms of asking the systems stpphers to assess how these items affected 
their customers activities and strategies.
As will be seen in questions (a) the original intention of the research was to examine the 
inq)lementation of EPoS systems in the organisations and to see how EPoS had affected 
retailing strategies. The first outcome o f the pilot study was to demonstrate that EPoS 
had so many complex relationships within the technology systems used by these 
retailers, that to treat it separately would distort the research It was only ly  
investigating the technology system as a vdiole that mcanmgful relatîonshÿs could be 
established between technology and s tra t^ . The second issue that arose was the 
similarity o f the information and control systems that the three retailers used. Because
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of this it was possible to derive a generic technology systems description that would have 
general validity in the multiple food retail sector as a vfoole. This seemed to be a 
worthwhile target for part of this investigation as no desctiption existed at the time of 
starting the thesis in 1993. This was to prove an in^rtant backdrop when subsequentfy 
interpreting the strategies of the three retailers. The fined issue that arose was that none 
o f the interviewees who work in the three food retailers, were prepared to talk in detail 
about current strategies and mterrud technical developments. This was understandable 
in the context of commercial prudence and confidentiality. However, during this pilot 
research it became clear that the period 1980 to 1990 was inportant in the evolution of 
retail systems. This was a period of great technological change, and by focusing on this 
period it would be possible to gain useful msights into the development of past and 
present technology/strategy relatiohshps. An additional benefit was that information 
about organisational activities during this period was not sensitive and was readily 
recalled by those interviewed. Other data that was required to complete the descrption 
the cinrent management and control systems was available fiom the mam system 
sippliers.
In summary, the pilot programme demonstrated that the main research programme 
would make an original contribution to knowledge about the relationship between 
technology and food retailer stratepes; and, was a practical possibility.
The pilot programme'hefyed to defined the structure of the fiill literature search and the 
structure of the enquiry into the nature of the technologr systems used by Sainsbury, 
Tesco and Safeway. It also befyed to refine the approach to the conpany histories that 
illustrate the changing relationship between technology and the general and operational
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strat^ies that the food mukples adopted as they evolved espedalfy in the period 1980 
and 1990.
3.4 The main research programme
The main body of the research may be conveniently considered in four parts. The first 
was the literature review and this will be found in Chapter 2. The second part of the 
research gathered data about the information and control systems and about the system 
conponents. This data is correlated, and discussed in Appendix 1 and Chapter 4. The 
third part of the research gathered data to compile and summarise the histories of 
Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway vrinch may be found in Appendix 2. This information is 
correlated with the information gathered from the executives and senior managers of the 
organisations and was used to evaluate the evolvution of information technology and 
strategic issues. This information, together with that gathered in other aqpects of the 
research was used in Gupter 5 in which the development of the food mukples is 
examined. The fourth part of the research programme is discussed in chapter 6 and this 
examines the relatinnshps between performance measurement systems, core conpetence 
development and information systems development This chapter draws on the data and 
conclusions fix>m Qupters 4 and 5.
Wherever possible the intervfew data was triangulated with other data available fiom 
books, journals, the retail trade press, or fiom the archives of the Institute of Grocery 
Distribution in Letchworth and/or fiom the archives and library of the Oxford Institute of 
Retail Management in Tenpleton College Oxford. However, k is inevitable that some of 
the data, especialfy that associated wkh the recollections of the senior management of
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historic events, was taken at 6ce vahie as it was often associated with internal events 
that were not recorded in a formal way either when th ^  took place or subsequentfy.
OrgrnûMtMm Name PosUkm Interview na
J. Sainsbury pic C.MootagnoQ Informations Systems Director JS:CM2:10:93
J. Sainshnyplc C. Baker Systems Development Manager JS:CB2K)1:94
JSK:B3:02:94
J. Sainsbury pic C. Swanston Systems Development Manager JS:CS:06:94
Tesco pic L OReilly Information Systems Director TE:IOK)6:94
Tesco pic J.Dove Systems Development Manager TEJD1:10:94
TEJD2:02:95
TEJD3i06i9S
Safew^plc M. Windi Information Systems Director SAAfW2K)6:95
SAA1W3:09:96
ICL pic PEvans Technical Manager Ret Sales IC:PE2:06:94
ICL pic . R. Wilkinson Systems Engineer ICRW1:06:94
IBM pic P. Rees Mktg. Manager Ret Sys. IB:PR2K)6:94
IBM pic F. England TedL Manager Ret Sys. IBJE1K)6:95
IBJE2XP9:95
Siemens Nixdorf L Stewart European Marketing Manager SNJS2:03:96
Siemens Nbcdorf J.Pettinger Systems Engineer SNJPl:03i96
SNJP2K)4:96
Table 33 Retailer and System Suppliers interviews
The data used to corrpile the histories of the conpaniœ was obtained from several 
sources. All of the food retailers had a form of company history. Sainfouiy and 
Tesco this was quite detailed and was available in book ftprm. Sainsbury have a conpany 
archivist vho was very hefyftil in allowing access to the Sainsbury archives, although 
records of past board meetings were conpany confidentiaL The Hbraiy of the IGD has 
an extensive archive of retail journals such as the 'Grocer’ that go back to the 1800s and
1 2 6
which have regularfy l i l t e d  the activities ofthe food retafl mukples. These were used 
to check the information in the official conpany histories. Some ofthe Hata gathered 
from the executives in the food retailers was used in the construction ofthe histories of 
the food mukples. Also several books, in particular those by Adbergham (1964), 
Bamfield (1980), Barty-King (1986), Briggs (1991), Hffl (1990), Kirby and Rose (1994), 
McKinnon (1981), Matthias (1989), Philps (1992) and W au^ (1951) were very usefol 
in triangulating general retail mari^ et information vriiich influenced the official conpany 
histories.
To gather the data to build ip  a descrption of the retail systems two main sources of 
data were used. The first was the mukple retailers and the main systems sippliers 
(Table 3.3), the second were the systems conponents suppliers (Table 3.4).
The data gathered during the pilbt programme enabled an pproximate generic 
infoimation systems diagrams to be constructed, and this was used as a basis for 
discussion during the interviews in Table 3.3. The interview strategy for 
encounters was to use the "neutral' generic model to build ip  an overall picture 
incrementalfy. This avoided the need to ask directfy for sensitive mformmfinn «nH of 
placing interviewees in an embarrassing situation. The interviews concentrated on 
defining the retailers systems structures at Head Office, in the distribution cbam, and in 
the store. Also the connections between the retail systems and external organisations 
such as sippliers and the banks were identified. As each part of the systems was defined 
in greater detail the relationship between that part of the system and operational 
strategies was identified and discussed.
127
During these interviews, especialfy those with the systems builders, it became obvious 
that another inportant source of data were system conponent suppliers. This was 
because the retail systems builders had ceased to design and build their own perpheral 
technology, concentrating instead on "putting together and making the big system work". 
Accordingfy, a survey of a variety of technical and retail sources (magazine, journals, 
and exhibitions) identified many of the established leaders in their relevant fields of retail 
techiu>]ogy and software. These are identified in Table 3.4. These sippliers were 
interviewed during 196 and 1967. They were asked to explain how their product fitted in 
to the retail systems; wbat advantage their product gave to the systems builders; what
I
advantage their product gave to the system users; and, if they would sippfy information 
in the form of technical performance and functional pecifications. This data was 
correlated with that obtained fix>m the retailers and systems builders and used to 
construct the descrption ofthe generic retail system described in Chpter 4.
OrgflBàaitUa Prodoct Orgawntkn Product
3 Com Ltd. ISDN & Data Metanetics Corp. ID Cards
Glasgow Netwockmg Myers, Florida
AIM Ltd. Retail&Disfn Métrologie GmbH Bar Code Readers
Hull Systems Mundien
AstracLtd. IBM Training Microsoft Corp. LAN,WAN&Retafl
Leeds AS400Ser. Basingstoke Systems
BayNeCwofksSA LAN&WAN Omron Electronics Ltd. Plastic Card ^ stems
VaHxHme Networks -
BACGLtd. Data Warriiouse Ouroumoff Sys sa Logistics Systems
Leeds Software Paris
Brio Technology Inc Data Warehouse Paradigm Tedi. Ltd. Bar Code Systems
Islewordi Software Wallingford
Cambridge Online Database software Pegasus Soft. Ltd. EPoS Systems
Ltd. Cambridge Kettering
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Campbell Software Europe, WoridbtceMan. PMCS pic, Coventry Store Retail Systems
Loudoa Software
The Checkout Centre, EPoS Systems Prologic Ltd. Datamining Systems
Dunstable London
Computeraid Services Ltd. Consulting Services Project Assist Ltd. Customer Loyalty
Fambcrou^ Hardey Whney Systems
Epson (UK) Ltd. PoS Equpment and C^ umtdcLtd. Retail Information
Hemd Hempstead Systems Wddn^iam ^sterns
Gnxp Alpha Ltd. Store Software and Radius Retail Dd. Retail Software
Romford Systems Nfflton Keynes Systems
Hero Systems Ltd. PoS Terminals and Russet Ltd. Plastic Card Systems
Weyfaridge Systems Reading
Pearson Professional Dd. F.T. Reports . RTSILtd. Distribution Software
Nottin^am
Holiaic ^sterns Ltd. Business Intdligence Scan Coin Ltd. Cmn Sorting Systems
London Systems Salford
ICM Security Ltd. Security & Monitoring Santa Cruz Ops. Ltd. UNIX and Windows
Leeds Systems Watford Systems
ICS pic Personnd Systems Senn-Delaney Ltd. Retail Systems
Reading London
IMS Ltd. Voicemail & SPSS Ltd. Statistical Analysis
Leeds London Systems
IPCLtd. PoS Terminal & Systems SWL Retail Sys. Ltd. Service Management
Ndson Redditch Systems
Island Pacific Corp. Database Systems Tabula Ltd. EPoS Systems
Wendens Ambo Shepperton
Ordnance Survey Digital Maps Tiyptydi Systems Ltd. User Interfoces
Southampton Gerrards Cross
Kronos Systems Ltd. Time Management LIS Ltd. Proof of Delivery Sys:
Reading Ifigh Wycombe
Lee Integer Ltd. Customer Counting US’ Inc. Smart Cards
Kettering systems Santa Clara
Medoc Computers Ltd. EPoS Systems Verniers Comp. Ltd. Point of Sale Systems
Nottin^iam Milton Keynes
Table 3.4 Organisations who provided technical information
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The final phase of the research was to gather broadfy based information about the 
retailers from senior members of the three retailers i^io ekher were currentfy in position 
as director of a technology function, or who held such a postion in the past These 
people had access to the strategic thinking within the organisations and were of great 
hefy in identifying critical events during the period 1980 to 1990. The interviewees were 
Mr. Oliver Randle a semi-retired Director of Technology of J. Sainsbury (interviews 
JS:OR: 10:96; J8:OR:02:97), Prof Donald Harris recentfy retired Technical Director of 
Tesco and visiting Professor of Retailing at Stirling University (interview TE:DH:03:97), 
and, Mr. Nfike W^nch i%ho is Director of Systems at Safeway interview 
SA:MW4:03:97). The interviews were undertaken using the previousfy described 
semi-structured eoqiert interviewing rq^proach. Each interviewee was given a list of 
questions prior to the interview commencing. These were as follows:
a. What kind of technology was inqiortant for (Conçany) in 
the lead iq> to the period 1980 to 1990 - and vhy?
b. On reflection, how important do you think technology 
was to the devefopment of (Company) during the period 
1980 to 1990 - could you give some exanq>les?
c. Could you describe (Congxmy) technology strategy during 
period 1980 to 1990?
d. How did (Conyany) technology s tr a ta  afreet other corporate 
strategies during the 1980's?
e. Leaving technology aside for the moment, what other 
developments were going on in (Conçany) during the 1980s?
£ How would you describe the relationships between (Conqiany) 
and its' IT systems stqypHers during the 1980s?
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The final phase of the research was to gather hroadfy based information about the 
retailers fiom senior members of the three retailers who either were currentfy in position 
as director of a technology function, or vbo held such a postion in the past These 
people had access to the strat^ic thinking within the organisations and were of great 
hefy in identifying critical events during the period 1980 to 1990. The interviewees were 
Mr. Oliver Randle a semi-retired Director of Technology of J. Sainsbury (interviews 
JSrOR; 10:96; JS:OR:02:97), Prof Donald Harris recentfy retired Technical Director of 
Tesco and visiting Professor of Retailing at Stirling University (interview TET)H:03:97), 
and, Mr. Mike W^nch i^ho is Director of Systems at Safeway (interview 
SA:MW3:03:97). The interviews wae undertaken using the previousfy described 
semi-structured oqpert interviewing q>proach. Each interviewee was given a list of 
questions prior to the interview commencing. These were as follows:
a. What kind of technology was inportant for (Compaity) in 
the lead tq> to the period 1980 to 1990 - and why?
b. On reflection, bow inqportant do you think- technology 
was to the development of (Conçany) during the period 
1980 to 1990 - could you give some examples?
c. Could you describe (Conqxmy) technology strategy during 
period 1980 to 1990?
d. How did (Company) technology strategy affect other corporate 
strat^ies during the 1980's?
e. Leaving technology aside for the moment, vdiat other 
developmmts wne going on in (Conq>aDy) during the 1980s?
f  How would you describe the relationships between (Conqiany) 
and its' IT systems siqipliers during the 1980s?
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g. Have technology developments since 1990 progressed
in the way that was envisaged - or have unexpected changes 
taken place? (If so, vdiat are they?)
h. Do you think that technology has played an enabling role or 
a determining role in (Conqiaity) general development?
L In your opinion, how will technology change food retailing 
in the next 10 years?
Question (a) was designed to confirm the issues that the organisations were feeing as 
they entered the 1980s and was something of an icebreaker at the start of the interview. 
Questions (b) to (d) were designed to eiqilore the relationship between the technology 
that the retailers were using and the strategies they were adopting for both technology 
and in the maricet place in general Question (e) was designed to identify general 
organisational developments that were acting as a backdrop to technical change in the 
organisation and to pennit judgement of the perceived inqx>rtance of technology. 
Question (t) was designed to confirm opinions expressed by systems siq^liers about their 
reMonshp with the three retailers. Question (g) sought to establish how accurate the 
retailers are at predicting technological trends and developments; Question (h) sought to 
establirii if there had been a change in the role of technology with respect to the 
development ofthe retailers. Finally, question (i) was included to allow the interviewees 
to speculate on the firture developments of the technology - strategy relationshp in 
mukÿle food retailers. These questions were presented to the interviewees as a 
guideline for the areas to be discussed. At the interviews the interviewees answered the 
questions in whichever sequence they liked, lefeEiing to the question sheet onfy to ensure 
no issues had beai omitted. Each interview was recorded, transcribed, coded to identify 
data that was relevant to the main themes of the research:
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a. technology evolution (generaQ,
b. technology evolution (information and control systems),
c. general retail strategies,
d. key events between 1980 and 1990,
e. the chronology of operational problems,
£ the evolution of operational strategies,
h. technology supplier relationshÿs
L reflections on future systems developments.
This data was subsequently correlated and used in chapters 4,5 and 6.
In order to provide additional information about fliture devebpments of technology and 
strategy in multq)le food retailers question (Q above was also posed to John Walvetn of 
the I.G.D., Dr. Steve Birt of Stirling University, Dr. Jonathan Reynold of the Oxford 
Institute of Retail Management, John Walvem ofthe Institute of Grocery Distribution, 
and Prof John Dawson ofthe University of Edinburgh.
3.5 Post scr^
Although not formally included in the research programme, some of the operational 
systems and people issues were discussed informally with:
Simon Pattern, Sainsbury Store Manager, Central bfrtton Kçynes, 
hflke Gilmore, Safewsy Store Manager, Westcroft, Milton Keynes,
Mike Smith, Tesco Store Manager, Kingswood, Milton Keynes.
These discussions provided another per^iective on the information gained from previous 
interviews with managers in the retailer Head Offices. T h^ were also invaluable in
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evaluating the perfonnance measunnent systems that were used by the food mukÿles in 
the stores as a whole and within individual store functions.
3.6 Summary
The methodology adopted in this research provided data that allowed the relationship 
between information technology and retailer strategies to be analysed, and through this 
analysis understood. The combination of qualitative data and quantatfve data gathered 
from individuals and organisations within the theoretical framework suggested by the 
literature qipraisal was appropriate to the objective of the research - namely to 
demonstrate that information technology is beginning to lead strategy in the food 
multÿle retailers. The following three chsqiters anafyse this data.
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Cht^ter4 
The Food MuÜ^le Retail Slystems
4.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the results of the research undertaken into the retail information 
and control systems. The detailed descrqstions of the hardware and software structures 
of the store. Head Office and distribution systems are contained in Appendix 1. This 
ch^)ter concentrates on the structure and functionality of the systems as they relate to 
the operational aspects of the organisations. These give a view of the 'generic' system 
descrqjtion developed with the retailers and the retail systems designers. Variations to 
this congx)site system were almost entirely due to the historical evolution of both the 
retailers and the systems, and the extent to i^hich the retailers have modified and 
enhanced their systems to accommodate operational changes.
4.2 A system overview
Food mukfyle retailers use information and technology systems extensivefy througlx>ut 
their organisations - throughout the distribution chain to move, store and control 
merchandise; within stores to augment the activities of personnel; to control the 
communications within the retailing organisation and between the retailers and their 
suppliers. It is also used to communicate with customers and refine retailing operations 
to better meet the customers needs and to measure the performance and control the 
retailing management systerxL The food retailers use technology to enhance the 
efficiency of their organisations and this increases their effectiveness in the market place. 
A wide range of technology may be observed in the modem supermarket. Conçuters,
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automated weighing systems, bar code readers, automatic recent printings automatic 
cheque printing, store security systems, conveyoring at the check-out, air conditioning 
and refiigeration systems, automatic doors, dry cleaning equqyment, automatic baking 
equqjment and more. Elsei^ &ere in the retail chain other technolo^ adds to the 
efBdency of the retailer (e.g. automated warehousing 6c3ities, EDI controlling the 
communications between the retailer and their suppliers). It is difficult to imagine a 
modem food retailing chain without technology in general and without conq>uter systems 
q>ecifica]]y.
The histories of Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway discussed in Chgqyter 5 and ana^rsed in 
Appendix 2 demonstrate the inqx>rtance of information systems in the growth of the 
organisations. In particular there is ançle evidence, even in the earliest years of the 
history of Sainsbury, of the use of technology to iaq)rove the selling environment (e.g. 
refrigeration to store meats and dairy products, electric Hghtmg to enhance the diq>lay of 
products and the use of steam lorries to inqnove the speed of distribution). The Use o f 
these technologies inqiraved the conq>etitive performance o f the food retailers and 
irrqrroved control o f the retailing environment. Good information enabled meant good 
control In the very early days of Sainsbury control was obtained hy standardising 
manual systems in all shops. Through this standardisation it became possible to measure 
Wividual md store performance, and also to enhance the co-ordination of maiy of the 
central functions by having a consistent reporting system. The use of technology, 
coiq>led with the need to constaritly inqnove control and the shopping environment is a 
persistent theme in the retailers studied in the research.
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43 Factors i^ ecling food retail systems deâgn
Although Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway differentiate themselves through their 
advertising strategies by qxpealing to different sectors of the same market segment, at an 
operational level, leaving image issues aside, they are remarkably alike. So, for instance, 
food retailers all need to manage the distribution chain in more or less the ?ame way. 
The similarities were identified in the pilot programme durn% this research, a fiict that 
had not esc£q>ed the attention of Jones (1990) who observed that similarities are greater 
than differences, and that the design of retail systems is converging. He goes on to assert 
foat transaction volumes and data storage are hkety to be very ingx)rtant in the final 
design of the system, an observation confirmed in Appendix 1.
4.4 An overview of a typical retail control tystem
The role of control and information systems within a modem retail environment is 
cony lex and extensive. The core function of the information system is control of the 
distribution chain fiom siypher to consumer. Figure 4.1 illustrates a typkral system 
found in a food multyle in which the Head OfSce (HO) is the centre of the control 
system. The HO control and information systems will be connected to the warehouses 
and individual stores by telephone data lines and to siypliers (forms and foctories) via 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) connections. The normal stock rq>lenishment cycle is 
for the store to register actual sales via the EPoS system and to pass this information to 
head ofOce. The Head OfBce Conyuter (HOC) consolidates this information with 
information from other stores and generates stock rq>lenishment orders sent to siypliers 
via the EDI links. Siypliers despatch produce to either the warehouse or in some cases 
(e.g. vegetables) direct to the store. At the same tim e they send an electronic invoice 
over the EDI link to the HOC. When produce arrives at the warehouse it is checked for
137
quality, quantity, styplier etc. against data that has already been sent from the HOC 
about the order. The warehouse system is updated and this information is passed to the
DlSrrRIBUlK)NWAR£HOllSE BULK
DELIVERIES FARM
Despatch 
Informatioi]
Dcfivcnes
DIRECT DELIVERY
-> InAnmatâm(kwy(b#direciionaI)
^  Goods Bow
Figure 4.1 Schematic of information and goods flow in a food retailer
HOC and initiates payment to the suppliers. (Direct delivery psgrment wiH be initiated 
from the store.) Meanwhile the warehouse system allocates the stock to a storage space 
and at the same time generates a location bar code that is attached to the produce 
packaging. The produce is then moved to the pre-allocated location to await store 
replenishment orders. When these come from the HOC, a conyosite stock 
replenishment order is picked and prepared for despatch to the individual stores.
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One lorry will normally service several stores of moderate size, several lorries may be 
required to service the large siyer and hyper stores. On arrival at the store the stock 
order is checked and the produce moved to the display cabinets. The stock order 
delivery information is relayed to HOC. By conyaring deliveries and despatches or sale 
from the warehouse and individual stores a picture of the conyosite stock position is 
maintained by HOC. Essentially this is a Just La Time (JIT) system that works with 
remarkable efBciency considering the number of daify transactions that occur (in the 
order of millions). With produce such as vegetables this system can place orders on 
siypliers in the morning of a day for delivery before noon and to be placed on sale the 
same afternoon - a lead time of 3 or 4 hours! On other items such as exotic goods, some 
Just In Case (JIC) stock is normally held. The level of this stock is usually determined by 
the length of delivery chain. Clearly if produce has to come via ship from a remote part 
of the world, and the ààp only visits that part of the world infrequently, stock must be 
held to ensure a consistent siyply to the stores. The m ^ r  food retailing multyles have 
about 15,000 stock items in their smaller stores and as maiy as 35,000 items in dieir 
syerstores, and achieve an average stock turn o f22 (1994 Tesco conyany ryorts).
To some extent the previous descrytion is a simplified view of the system. In practice it 
contains other features such as the bar coding of produce, the Direct Product Profitability 
(DPP) system and the Electronic Funds Transfer for Point of Sale (EFTPoS) that are 
identified in Figure 4J2.
The bar coding of products enables the gathering of data at various parts of the system 
and forms the backbone of the stock control system. For the stock control system to 
work efficiently it must provide data about vfhat is in stock; data on what is being sold
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and Wiere it is being sold at i^ien it is being sold; allow good re-order decisions to be 
made; generate orders to be sent to siq^Hers; register receq>t and distribution of stock 
throughout the system; interAce with the space management and merchandising systems 
to allow effective stock diq)lay. In the UK the food retailers follow the standardised 
European Article Numbering system (EAN). Originally this coding system began in the 
USA. during the 1960s vdiere it was known as the UPC. Later, it changed its identity
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Figure 4^ Detailed Retail Information System
when it became universally adopted as the EAN. The EAN is a 13 digit code. Digit 1 
and 2 identify the product country of origin (e.g. 00 = USA, 32 = France, 05 = UK). 
Digits 3 to 7 identify the congxany making or marketing the product. Digits 8 to 12
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identify the specific product (size and descrytion) and digit 13 is check digit used to 
validate the code. These 13 digits will be used in their entirety within the stock control 
system. It should be stressed that bar codes are used throughout the distribution cWn 
and can be adapted dq>ending on use. For instance traded units (bulk orders) often use 
the ITF.14 code in winch the bar code symbol is larger, more robust and contains an 
extra digit (Figure 4.3). Sometimes additional information is needed for tracking or 
control purposes, in which case a supplementary code may be added to the EAN code.
The use of bar code scanning in food retailers is extensive. In 1993 99.7% of Sainsbmy 
stores, 97.5% of Tesco stores, and 100% of Safeway Stores used scanning equyment. 
The average for the grocery business as a i^hole was 74.1%. It is estimated that by 1997 
86% of grocery stores will use scanning equyment (Nielsen, 1995, p.l37). The scanners
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Figure 43 Examples of Bar Codes
themselves have developed since their introduction in the earfy 1980s. Originally they 
were hand held Heliumrneon lasers that were large, rather heavy, expensive to 
manufacture and used a lot of power. More recentfy (circa 1990) new scanning 
technology has been developed and the Helium-neon laser has been r^laced by Visible 
Laser Diodes (VLD) or Charge Coiyled Devices (CCD). These are small, ea^r to build 
in to equipment, cheap to manufacture and use a small amount of power. Of these
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features it is the cost of the scanner that has had the most significant inyact on the 
growth in use of this technology. The actual cost of the scanning laser has dropped ty  
over 80% between the period 1983 and 1992 (RMPD). From a practical point of view 
the design of modem laser scanners includes electronics and software that can recognise 
and decode several codes (stores sometimes use yecial codes) as well as coping with 
omnidirectional reading.
The second feature that is different between the simple system of Figure 4.1 and the 
more sophisticated system of Figure 43  is that of the DPP (Direct Product Profitability) 
system. DPP was original^ invented by McKinsey Consultants in 1967 to rylace
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Figure 4.4 Build up of Direct Product Profitability
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manual methods of calculating product profitability. Up to this point the food multiples 
used much cruder ways of calculating profit that only worked effective^ at store (not 
product) level DPP languished waiting for technology and ancillary systems to inyrove 
before it  could become a reality. In the past food retailers have used the stock control 
unit (SKU) as a way of controlling stock. The SKU compares actual stock usage with 
the quantity of stock on the shelves and then uses a predetermined stock level to trigger 
an order. The stock reorder level is determined by the dehveiy time of stock, either fiom 
the warehouse or fiom the sryplier. The SKU system is rather crude as it fiuls to take 
into account product size and cost relationships or other foctors such as handling costs, 
all of which can affect the marginal contribution of a product DPP takes all of these 
Actors into account and atypical DPP system is shown in Figure 4.4.
The DPP anafysis can lead to an accurate profit profile for each product and avoids the 
bucket accounting' syproach of the SKU system. Robson (1988) identified the benefits 
of DPP as:
1. identification of high DPP items can lead to better and more 
profitable merchandising,
2. DPP can identify items with high warehousing or distribution 
costs and fi>cus cost reduction activities,
3. DPP can improve shelf management by allowing the retailer 
to measure the relationsfay between the amount of space 
allocated to a particular item and the rate of sale of the item,
4. linking DPP with information gatha^  via the EPoS system 
enables a link between profit and demand patterns, and
143
5. because an accurate profit profile is generated by DPP better \
pricing strategies can be undertaken by the retailer.
However, Gavanagh (1987) suggested care must be taken when using DPP as its focus 
on the individual product can lead to distortions in the stock profile of a store. In turn 
this woik against issues such as merchandising and store aesthetics. Also it is inyortant 
that the measurement and control systems that provide data for the DPP system are
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Figure 43 The DPP driven merchandising matrix
^fective (Le. accurate costs are kiK)wn, accurate figures are available for space, an 
effective and robust inventory management system, etc.). Even so, DPP is a better and 
more focused approach to merchandising (Figure 4.5) because it enables relatively simple 
merchandising tactics ly quickly identifying Wiich of the four categories (sleepers, 
winners, underachievers and losers) a product foils withiiL Merchandisers can 
concentrate on ensuring that ^winners' are kept in active stock, that promotion policies
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for 'sleepers' and *underachievers' move these products into the 'winner' category, and 
that loser' products are taken fiom the product portfolio. It is significantly more 
accurate than previous approaches that relied on manual assessment of stock activities.
The third feature ofdiflference between Figure 4.1 and Figure 43  is that of the EFTPoS 
link with the banks and financial institutions. EFTPoS was developed as a joint initiative 
between the clearing banks and the large multyle retailers. The target in creating the 
EFTPoS system was to reduce the amount of cash and cheques that had to be handled by 
the retailers and the banks, and at the same time yeed up fimds transfers between the 
banks and the retailers. By using EFTPoS banks save up to 40% of the cost of a 
transaction and most EFTPoS systems installations pay for themselves in about a year. 
Naturally these savings have resulted in a reduction of costs for the retailers.
The EFTPoS systems that were inidalfy developed during the late 1980s onfy worked 
with debit cards (as opposed to credit cards), largefy because the banking systems were 
not sophisticated enough to cope with credit and debit cards simultaneously. However, 
the msgority of current EFTPoS systems will register transactions on not onfy hank 
issued credit cards but also a range of own brand' store cards. In princyle their 
operation is simple. After the customer's purchases have been totalled ly  the customer 
offers the check-out operator their debit card. Tbfo w swyed by the check-out operator 
and details of the transaction are sent through the communication system into the 
banking network. Here the customer’s coded information allows access to the current 
account details of the customer. Assuming that funds are available in the current 
account, an authorisation code is transmitted back to the retailer and the transaction is 
cony leted. At the same time fimds are transferred fiom the customer's account into the
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retailer's account As an additional check à p^>er audit trail is provided fiom the 
customers' point of view in terms of a till receyt and fiom the retailers' point of view 
with a copy of this receyt. Besides the saving in transaction costs EFTPoS reduces the 
time that the customer spends at the check-out and reduces the need for people to carry 
cash. In addition, the customer can use the EFTPoS system to draw ca^  fiom their 
bank accounts and this reduces the pressure on banking fociHties. Apart fiom these 
advantages it is Hkefy that EFTPoS is likely to play a considerable role in the future 
development of retail systems as its use spreads. In 1995 EFTPoS was available in 65% 
of all retail stores, and its use in the large food retailing chains exceeded 95% (RMPD 
Research).
This broad introduction to the retail systems has examined how the retail multyles 
structure their systems and some of the issues that must be addressed to ensure the 
effectiveness and efBciency of the overall business. The second part of this cluyter now 
considers the fimctionality of the software at an operational level
4*5 System Functionality
Retail systems may be conveniently analysed in five interconnecting functional areas -
a. m erehandiCTfig
b. re t^  price managem^
c. purchasing (part ofReplenishment software - Fig. 4.6)
d. warehouse and distribution ( as above)
e. management reporting
These five suites of software control all levels of operations fiom corporate headquarters 
activities, through the product distributions systems, to individual store activities. In
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broad conceptual terms the conylete system m ^  be regarded as a large, distributed, 
dynamic, integrated database controlled by a Relational Database Management System
r^‘ ■'jA/atabase^ ?:—
Normal links
<  >
Back-up links
Figure 4.6 Typical retail system functions
(RDBMS) - the central element in Figure 4.6. The hardware on vrinch the main database 
and other corporate software is located at the retailer data processing centre in the 
retailer’s Head Office. In most systems a diyficate or back-up data processing centre 
wülbe located remote fiom, but connected to, the main data centre. This is an insurance 
against a main systems foihire. The central and badc-ty data centres are always located 
in a high security building that is capable of withstanding bombs and terrorist attacks. 
The loss of a data centre, for whatever reason, has the potential to cryple the viiole 
organisation. Communication between the central and back-iy conyuter is usualfy 1^ 
Tandline’ - a dedicated ISDN link (usually an British Telecommunications or similar 
operators), or via satellite (commonly used on IBM ^ tem s).
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There are two methods of data processing found in the food multyles. Batch Operating 
Systems (BOS), and On Line Systems (OLS). In BOS the data gathered about the store 
and distribution activities is collated on the store or distribution centre conyuter, 
collected via a data polling system, and processed once or twice a day. In OLS data is 
gathered fiom the stores and distribution locations and processed continuously. Most of 
the modem systems are OLS. Occasional^ hybrid systems are found in which the main 
batch processing conyuter is run in tandem with an on line conyuter. The main 
advantage of the BOS is that data can be processed very quickly, the disadvantage is that 
the system can only lydate the peryheral systems once or twice a day. The advantages 
of the OLS is that data can be constantly lydated in peryheral systems, the disadvantage 
is that a large amount of hardware and processing power is dedicated to 
communications. On balance OLS are preferred by the food multyles as they give a finer 
degree of control in the overall system.
4.6 The merchandising system
The function of merchandising system is to control the variety of products offered for 
sale, to keep product information ly  to date throughout the retailing system, and to 
ensure that products are priced and displayed in a consistent manner in all outlets. The 
merchandising system may be considered at two levels. The first level is fixmsed on 
Head OfBce activities and involves the general management of the m^handise of^%d 
throughout the organisation, the second level is associated with the management of 
merchandise offered at store level in the system. The merchandising database is normally 
maintained at the organisation's Head Office and the merchandising strategy is also 
determined at Head OfBce. Product information can be surprisingly conyhcated, even
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Fuactimi
HienDTcfaiad ownodiq)
Descriptioa
This usually defines who owns» ptodact in tbe system. When new products «re piloted owoeisfaip 
(aoooantalnlity) mqr not reside ^ vitfa Ifae tfoce but widi one of the oeotral fimcdons of the
otgmisatinn Aitetnxtivnely some stores «re zoned fi* the purpose of control (e.g. the Bakers, the 
Delicatessen, the PbaimacyX and again «oconntability fix* perfbfiuanoe mnd «les may rest with » 
sub-manager within the store.
Stains new prodnct lines coming inlD the stores and old prodnct lines being taken off the shelves all 
the'time it is necessaiy to know whether prodnct lines are tanrenf,’withdrawn'<g*pendin^.
Boyer and buying hierarchy In most âwd retailing muhqdes buying is subdivided into product groups (e.g. tinned produce, AeA 
meats; herbs and spices, etc.). Most of toe sul%nmps will have toeir own buying peopk who 
authoiiae purchasing This will be augmented by 'super' group buyers who take an overview of
sevenl subgmqs monitming product 1ÜB ^ d es and product bafamoe whfain the merdmndiniis
structure.
Gross margin totenmce
Product type and dass
Prodimt features
Pack mnlttyles
SeawnaKty fector
Individual product minimnm and maxmnun percentage tolerances are used to set the limits at whidi 
a product m ^  be sold. An upper limit mty be set on a product with premium pricing-e.g. the 
upper limit mqr be cafcnlated on the basis ofsimilar products sdd by oompetitors. The lower limit 
will set the maxnmundfeoountaUowed - eig. the price ofa product nearing its Ml-Ity* date; or 
possibty udiere a store may have to match the petnd prices of a nearby rival store.
The product type is the description of the product-c.g. Tin ofHeinz beans. The product dass in the 
cam of the tin ofbeans would be Tinned Produced or possfldy Tinned V^etabief.
This data may be (prite complex fer products with lots of features-a tdevisioaferinstanoe. For the 
majority offeod produce product features are usually confined to packaging, weight, size; sqgdier 
and possibly location in stxae^  mfbonation.
Hus usually describes the number of products contained in a ^ jack* at diflfaeat places in the 
distribution tysteoB. So, fcrhatanoe, an item nuty be purch e od a d  driiyerad from the agpiier in
thnmaiuia. then he mpplied to the atmme m ewe* otwwining .  thf sfarif to be
diqilayedasindivkhudifems. Where special offers such as a three fertile price oftwo'are on 
diqday that m ^  also have implications fer the remainder ofthe distribution chain.
This is oAen a part ofthe buying strat%yofthe retailer when product lines that are seasonally 
sensitive (cLg. charcoal fer barbecues, Chrislmas decorations). Seasonal levels will be carefeUy 
defined on fee h a n t  o f  previoiMgaq w iei Me
ABC analysis Pareto analysis of product sales are an important pert of retailing strategy. As products rk m p  their
popularity this anatysis enables products to be moved fiom one cat^ory to another fer stockh^ and
buvhm purposes antnmatically-mvmghnyBrs tim e and money jyptwmnrnig pnpiW rtwfflr md 
demoting unpopular stodc
(Source: Radius Retail Ltd.)
Table 4.1 Functional requirements for merchandising software
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for apparently sinyle products. Most of this conylexity arises fiom the need for 
accuracy in the control of products at all stages in the system The merchandising 
database fimctional structure is described in Table 4.1. This is not exhaustive and the 
actual structure of the merchandising database wiü reflect the nature of the products and 
product mix sold. So, for instance, retailers v/bo inyort produce will have a part of 
their database dedicated to items such as country(ies) of origin, currency conversion rate, 
delivery lead time, special shyping arrangements, tariff arrangements and so on. The key 
data for products will always be held at a base level although lÿdating may done at any 
level in the system.
Because the merchandising system has to cope with a wide variety of products it must be 
flexible in yplication and access. In addition to the features described m Table 4.1 the 
merchandising system may have to contain details of alternative products or siypliers 
that could be used in case of problems with siyply. Other details that the merchandising 
system is Hkefy to contain are product variants (e.g. colour, size, weight, material, 
flavour, design, edition, texture - or ai^ combination of these); tenylates that pronyt 
sales assistants to suggest related buys (e.g. after buying a pair of shoes the assistant may 
pronyt the purchaser to buy polish); multi-buys vdiere different products may be offered 
in a joint purchase yecial promotions deal; and, pack details that are related to the 
different numbers of products in packs when purchased, stocked or sold.
In the merchandising system each product will have its own unique EAN (European 
Article Number) code or in the case of a book an ISBN number. A book sold at a 
siyermarket may have both codes. The minority of transactions associated with the 
product will be cony leted using this (or these) code(s). However, at the store, and in
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some aspects of the management system, it may be necessary to identify the product in 
different ways or with different codes jfer different purposes. Some of theses different 
lasys' are shown in Figure 4.7.
The availability of these altemative keys make the overall system more user fiiendfy in 
that a manager could, for instance, ask for a management rqx>rt based on a search word 
*tea', and this may cause the system to list all items with tea' in their product desciÿtion 
(e.g. herb tea, break&st tea, special tea, etc.). Other codes (or partial codes) such as an 
ISBN number would allow a manager to identify a particular book (e.g. 
0-07-70779991-4), or, if onfy 0-07 were entered, all McGraw-Hill books in stock would 
be listed. Of course it may be that a manager may be concerned with stock turn over and 
use the velocity code to identify items that were quick or slow moving. Flexibility in
Major 
3) AhemattveISBN
Code
Minor 
Altemative 
Keys 
K (e.gAuthor. 
^  Publisher)
Vekx%
Code (gf
Bar Codes 
ISBN
Partial
Key P EAN
(Source: Ouroumoff System SA)
Figure 4.7 Product Keys
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this aq>ect of the database configuration will have a direct influence of the overall 
systems usaMlity. Most of the modem systems have multi-key access as a 
feature of the core RDBMS.
The final aspect of the Head QflBce merchandising ^stem that is focused on activities in 
retail systems is associated with supplier information. This aspect of the 
contain data fields that describe: siqiplier product code; s illie r  reference number, EAN 
code; purchase or sales pack units; recominended retail price; nnnimum/mmdnium order 
quantity or value; luiitiniiim / maximum delivery quantity or value; manu&cturer delivery
/ lead time; country of or^in; preference ranking (often used in coqunction with ordering
policy); cost and discount details and special offers; user defined fields that will be
determined by the needs ofthe management and the business. The latter field m ^  be
used for siçplier performance information, siq^lier status flags and simibr administrative 
information.
While many merchandising software functions are focused on the Head OfBce activities, 
a substantial amount of software in the retail systems is focused on store merchandising
activities. This software is usualfy called'store nœrchandising'but to sonie extent this is
something of a misnomer as the software is administered at the centre ofthe system not
in the stores. More correctfy it o i# t to be called 'store merchandising monitoring' as
this more accurately reflects the use of the software. Broadfy speaking the store
merchandising software may be divided into six aqiects all of winch draw on the data
generated by tte  stores in the normal course of their operations. Tbese are illustrated in 
Figure 4.8.
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The first aqiect of the merchandismg software is associated with the corporate structure. 
^%hin any large organisation, and the food retail mult%)les may have in excess of 300 
stores, many distribution centres, and several administrative centres, there is a need to 
keep an accurate record of the corporate structure. The majority of the multÿle retailers 
have a cascade structure starting at the highest corporate level and devolving through 
divisional, regional, area and finalfy store levels. The store data wiH record the grade of 
the store (usually the higher the grade the larger the store or the more prestigious the 
location); the store features (e.g. square ftwtage, layout, number of floors, \%hether or 
not the store is licensed); the store trading data (e.g. trading plan, holidays, key dates);
Store 1
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STORE
GENERATED
DATA
Organisation
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Store initial 
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system
Stores inventory 
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(Source: Adapted from an RSA Systems Ltd diagram) 
Figure 4.8 Store merchandismg fonctions
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the store location data (e.g. address, communication numbers for fecsimile, modem and 
telephones, delivery route and constraints on access); the type of store (e.g. vdiether it is 
a stand alone store or a joint operation); the store personnel information (e.g. the namm 
of the General Manager, the dqiartmental managers, the key sta% the number of full 
time and part time staf^ etc.); and, the store performance data (e.g. position in the 
league table*). An additional conqilication in maiy of the retail multÿles at store level is 
the subletting of &x)r q%ce to ftanchises (e.g. Laura Ashl^ operating in the Sainsbmy's 
Do It AH subsidiaries). Again, the store merchandising software must be flexible enough 
to cope with the continually changing requirements ofthe market place.
Initial allocations and store gradings are closefy related aspects of the merchandising 
system (Figure 4.9). An initial allocation is, as its name suggests, the distribution (or 
allocation) of goods to stores for the first time. The precise sequence of this allocation 
throughout the retail system may be critical to product sales success and can be driven by 
several criteria. These are primarify store size and availability of shelf space or special 
facilities, for exanq>le refidgeration, and distribution and storage facilities in fl&e system 
and in the store. Other aqiects that may be taken into account in initial allocations are 
broader market items - for instance the willingness of people to try new produce or the 
correlation of population with commercial television coverage (Nielsen, 1995). Each 
food retailing multg)le has its own system of detenmoing the sequence of initial 
allocatioiL In general these may be classified into two types. The top - down system 
requires the user to input quantities required and warehouse stock retention levels, and 
then allocations will automatical^ be made by store grade downwards against previously 
allocated grade limit parameters. The bottom - up system requires the user to hqmt 
quantities and warehouse stock retention levels, and the system calculates the total
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quantity required. Grade iqiper and bwer limits are usuaify set by sales vohmie or value 
band.
The store inventory control cycle begins with stock deliveries being recorded as they 
arrive at the store. These are normalfy checked against store orders and shortages are 
recorded and fed back into the ordering system fer future deliveries. The deliveries and 
shortages, together with actual store transactions are coUecfed via the store EPoS system 
and automatical^ downloaded to the central systems wbsa the store is polled by the 
central computer system. Stock adjustments (shrinkage, breakage, etc.) may be recorded 
manualfy or automatically, and these will be consolidated with the other information. At 
product and variant level the following information wiU be registered: current stock; 
stock category (e.g. free, damaged, display, transferred, quarantined); units, value and 
weigjrted average cost; in transit & on order quantities; mmimum / maximum stock level; 
reorder quantity and reorder point This information is usualfy combined into a store 
product catalogue that may be unique for each store, be shared by several stores of the 
same grade, or possibfy be structured into core products common to all stores with 
special amendments for individual stores. New products wiU be added to, and 
discontinued products removed from, the catalogue by Head OfBce merchandisers vibo 
will modify the EPoS product catalogue and amend the store management system. The 
^rstem must take into account store returns, vèatever the reason (e.g. breakage), and 
keq) both store and central records iq> to date. Finalfy, the store stock records must also 
have the provision for stock corrections that come about because of either partial or frill 
stock audits. From the store and central management point of view accurate records arc 
essential for the system as a vAioh as th^r form the basis of the management reporting 
system. In this system the data can be interrogated to provide information about actual
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stock in stores, transactions details (number and type), product status, stock availahflity, 
stock take-on, stock product list and stock adjustments. These reports are used regularly 
by store managers to monitor store activities.
Stock replacement information is derived fiom EPoS data gathered during normal 
trading. Reorder level information wül be calculated either manually or automatically, 
and be reviewed regular^ and adjusted on the basis of current usage. Adjustments to 
stock level may also be driven ly  a variety of other foctors - seasonal profile (e.g. 
increasing stocks of chocolates before Christmas and Easter); trading plans (e.g. 
holidays); product substitutes; and, k ^  dates (e.g. back to school). Most merchandising 
system reordering processes are monitored by algorithms that allow actual trading data 
to be smoothed and a variety of forecasting methods (Le. average, weighted average.
Extract sales 
information Review sales 
historyCalculate
fisrecasts Review
forecastsCalculate 
replenishment 
levels ,
Calculate
requirements
Produce
order
Review
order Supplier
Source: Ouroumoff Systems SA
Figure 4.9 The order processing cycle
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regression or exponential smoothing) to be used for product planning and ordering. 
Figure 4.8 illustrates a typical order process that uses these kinds of techniques.
The merchandising software is one of the most critical parts of the retail system as it 
controls the range and volume of products on offer, and it also drives the purchasing 
system of the retailer. In many ystems the merchandising software was historically the 
first to be installed. As a consequence in many of the older muhq)le food retailers this 
software contains many idiosynrades that are difBcuh to e>q)lain in strict^ fogical terms 
but which can be understood in the context of the evolution of the specific organisation. 
However, the aq>ects of the merchandising system previous^ described are common to 
the majority of food multÿles and form the base iq>on i^fich the remainder of the 
systems are designed and operate.
4,7Retm lprice management
The price management software suite has the primary fimction of protecting the margins 
of the business by maintaining accurate pricing. It inter&ces with the merchandising 
software to ensure the right price is on the right goods and that the price is in line with 
merchandising plans. It also interfoces with the purchasing software in order to keep the 
prices charged for products up to date. The product pricing software has to cope with 
an unusually dynamic situation in the food multÿles. Figure 4.10 illustrates some ofthe 
product pricing options that the software has to accommodate.
The tin of beans at the centre of the diagram has a normal price of 10. Option 1 is this 
same tin of beans at a price of 5 - a simple and automatic discount Option 2 is called'
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table pricing' - if two tins are bought for a price of 10 the third tin costs 5. Option 3 is 
called 'quantity pricing' - if three tins are bought at once each tin costs 5. Option 4 is 
called "restricted quantity pricing' - only the first two tins are discounted to 5, successive
Source: Ada^ed fiom Siemens Calypso pricing diagram
Figure 4.10 Product pricing options
tins will cost 10. Option 5 is called 'case pricing' - if the whole case is bought the price is 
30. Option 6 is called 'deal reward' pricing - this could be buy a tin of beans and a can of 
soft drink and pay 15, or ahematively the may be buy a tin of beans and get a can of soft 
drink ftee or at a discount. Option 7 is called 'date and time' promotions - the can of 
beans is discounted to 5 on a particular day, possibly at a particular time. A tour of most 
fix)d muhÿles will produce examples of these (and other) pricing options and th y  are an 
inqx)rtant means of attracting customers to the store.
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A cost and price breakdown suggested ly  Ouroumoff Informatique Synform (1996) is -
(atOSS PURCHASE PRICE
(m im M ) P rw n f l t in w l H h n n n n t 
( a n d  /  n r im n m ;)  Aicfinn it
(and /  or amms) Tiade disooiiiit
(and /  or miniis) ExcqMioiial esqxases
(and /  or mnms) ^ )ocial deals
(and /  ornumis) ^ )odally negotiated ordos
(phis) Taxes
(phis) Other expenses
(ptos) Tranqxxtation
=• COST OF MERCHANDISE 
(phis) Depot to store transport cost 
(pha) Management cost 
(ptns) Head OfBce price adjustments 
Odns) Other costs
= SELL /  TRANSFER PRICE 
(phis) Mark-up 
(phis) VAT
(phis) Stine promotional ovcrixad 
= RECOMMENDED NET RETAIL PRICE (lac. Tax)
Clearfy arriving at a price is quite a conq)lex process m the first instance and one that 
involves a significant effort to keq) it iq) to date. Getting the price r i ^  wOl have a 
significant con^)etitrve inxpact and may be closed associated with organisation strategy. 
An exairq>le of this is the way m which UK food muhÿles discount petrol prices in order 
to attract customers to their store - where they make their profits on the sale of their 
food and other products. It is the responsibility of the central merchandising department 
to get the price right
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The pricing database holds k y  cost and price data for each product in stock. These wiU 
be aggregated into retail price fists that may be general for the vfbols of the food retailer 
organisation, focused on a geogrsq>hical or national region(s), or be discrete for an 
individual store - or combinations of these depending on the merchandising strategies and 
tactics being eng)loyed at a y  particular time. The k y  data usually contains a reference 
code and descrÿtion, the start and end dates for which a particular price is valid, the 
purchase price, the standard selling price and variations on this price for irinch the 
product is sold (e.g. promotions, conq>etitor), the curreny in which the product is 
bought, and details of sales taxes that may be due (e.g. VAT). The prices contained in 
this data will have been calculated (see above) to maintain the margins required by the 
organisation. Variations in actual selling price that transgress these pre-set margins wiU 
generate warnings at the store and Head OfiSce. A product price may change several 
times within the product fifo cycle. These changes are notified to each store each day. 
When stores have closed to the public price changes are made manually on the shelves. 
It m y  be in the fiiture that this wiH be done automaticafiy when electronic shelf edge 
labels become the norm and 24 hour opening means that manually changing prices is not 
a practical propositioiL In addition to instigating manual changing of price information 
the price maintenance system iqxlates the EPoS system at the checkouts. In this way 
when trading begins on the following day all pricing information will be co-ordinated.
There are additional complications to pricing when trading across international 
boundaries and it may be necessary to keep price catalogues and sales tax information in 
several languages. It may also be necessary to adjust prices for curreny fluctuations on 
a da% basis. The conq>lexities of the international trading situation are reflected in the 
6ct that nearly every system examined has historically had a different ^>proach to
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performing these tasks. However, within the past four or five years specialist software 
houses have developed international trading packages that are r^idjÿ becoming adopted 
as the standard throughout the industry. The issue of international trading is very much a 
current one in the food retailing multÿles as mar^ r look abroad for ie^ qiansion foced with 
a saturated home market.
4.8 Purchasà^
The purchasing suite of software is, as has already been described, closely linked to the 
merchandising and price maintenance suites. Functionally it will place orders, pronqjt 
orders based on established reorder levels, and keep siqiplier details iq) to date. In order 
to con^lete these tasks, a supplier database is maintained that wiU have the following 
data structure: siqiplier name, address(es) and contact(s); siqiplier type, class, category 
and status; siqipher code(s); Dun and Bradstreet credit rating; min/max quantities and 
values; brgdng method (e.g. manual or electronic); credit & payment terms; invoicing 
methods; product(s) siqiplied; additional costs or discounts; lead times; carrier details & 
charges; language for transactions; electronic communications details (e.g. "phone, fox). 
There are three basic methods of purchasing produce. The fiirst is by purchase order in 
i^ dnch a fixed quantity of product will be ordered and scheduled for delivery at one or 
mukÿle dates. The second is by purchase contract in i^bich produce is 'called off a 
forward contract with the supplier and each 'call off wHl be logged for audhmg purposes. 
The third method of purchasing is by a purchase requisition for a one-off delivery that is 
usua% placed at the store level direct with the supplier. This system uny be used i^ foere 
store managers are allowed to buy local produce. Whichever method of purchasing is 
used the purchase status, or protocol, must be observed ly  the person or system placing
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the order. This status defines the way in \^iich the order is policed. An open order 
would equate to a call off situation usualfy used for st^le products (e.g. tins of beans, 
cereals). A closed order would only ^yply to a one-off purchase. A cancelled order 
would usually ^ l y  in the case of siq^Ker defouk (e.g. non delivery). A completed 
order may signify the termination of purchase contract or possibly the final stage of a 
phased delivery plan. An authorised order will stÿulate >^ bo is to authorise the order. 
This may be hnked to volume, value or special conditions (e.g. a previousfy delinquent 
supplier is placed on trial for a time). In some cases special passwords are required to be 
given by the authoriser. If orders are normally placed over an Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) system auditors may require a sanple of orders to be printed and this 
would become a printed order.
Once produce enters the depot or the store, siqpliers invoice the retailer either 
electronically or manually. In the normal course of events electronicalfy tendered 
invoices wiü be matched against delivery information and paid. Where there are 
shortages or returns of the product the sippher w31 have a flag set on their account and 
this win normally trigger a manual check befine the invoice is paid. As all suppliers are 
not connected through EDI there are inevitably p^>er invoices to be manually processed. 
The percentage of p^>er invoices that the food mukples have to process is quite low 
(between 20 and 40% of all invoices) and is likely to continue to drop. Most of the food 
mukples now insist that new sippliers have EDI connections (and may even provide 
them fiee to small suppliers). By pursuing this policy Sainsbury, Safewz  ^and Tesco 
believe that under 10% of their stppliers will be sending paper invoices by the year 2000. 
From these companies' point of view the EDI strategy saves a lot of money as manual 
processing of invoices is e3q>ensive.
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Because of the problems that are associated with controlling the large number of items 
the food mukples sell, a wide range of reports are automatically generated on demand by 
the purchasing suite. These include reports on outstanding purchase orders; 
recommended rqilenishment orders; recommended replenishment stock; avadability 
schedules; delivery schedules; purchase order summaries; purchase order forward 
commitment; diortage reporting; imminent delivery information (at store and depot); 
stock availability; stock transfers; cancellation reports; and various supplier performance 
reports. Normally these reports are generated on request ftom either the store manager 
or Head OfSce and can be configured to give both historical anafysis and projections.
4.9 Warehouse and distribMitian
There are four basic requirements that the warehouse and distribution software has to 
meet Firstfy there is a need to control the physical storage of the stock within the depot 
or warehouse. Secondly the changes in stock must be monitored and controlled. 
Thirdfy, the distribution of stock to the stores must be ordered and controlled. Fourthly 
returns fiom stores or depots must be controlled and stock adjustments made.
The physical control of stock in the depot or warehouse requires a precise record to be 
kqjt in order to locate stock in the system. Each depot or warehouse wiH have its own 
unique plQ a^cal layout and is usualfy divided into zones, areas, and then subdivided into 
aisles, rows and bins. The nature of the depot or warehouse tends to determine the exact 
physical layout So, for instance, most depots have qiecial zones associated with 
different tenqieratures. Tesco depots have four different tenq)erature zones for different 
products - a -15°C zone for fiozen produce, a -5°C zone for chilled produce, a 5°C zone
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for greengrocery and an ambient tenqierature zone for the remainder of the produce. 
This gradation of tenqierature aUows foe produce to be kept at optimum storage 
tenq)erature and enhances the product shelf life. The corollary of this situation is that 
delivery lorries also have the same tenyerature controlled partitions. Ten^ierature 
controlled zones are only one exanqile, other zones will be required for bulk delivery, 
marshalling for despatch and despatch to stores. Some warehouses have zones dedicated 
to third party transient storage/rqiacking operations. The stock management software 
win be required to register inputs to the system and the physical or automatic placement 
and retrieval of the stock, into or ftom locations that may be defined ly  the automatic 
system or by manual allocation. Each stock movement within the warehouse must be 
logged by the system, together with precise stock description details. In general the 
mqority of the stock wfil fiow smoothly through these systems, however, fix)m time to 
time the system may have to change stock status fiags for special events or because of 
qiecial storage conditions. This could happen when an stock audit is undertaken, when 
stock is nxpressed for quality reasons, or for delivery to a bonded part of the warehouse 
as would be the case with beers, wine and spirits. In this latter case the software may 
have special ftmctions that are associated with Customs and Excise duties and licensing 
and tranq>ort arrangements.
The goods receiving part of the system must have an effective "handshake' with the 
previously described purchase order system. The first task of the this part of the system 
is to reconcile deliveries with orders. If the delivery is reconciled then the products may 
be moved into the storage system proper. If not, as nuy be foe case with foortages, part 
deliveries and damaged products, the system must either rpdate the purchasing system, 
inform the vendor to arrange future collection, and organise the movement of the
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delinquent stock into a holding area to await collection; or, allow a part delivery to be 
stored and processed in the normal way. Replenishment of stock wiD either be driven by 
manual ordering - as would be the case with new or trial products, or ly  aiitnnmtir 
ordering controlled by an algorithm within the software. In practice Sainsbury, Tesco 
and Safeway all have conqx)site replenishment systems that allow a great deal of 
fiexibility. This is ideal for the biyer, but rqxresents significant control problems for the 
software. Rq>lenifoment order parameters are usually set by maxmnim/mminnnn 
criteria, ideal stock level, economic order quantity or reorder point
The majority of stores stock rq>lenifoment is driven fix>m the EPoS systems within each 
individual store. EPoS data is passed from the store to the warehouse system and is used 
to generate picking lists fi>r the manual and automatic retrieval system. The sequence of 
picking is worked out automatically by the wardmuse conputer system to minimise 
picking time. Goods are then picked and assembled for the store in stiDages. The 
pattern of stiUage filling is usualfy driven by foe store layout (e.g. one stiUage may 
contain cheeses and delkatessen produce, another clothes, etc.) and by doing this, 
unnecessary handling at the store is eliminated. StiDages are then assembled ft>r depatch 
and held in marfoaPing areas that correpond to the tenperature requirements of the 
produce. The conplete order is final assembled in the lorry itself The lorry storage 
space is divided into tenperature zones (sub-zero to ambient) to maintain the produce at 
its optimum storage tenperature. Frozen produce is loaded first, chiUed produce next, 
cool produce next and finalfy ambient tenperature product last. Normally a brry wiD 
deliver a discrete load for a given store, altk)ugh the lorry may shared if two gmaller 
stores have to be serviced. The onfy exceptions to the EPoS initiation of the store order
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win be generated by the merchandising system \^ben new products are introduced or 
other products are de-Hsted.
Other stock movements, that are driven by central requisitions (rather than stores 
requisitions) are those of inter-warehouse transfers (sometimes called consignment 
stock). This kind of stock movement is identical in all repects to the store stock 
movement except that it is instigated by the central food retailer conputer system, or 
manually through the merchandising system.
All systems require stock checking feciHties. )Mth so many product Hnes and such large 
volumes of products moving through the distribution system, or waiting to be delivered 
to the stores, regular stock checks are an essential part of the system. Stock checks may 
be conducted on a total stock, random stock, selected stock or on a cyclical basis. The 
warehouse software must be capable of accommodating any of these systems. Most 
stock checking is manual with the sanple to be taken being identified by foe system itself 
Updated stock data is usually entered through a terminal in the warehouse or, as most 
commonly the case, with a hand held terminal that can be connected to the main system, 
and which automatically downloads its data. Some of the sanpHng stock check systems 
win automatically trigger another immediate search if more than a pre-set level of stock 
discrpancies are detected. Sometimes this may prove to be adeg i^^ te, however if the 
second stock take is not satis&ctory a fuD stock take w31 be inplemented. The food 
retailers were reticent to disclose the level of errors that are typically found in their 
warehouse stock control systems, but system sippHers suggest that the level of error that 
would trigger a second or subsequent stock take is 1% to 2%.
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The final aspect of the ware house system is that associated with returns. It is almost 
inevitable that returns wiü be generated fix>m the store or fiom the warehouse. In the 
first instance the returns must be accounted for in the global count of produce in the 
system and adjustments made i^ foere apropriate. Secondly returns information must be 
entered into the suppliers' record in the merchandising system for sipplier performance 
purposes into the purchase system for top-ip reordering. Tenporary pace (or an 
inpress area) wül be allocated to the returned stock where it wül be held untfl 
arrangements can be made for its return to the sipplier. The system must control this 
storage and also graerate the paperwork required to return the goods. If the retailer 
returns the goods the supplier wiü be charged for the delivery. Some stock wiü not be 
returned but wül be destroyed or dunped. Again, the cost of doing either of these things 
wiü normaüy be charged to the supplier. Return agreements vary between the fixxi 
mukples but wül usually contain details of Wio wül pay for fieigbt, how claims are to be 
submitted and which cost base is to be used, whether approval is required or not, and the 
return address and contact detaüs.
4.10 Management reporting
AÜ of the multple retailing systems have sophisticated management reporting systems. 
In general the management reporting structure operates at three levels. The first level is 
the Operational level and is focused on the store and the distifoution system. The second 
level is the corporate level and is focused on Head OflSce and global activities. The final 
level is focused on the systems monitoring, maintenance and development The majority 
of the reports in the system are pre-formatted during the initial systems design or during 
subsequent systems development. Some reports wül be user defined at the point of
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request. These latter reports are more Hkefy to be requested by systems people than 
operational managers. Data for reports is constantly gathered fiom mamial and 
automatic (e.g. EPoS) nputs throughout the systenL In BOS this data is collected and 
processed each night, and all reports wiü be updated once a day. In OLS data is either 
constant^ ipdated with aÜ reports correct to the last data entry, o r-as is more often the 
case - processed periodical^ throughout the day meaning that the report is more 
accurate. Key report data, after processing, wül be sent from the central warehouse 
(a term used for very large databases) to the operational or executive serving system 
where it wiü be held, usualfy on a sateüite system file server database, for interrogation 
and report formatting when and if required. For special rqx>rts that arise fiom a 
non-standard request there may be a delay until the data needed for that report is 
downloaded fiom the central conputer database. At the store level this meang that the 
data relating to the regular trading activities of the individual store wül be ipdated, no 
more than 24 hours old, and be available for anafysis. The same wül be true for aü 
operational systems. Long term anafyses of the data, or parts of the system, m ^  be done 
by accessing the main database and its archives. With so much data available, searches of 
historical data have to done using special fist data search techniques, sometimes called 
data drifting or data mining. At the executive level rports are usually based on 
exception reporting - again with fist search capabüity. These reports focus on trend 
anafysis and performance against target reporting.
Aüofthe levels in the system have interfices with other standard software packages such 
as word processors and pread sheets. In this way individual mana^rs can prpare their 
own reports and do their own anafyses. Not aU managers have access to aü information. 
There is always restricted access. Individual non^management enployees wül have the
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lowest level of access, managers the next highest, directors the next and the systems 
support personnel the highest of aL At the highest level there is full access to all aspects 
of the system including overriding all security systems. Naturalfy there are only a few 
people in any of the retailers who have this clearance.
A great deal of effort is made by report designers to make reporting user friendly. 
Graphics are used extensivefy to displ^ data. In general Graphical User Interfeces 
(GUI) are used to access the system, and this allows a 'point-and-click' qproach that 
most managers are comfortable with.
In addition to these five basic system other ancillary systems are to be found in different 
parts of the system. For instance in the store there will be personnel control systems for 
time checking and management; there may be customer counting systems that count 
customers as they arrive and leave and prompt the store manager to open or close 
checkout positions; or there may be basket analysis system that analyses customer 
purchases and pronpts the adjustment of store shelf layouts or product grouping to 
capitalise on buying behavfour patterns. In the warehouse or depot a great deal of 
research and analysis had led to special software that manages storage systems in a more 
efScient manner, and reordering algorithms that reduce stock holding.
4.11 Cofparate management software
The corporate management software suites includes the previously described basic five 
ftmctions and have many common elements;
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♦ A financial control system (e.g. financial ledgers, payments and recepts, budget 
setting and monitoring, pricing structures, rebates, asset registers and
store and corporate financial performance measurement).
♦ A distribution system suite (e.g. stock received, stock returned, stock transfers 
scheduling and stock allocation, distribution system performance measures)
♦ A merchandising system (e.g. purchase order management and EDI control, stock 
and replenishment control, the DPP control suite, stock taking and stock 
reconciliation, pricing management, promotions' planning and analysis, sipplier 
returns and sipplier performance anafysis, advertising planning and analysis, 
merchandising planning, sales analysis and feedback).
♦ An EPoS monitoring system (e.g. communication costs, store and total system 
performance monitoring, file and data analysis, event logging)
♦ An EFTPoS monitoring system (e.g. communications costs, store and total system 
event logging, auditing and reconciliation).
♦ A reporting system (e.g. store monitoring and performance feedback, 
warehouse/depot monitoring and performance feedback, supplier monitoring and 
performance feedback, management variance reporting).
♦ A personnel system (e.g. wages and salaries, pensions, training status, education 
evaluation and monitoring, attendance records, staff development 
programmes)
♦ A customer relations system (e.g. customer profile anafysis, customer buying 
pattern analysis, customer loyalty schemes, customer communications).
♦ A corporate suite (e g. shareholder records, archives, consolidated accounts 
information, statistical analysis, market research activities, treasury activities, 
conpetitor analysis).
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♦ A store planning and maintenance system (e.g. new site planning, evaluation and 
acquisition, planning liaison, civil engineering, store maintenance).
♦ Communication systems.
♦ An overseas operations suite (e.g. exchange rate monitoring, overseas branch 
sippfy and monitoring, overseas tranport and logistics).
♦ A partnershp suite associated with joint ventures (e.g. in store banking, franchising 
and franchisers).
Other software functions not included in this list are usually associated with the special 
requiremeiits of a particular food multple.
4.12 Condusions
When considered in their entirety (including the information in Appendix 1) the 
operational and nianagerial information and control systems are simpler than they at first 
appear. The systems aie designed for robustness in operation at all levels and the food 
mukples have no illusion as to their level of dependence on the systems. Robustness 
appears in stable and well designed software code, operational involvement in the design 
processes, critical hardware duplication, and extensive user training in the use of the 
systems (Swanston, 1994; Dove, 1995; Winch, 1996). Information is the 'oü in the 
engine' of the food mukples. These large organisations need accurate information to 
manage their operations, to maintain their level of service to the customer and to inprove 
their performance in terms of efiSdency or effectiveness.
Given the broad sweep of technology and software that go to make a modem food 
retailing system k is no surprise that few, if ariy, individuals - even those in directorial
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positions - have a conplete picture of how these information systems work. This is as 
true of the systems suppliers as of the food mukples vfoo use the systems. If there are 
people who come close to a broad understanding they are the feirly small group of 
perpatetic systems designers and programmers, who move between the large systems 
suppliers, designing and modifying ^ e m s  (Pettinger, 1996). This is not to suggest 
that the systems users and suppliers do not have people who can perform these design 
and programming tasks, or maintain the systems once installed. They have and they do, 
but these people tend to ipeciafise on one aspect of the greater system, for exanple 
communications processing, and in doing so lose femifiarity with and knovWedge of those 
aspects of the system that they do not normalfy come in contact with. As the retail 
systems increase in size and conqdexity, and the overall rate o f technical innovation 
increases, there is a reed danger that they will become unmanageable.
The conputer based retail information pstems have grown in fits and starts. In the 
1970s system design and évolution was dominated by the large systems builder. The 
retailers bought a package in which the system sippHer dictated the hardware and 
software used. If the retailer wished to use hardware or software fix)m other suppliers k 
had to conply with system builder standards and interfaces. This pattern of system 
sippfy dominated the UK (and the US) market until the early 1980s. Then two 
developments chmged this skuatioiL The first was the emergence of small OEM 
suppliers (often conpanies set up by ex-enployees of the large system builder) vfoo 
produced technically superior hardware products, for exanple EPoS terminale, at prices 
much less than those of the large systems builders . The second develofmoent was the 
increasing popularity of the UNIX operating systems software and 'open' systems 
gradually came to dominate the market. Once adopted, the open pstems architectures
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positions - have a conplete picture of how these information systems wotic. This is as 
true of the systems suppliers as of the food mukples who use the systems. If there are 
people who come close to a broad understanding thqr are the fairfy small group of 
perpatetic systems designers and programmers, who move between the large systems 
suppliers, designing and modifying systems (Pettinger SNJP1:03:96). This is not to 
suggest that the systems users and suppliers do not have people who can perform these 
design and programming tasks, or maintain the systems once installed. T h^ have and 
they do, but these people tend to pecialise on oi^ aspect of the greater system, for 
exanple communications processing, and in doing so lose fomiliarity with and knowledge 
of those aspects of the system that they do not normally come in contact with. As the 
retail systems increase in size and complexity, and the overall rate o f techniccd 
innovation increases, there is a real danger that they will become vnmanageable.
The conputer based retail information systems have grown in fits and starts. In the 
1970s system design and evolution was dominated by the large systems builder. The 
retailers bought a package in which the system supplier dictated the hardware and
t
software used. If the retailer wished to use hardware or software fiem other suppliers k 
had to conpfy with system builder standards and interfaces. This pattern of system 
supply dominated the UK (and the US) market until the early 1980s. Then two 
developments changed this skuatiotL The first was the emergence of small OEM 
suppliers (often conpanies set up by ex-enployees of the large system builder) who 
produced technicalfy superior hardware products, for exanple EPoS terminals, at prices 
much less than those of the large systems builders . The second development was the 
increasing popularity of the UNIX operating systems software and 'open' systems 
gradualfy came to dominate the market. Once adopted, the open systems archkectures
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almost eliminated the stranglehold of the old systems suppliers, and the role of these 
suppliers changed to become system integrators. There was a time in the earfy 1980s 
when it might have been possible for the food mukples to undertake this role themselves 
as the systems were relatively sinple conpared with those of today. However the food 
mukples, vfoile major users of the systems, have never seen themselves in the role of 
systems builders or integrators, and this opportunity passed. By the late 1980s the food 
mukples systems were becoming very sophisticated. The traditional large TnamA-amm 
conputers were gradually being rq>laced with mukple processing a r r ^  and the 
processing became distributed throu^ out the system. These developments at once 
harnessed the enhanced processing power that became available through the development 
of the PC and the data capture abilities of the EPoS technology.
Arguably the most significant technological advance of the 1980s was EPoS. It was the 
key that unlocked ordering systems integration with suppliers; accurate stock control 
within the store; enabled the evolution of the distribution systems; and, through EFTPoS 
allowed the direct linking of the retailers with the banking systems. Many of the retail 
system innovations of today can trace their roots, directfy or indirectly, back to the EPoS 
concept. With hindsight it is clear that the real value o f EPoS is that it changed 
managements view o f technology from that o f a reactive tool to that o f a proactive tool 
In doing so k changed the w ^  in which the food mukples were managed forever. When 
examining the data gathered for this chapter k became clear that the concqjt of EPoS is 
so closefy woven into the fabric of the food mukple management system that they would 
be unable to fimction without k The 1990s have cqntalised on the EPoS legacy by 
the EPoS data to interpret the present buying patterns of customers and to create new 
marketing and merchandising opportunities for the future.
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Prior to 1950 the technology used ly  retailers had little inpact on management or on 
strategy, and was viewed as useful but not critical in the running of the organisation. A 
few basic conputer based information systems operated at store and Head Office levels 
in the organisation but these systems were perpheral to the mam management activities. 
The attitude of managers to technology seems to have been ambivalent rather than 
hostile. Between 1950 and 1970 the food mukples grew in size and complexity. The 
manual methods of controlling the retailer operations were becoming increasingfy 
inefScient and expensive. This created an environment inhere technology was viewed in 
a more enthusiastic light by managers at all levels in the food mukples. Once 
technology, in the form of conputers, began to do some of the more mundane arithmetic 
and to inprove efficiency, some managers at Head Office began to realise the potential of 
the technology. However, the conputing technology was not particularly sophisticated 
or reliable. In the 1980s, as has already been noted, the shortcomings of both hardware 
and software were eliminated and k became clear to all management in the food mukples 
that a future without technology was not a practicable possibüky. This brings us to the 
modem systems that have been described in this chapter. With evidence o f such 
sophistication in ^sterns technology, and o f its widespread use at every level and in 
every aspect o f the food multiples operations, it not unreasonable to argue that the 
balance o f operational control in the food multiples has shifted from management to 
technology. In general this kind of observation is met with a firm rebuff from 
non-technical managers who stiU appear to have little understanding of the pervasive 
nature of the technology in thek organisations. The technical managers are 
uncomfortable about admitting that k might be so for fear of setting off technophobie 
reactions among their colleagues. These problems are poorfy understood in the food 
mukples and undoubtedly deserve further investigation. Meanvbile the fi>od mukples
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continue to invest in newer and more sophisticated systems, and not to invest in the 
technical literacy in the general managenoent cadre. It is possible that in doing so ibsy 
may be storing up problems for the future.
Having described and explained the function of the various technology systems that may 
be found in food mukples, the following chapter anafyses the wider growth and 
development patterns of the food mukples.
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Chapter 5 
Samsbwy, Tesco and Sitfewc^: Environment,
Patterns o f Evolution and Strategy
5.1 Introduction
The main focus for this chq>ter is the analysis and synthesis of the Hata gathered about 
the development of Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway that is chronicled in Appendix 2. The 
first part of the chapter explores the changing retail environmmt that is portrayed within 
Appendix 2 æeking to identify the dynamics that shape the interaction of the 
organisations and the evolution of the information systems that are central to this 
research. The second part of the chapter examines the historical data to determine the
patterns of food retailer eu^hztion mid the wsqt in i^ rinch information systems have hefoed
}
the food mukples to control operations and evolve competitive strategies.
5.2 Environment
From a general perspective a study of the evolution of industrial and commercial 
enterprises in the UK fixim the mid 1800's onwards, leads to a picture of atrophy in the 
manufacturing sector and growth in the retail and service sectors (Mathias, 1967; Briggs, 
1985; Sigsworth, 1990). Clegg (1977) argued that as the United Kingdom was the fiirst 
nation to have an industrial revolution k was not entirefy surprising that they were the 
first to eiperience the decline in manufacturing vigour. While the decline in 
manufacturing can be traced to lack of investment, lack of innovation, poor management, 
poor training and a lack of eiport performance (Briggs, 1956; Wilson, 1965; Mathias, 
1993), k would be dkficuk to level the same criticism at retailers. In general the retail
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sector has propered, but this prosperity has not been evenfy distributed. Table 1.1 
dmnonstrated that the larger retailers have grown in size and status while the gmaHpr 
retailers have declined in both number and influence. Initially the decline in the gmall 
trader was due to the food mukples offering lower prices due to Hghmf levels of 
efSciency and size related bargaining power. However, as long as retail price 
maintenance (RPM) was in force, the smaller food retailers could conpete with the 
larger food retailer reasonably well The large food mukples réponse to RPM was to 
introduce 'own brand' produce to avoid direct conparisons with branded food prices. As 
a resuk of heavy political lobbying by Tesco, Sainsbury and other food retailers during 
the early 1960s RPM was removed in 1964. It was this and the increased mobüky of the 
shopping public that Wakerss (1985) suggested finally sealed the fete of the small 
retailer.
In general writers agree that the post WW2 period has been the most significant in the 
food retailing environment (Bamfield, 1980, pp.33-4). The large food mukples have 
grown larger and in the process more efScient. These mukples have innovated in almost 
every apect of their operation, supply methods aixi supplier relationshps, distribution 
systems, packaging, store layout, product innovation, technology, store size and 
management systems. It is these investments which have really secured the market 
position of the large food mukples and the continued decline of the smaller retailers. 
Clearly these general observations are useful in that they set the scene for the histories
described in ^ pendix 2, but v/bat can be learned fix>m the histories themselves?
/
5.3 Evolution
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low. It has been able to take a long tenn view of the market because they were owned 
and dominated by one Êuxdly for a long time. Even now, vben the conpaiy is publicly 
owned, the Sainsbury femify retains a substantial share holding. John Sainsbury quickfy 
established his maricet niche in the "high quafity - value for money* food market, and never 
lost sight of this successful formula. This, combined with tight central control of costs, 
buying and distribution, made them one of the most profitable food retailers in the UK 
for a long time. This position remained unchallenged until in the late 1970s early 1980s, 
Tesco, fieed fix>m the dominance of Jack Cohen (their founder and Chairman), launched 
a concerted attack on Sainsbury. While Tesco had had more stores for quite a long time 
they had never been able to match Sainsbury*s profitability at the store level The reasons 
for this are quite conplex and lie in the infinstructure of the conpany itself and in the 
conpanies undeserved "middle to chep* end of the market image that it inherited fiom its 
earfy trading days, and which it has never been able to quite shake off
Both Sainsbury and Tesco have similar roots in that they originated in London, had a 
single entrepreneurial founder and began trading when the population was epanding in 
their locale. Both Sainsbury and Cohen worked long hours and ploughed their own 
money back into the business in order to grow quickly. Unfortunately the histories of 
these conpanies do not give any insights as to the motivation of the original founders. 
Indeed, the founders of both conpanies remained private figures, preferring to be at the 
hub of their expanding enpire than courting publicity. In this respect Sainsbury was 
unlike other retailing entrepreneurs such as Tommy Lpton who positively courted 
publicity (Waugh, 1951). Within the conpanies, both Sainsbury and Cohen clearly 
understood the inportance of creating a good conpany infiastructure. Having an 
efficient supply and distribution system was essential to keeping their customers satisfied.
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A good management control system hefoed to keep the organisations on the financial 
tracks. Staff training and insistence on standards of hygiene and presentation have also 
been a big fector in the evolution of the conpanies. AU of these issues stOl feature in the 
annual conpany rports as matters of comment.
Sainsbury and Cohen as entrepreneurs in food retailing are not unique by any Tneaus. 
Strong parallels to their conpanies development and individual characters can be found 
in other food retailers such as Lptons. The Thomas Lpton story, as described by 
Waugh (1951) began in Glasgow rather than London. However, the same pattern of 
astuteness, diligence and reinvestment lead to a meteoric growth pattern that took him 
fiom his first single small foop that opened in Stobcross Street in Glasgow on May 10th, 
1871 to a national netwoik by 1914. Lpton also became femous for his tea (another of 
his entrepreneurial ventures) i^inch became a national commodity in the nineteenth 
century. Unlike Sainsbury and Cohen, Lpton was more of a showman. He was well 
known for his publicity stunts - making the largest cheese in the world, taking part in 
high pirofile yachting races, lavishfy supporting charities. However, these were never 
designed for self aggrandisement but to promote his business. Lpton lived for his 
business and unlike Sainsbury never marrfed.
The success of retailing entrepreneurs such as Sainsbury, Cohen and Lpton has been in 
their willingness to break out of the mould of the small retailer, find a formula for 
success, and then singlB-mindedfy to follow iL Their risk has been offeet by a protected 
home market and in the case of Sainsbury and Lpton during their earfy stages of 
evolutfon, low rates of tax that enabled rp id  e3q)ansioiL
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The same pattern of development does not ppfy to the Argyll Group. In nmm years it has 
emerged fiom feirfy obscure beginnings to challenge Sainsbury for second place in the 
food retailing hierarchy in 1997. Argyll cleverly built a very wide geogrphical trading 
base everyvfoere but in the hotly contested London and Home Counties market They 
waited until their sippfy and control infiastructure was well established before buying 
Safeway, and then had the management skills and resources to mount a serious attack on 
the big two'. Their attack occurred at a point in time (c. 1989 - 90) when the market 
was polarising and pace was being created by the rp id  demise ofGatew^ (Table 5.1) 
and the steady decline of the smaller mukples, co-operatives and independents.
In addition to illustrating the change in relative position of Safeway, Table 5.1 also gives 
some valuable insights into the changing nature of the food retail market between 1987 
and 1991. The conpanies that operated in the upper quartOe (Sainsbury, Tesco, Safeway, 
Waitrose and Marks and Spencer [not included in these figuires]) all grew consistently. 
The conpanies that operated in the lower quartile (Kwik Save, Asda, Morrison (also 
Aldi and Netto who are not included in these figures) also grew consistently. The 
conpanies who have traditionally traded in the middle sectors of the market (Gateway 
and Co-op) have declined. This is evidence that the food retail market had begum to 
polarise towards the end of the 1980s, and a recent rport fiom the IGD (Superstore 
Trading Profiles, 1995) confirms this process of polarisation has continued into the 
1990s.
The effect o f the polarisation o f the food multiple market has been to increase 
competition within the tpper and lower quartiles rather than between the tpper and 
lower quartiles. In the upper quartile success has been closely allied to accurate
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identification of customer kfesty^ and shopping habits, and in this repect information 
systems has played, and continues to play a major role.
Conpetition, sometimes intense and cut-throat, is a recurrent theme in the histories of 
the food multples. When a conpany has a substantial percentage of the market (as is the 
case with the organisations investigated) it would be understandable if an element of
1987
%
1988
%
1989
%
1990
%
1991
%
J. Sainsbury 13.9 14.3 14.5 16 16.7
Tesco 13.5 14.3 14.9 15.3 16.2
Safeway (Argyll) 9.9 10.9 11 11 11.3
Asda 7.6 7.8 7.9 10.5 10.5
Gateway 11.5 11.8 11.2 8 7.3
Kwik Save 3 3 3.5 3.9 4.4
Waitrose 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5
Morrison 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.3
Iceland 0.5 0.6 1.8 1.9 1.9
Other Multples 7.7 5.2 5 1 3J2
Co-op 12.1 11.7 11.3 11 10.7
Independents 14.6 11.4 14 13.7 13
(Source; Verdict, IGD Researdi Services)
Table 5.1 UK Grocery Market Share, 1987 -1991
complacency was in evidence in managerial attitudes. ^%h the food multples the 
reverse is true. The interviews with the managers and directors of the conpanies left an 
abiding inpression of urgency and a deep concern about u^iat conpetitors are doing. In 
this respect one of the m%or paradoxes of foe food nnütptes «serges. It would be 
consistent with intensefy eonpetitive commercial situations for information about sales 
and operations to be a closely guarded secret (other that at a headline level in conpany
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rqx)Tts and accounts). The reverse is true and the food nnütÿles release large amnmrts 
of trading data to organisations such as the IGD, AGB and Nielsens who process it in 
order to give relative market positional data. Figure 5.1 is a good example of such 
conq)arative data that illustrates the winners and losers in the 1996-97 trading year. 
They indicate Wio they have gained from or lost business to who. Two things are 
remarkable about this data. The jSrst is the speed at Wnch the data has been processed 
(March - March trading data available in July); the second is that the data (generated 
Êom till roll gains and losses) is released at all
Iceland £4m
£43m£5m
CRTG
£7m Tesco
Kwik. Save
£4.1m Asda
£4.8mFood Giant £7.8m
Other Co-ops
£4.6m Safeway
(Source: AGB TUI Roll Share, Mardi 1997)
Figure 5.1 Till Roll Gain/Loss Analysis, Net switching over £4m, 1997
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This paradox is reflected in other areas as well The food multçles meet on a regular 
basis to discuss technical matters (including information systems development) and to 
establish or discuss operational standards and future technical developments and 
opportunities. What is not so clear is whether these meetings discuss the strategies of the 
particq)ants, and/or wdiether th ^  constitute a kind of cartel If this were the case, on a 
putelÿ hypothetical level, it would heÿ to explean. vâsy price conpetition (on a limited 
range of produce) has been such feature of recent market tactics in the food multÿles - in 
that it enhances the public view of apparent competition, without actual^ serious^ 
damaging the commercial proqiects of the organisation. In a near monopolistic situation 
co-operation is a better strategy i^iere product difEereotiation is low and i^ diere price 
competition would lead to market instability. An alternative view, and p a h ^  less 
controversial, is that the food multq>les are aU focing similar challenges and that they do 
need a common qiproach to shared problems. Some of the current problems they &ce
are:
Traffic congestion is causing average roads speeds to foil and urban 
parking and access restrictions may constrain the development of 
new stores.
> Pollution caused by vehicles, in particular diesel vehicles, in terms of 
noise and fumes is meeting with increasing public concern.
• The environmental impact of packaging used in the supply chain 
is increasing]  ^becoming the suligect of legislation in the EC.
(e.g. The weight of packaging will have to reduced by 40% and 
8% of packaging material wiH have to be recyclable by 1998.)
" Recycling of waste is becoming an economic practicality and new 
approaches to waste disposal and packaging design will have to
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be developed. The retailers wiU have to pay as much attention to 
the backward passage of waste as to the forward passage of 
produce within the system.
- Alternative or additional distribution methods may have to be 
developed in response to the rising foe! costs associated with 
road transport.
Other areas of common interest are varied and include a broad spectrum of technology 
and control systems and new trading formats. The current technology, described in 
Appendix 1 and discussed in the previous chspter, has already been of benefit to: vehicle 
routeing, scheduling, automated storage and inventory systems, new warehouse 
configurations, EDI, sales based ordering, and in-store operations management In the 
future Bames, Dadomo and Turner (1997) suggest the remaining challenges likely to 
yield the greatest benefit are in the sipp^ chain. They identify intelligent tagging, vehicle 
tracking and distribution support technology as being the key innovations to achieving 
these benefits. Intelligent tagging will he^ to eliminate the problems associated with 
keqxing track of produce in the suppfy chain. This will reduce lost' stock that is still a 
problem in spite of much inqnoved warehouse control systems. Vehicle tracking and 
satellite communication inqnovements will allow more accurate control of stock in 
between sipphers and warehouses, and warehouses and stores. These inprovements are 
likely to have a significant long term impact on distribution efficiency as t raffic 
congestion becomes more acute.
5,4 The future
New trading formats, in particular remote shopping, are currently the sulgect of much 
interest in the food multples. With so much invested in the large store format the
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multiples are strategical^  ^vulnerable to new flopping formats. As a consequence nearfy 
all of the multÿles have invested a great deal of money in catalogue «nH mail order 
shopping, TV shopping and home delivery options. The take of these options will be 
closed  linked to the bifurcation of the market disciwseH in the iotroduction to this 
research, (Le. those who have time to shop but no money, and those that have money 
but no time to shop). Which wiU prove to be siq^rtable with the current food multqiles 
cost structures remains to be seen. What is clear is that if home shopping is demanded at 
a significant level the food muhÿles will have to reconfigure at least a part of their 
systems to cope with it. Gathering the customer's orders is a relatively simple problem to 
overcome, the challenge will be to find economic picking, packaging, handling and 
distribution systems. If these problems are overcome then the food multÿles wiU remove 
the final reason for using smaU retailers - individual service - and eliminate them 
complete^. It is likely that shoppers who stiU prefer to shop themselves are likely to be 
offered more fociUties under the same roof (e.g. Cafos, GP surgeries. Opticians, Dry 
Cleanrog, etc.). What is known is that the food muhples have invested huge sums of 
mon^ in their stores and distribution systems. These assets stUl have a considerable lifo 
and managers are likely to be trying to make these assets 'sweat' for the foreseeable 
future.
5.5 Investment andptMents o f evolution
Qupter 4 demonstrated the inportance of information technology to the complex 
trading patterns of modem food retailing. Establishing these information systems 
reqwes a major investment initially, and ongoing investment to keep the systems ip  to 
date. The need to service investment capital influences the level of risk that aiy 
organisation can take. The innate conservatism of the food multiples institutional
1 8 6
investors inevitably tenpers entrepreneurial attitudes and constrain directorial actions. 
The institutional investors require long term plans, precision, clear goals and regular 
dividends. They are bureaucracies that eq>ect to see systems and structure in the 
companies they invest in. On the other hand the retail entrepreneur wishes to respond 
quicky to market opportunities or opponents activities with the mrnmmm of argument 
and discussion. Mmtzberg and Waters (1989, p.270) recognised this emergent tension 
between the entrepreneur and the constraints that large investors inpose and commented 
Instead of one individual being able to change his or her mind, 
the vhole system must be redesigned. Thus, depite the claims 
of flexible plauniog, the 6ct is that organisations plan not to 
be flexible but to realise pecific intentions. It is the entrepreneurial 
strategy that provides flexibility, at the epense of the 
peciflcity and articulation of intentions."
The issue of entrepreneuralism is inextricably intertwined with the history of the food 
mukples studied. Saiusbury and Cohen in particular, were not in the habit of committing 
their ideas for the fixture to paper for anyone other than their closest confidants. Until 
the conpany flotation in 1973 the direction that Sainsbury's took in developing their 
business was essentially a fiuniy afifeir. However, the overarching strategic themes in 
Sainsbuiÿs have always been growth and efSciency. Cohen also had to dilute ownershp 
when he began his main growth cycle in the 1970s and the Tesco strategic themes have 
been broadly the same as those of Sainsbury. The absence o( vagueness about, or 
unwillingness to discuss strategic thinking says much about the almost neurotic view that 
the food retailers have of the world. The current directors of the retailers that were 
interviewed (Montagnon, 1993a; V%cb, 1993) had an obsessive secrecy about strat^ies 
(although both said th ^  had them) that seems to be the result of the intense conpetition
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the intense competition and rivahy that exists between the food multples to d ^  and in 
the past. This secrecy makes direct conparisons of current Sainsbury, Tesco and 
Safeway strategies in a documentary form inpossible. However, this problem can be 
overcome as a great deal of information about Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway operational 
activities is a matter of public record and paist ana^sis. This information, together with 
the interviews detailed in the methodology, and the histories of the three organisations, 
make it possible to deduce the food multple's changing strategic and operational focL
5.6  The journeyfirom the market staU to mtemationatfood retaiiing nudtqde
The case histories of Sainsbury and Tesco show a remarkab^ consistent pattern of
evolution that may be described in five phases:
- the entrpreneurial phase,
- the early bureaucratic phase,
- the bureaucratic phase,
- the systematic phase,
- the restructuring phase.
During the earfy phases of its development Safeway evolved by amalgamating conpanies 
that had already been through the first two phases of this development pattern. This 
different pattern of development will be conside^ later.
The five phases of food retailing are to some extent not time dependent. A comparison 
of Sainsbury and Tesco Aows that both conpanies passed through the same sequence of 
phases, but at chronologically different times. However, the speed of evolution may vary 
radkalty and this will be influenced by many fectors - the ability and ambition of the 
managers, the availability of finance, the merchandising skills of the conpany, the ability
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to control the sipp^ chain, the rate of geogrpbic expansion, the ability to win a market 
share 6om competitors, and the ability to pay for and the availability of informstfion 
technology. Progression through the phases would transform a food retailer from a 
market stall to a multinational food multple.
Both Sainsbury and Tesco began in the efOrepreneurial phase in wbfoh they made their 
transition from what Mntzberg (1994, p.209) describes as a 'visionary* organisation to a 
learning' organisation. For the food retailer this phase is characterised by opportunism 
and unstructured or semi-structured marketing approaches. In some instances, as with 
Jack Cohen, the open market stall was the starting point In others, as with John 
Sainsbury, a «man shop is the starting point. At a general level in this formative phase the 
emergent food retailer has to define, its market niche and a create a platform on which to 
grow. Several alternative product mixes and trading formats may be experimented with 
before an accptable one is found.
Food retailers in this phase of their development are a local market' phenomenon. Both 
Tesco and Sainsbury only stayed in this phase for a few years, and once their trading 
format was defined, refined and was stable enou^ to be built upon, began to enlarge 
their trading to a wider geogrphic area, albeit within a few miles of their point of origin. 
The peed at vriiich this was done was very dependent p o n  the sources of fimding for 
the exercise. If the process of expansion was fimded by profits it took a long time, if 
profit was used to service borrowing it was completed relatively quickly because of the 
gearing effect (Le. £1 profit can service £10 of loan cpitaQ. The geogrpbic growth 
pattern of Sainsbury and Tesco, illustrated in Figure 5.2, cleary show that the peed of 
growth is linked to v/inch of these philosophies the entrepreneurial manager chooses to
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adopt Sainsbury during their early phases of evolution fevoured growing on profit 
rather than borrowing and subsequently grew s b ^ .  Tesco fevoured growth on 
borrowing or on ownershp dilution, and they grew more quickly.
As store numbers increased the need for more effective centralised control and 
distribution systems began to be evident In the case of Sainsbury the réponse to these 
problems was to centralise his distribution system and introduce standards for many 
operational apects of the stores. He introduced food hygiene standards in diplay and 
preparation, a standardised shop layout, standardised training and conditions of 
employment These standards were maintained through a system of inspectors. In the 
case of Tesco, Cohen's réponse to the emerging control problems was to encourage 
individual store managers to act in an entrepreneurial way and manage the shop as 
though it were their own. Unfortunate^ for Cohen many of his shop managers took this 
too literally and began to treat the shop money as their own. Cohen eventually reacted to 
these problems and he too began to introduce manual control systems that included 
regular book keeping and inventory control at both the store and the central dpot in 
north London.
Towards the end of this phase the entrepreneur may have as many as 10 small or medium 
sized stores (5-7,000 sq. ft.), be employing 15 to 20 Full Time Equivabut (FTE) people 
in the stores, 5 to 10 people in warehouse and distribution activities, 2 to 5 people in 
administration fimctions and may be turning over £lm to £3m. The entrepreneur is no 
longer managing the store they are managing a business. Store management becomes 
devolved; security of sippty becomes a nsgor consideration; trading win move fix>m a
190
1880-1900
SAINSBURY GROWTH 
PATTERN
TESCO GROWTH
PATTERN
Including the 1995 William 
Lowe acqisition
(Source: Company Reports & Accounts; Officiai Company Histories)
Figure 5.2 The geographic growth patterns at Sainsbury and Tesco
cash base to a credit base; stock location and control requires a stable and structured 
approach; stock security and losses in the supply chain and store become more important 
to control; and, cash flow and stock turn becomes increasingly important to control as 
money becomes locked up in stock. The control issue becomes increasingly ircqxirtant 
and management have to begin to evolve a sinple but effective performance 
measurement system that is focused on key operational activities. These are all difficult 
issues to overcome and require the management of the organisation to learn new skills 
and develop new techniques.
It is unlikely that the food retailer will have any clearly defined long term strategies at the 
stage of their evolution. Towards the end of the phase they may be starting to evolve
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operational strategies, but tbe lack of Head Office expertise and tbe focus inqx)sed by tbe 
entrepreneur makes it more likely short term planning takes precedence.
To move to tbe next phase of development tbe food retailer must have -
a. a viable trading formula that is profitable and 
which wiU sustain growth,
b. a viable product mix that will satisfy customer’s 
needs,
c. an adequate network of suppliers,
d. an adequate distribution system,
e. good financial management and stability to 
underwrite credit needs,
f. availability of premises (or land), and
g. a demonstrable ability to manage tbe business.
Tbe early bureaucratic phase is characterised by tbe evolution of tbe individual 
operational control systems that are associated with tbe store, distribution and tbe 
administrative functions. Standardisation of procedures and processes within tbe business 
becomes an important activity. Through standardisation tbe managerial workload can be 
reduced while at tbe same time ensuring that a sound basis for future control systems is 
built. Control systems will be refined, extended, and begin to produce information in a 
more timely and accurate manner. Examples of this would be tbe reporting period 
falling from a month to a week, or tbe production of reliable store stock statements that 
can be used for inventory checking and security purposes.
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The transition to a larger 'corporate* format of trading means that management begin to 
be more conscious of market image. This image is important for two reasons. The first 
is the ability of the corporate livery to project the right image to the customer and attract 
them to the stores. The second is to establish a credible image for investors as this stage 
of the food retailers growth is like^  ^to require external funding in terms of long term 
ban cental
Because overhead costs are spread over a wider operatbnal base and buying power 
increases, profit margins tend to increase during this phase. With this increase in activity 
the trading base becomes capabb of stqqwrting a separate central management 
structure. The creation of this management structure is essential for better control of the 
business. This change is also an inqx)rtant precursor to spreading the geogr^hical 
trading area. The extra profit generated during this phase of evolution is required to 
invest in control systems, infiastructure and higher inventory. M on^ to acquire or build 
property is ofiei not read% availabb and fiirther borrowing or ownership dilution is 
required. Performance measurement in the core functbns becomes more important to 
ensure that working capital is used as efficiently and effectively as possibb. 
Unwillingness to dilute ownershp may causes growth to become a very protracted 
process. This phase is quite bng, often more than ten years, sometimes much bnger.
By the end of this period the food retailer would have tp  to 25 store of medium to large 
size (7,000 to 15,000 sq. ft.), empby 75 to 150 FTE's in the stores, 10 to 20 peopb in 
the distribution chain, 5 to 10 peopb in a by now separate Head Offibe, and have a 
turnover of between £6m and £25m. The problems that begin to emerge toward the end 
of this phase of devebpment are often associated with the operatbnal control systems
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being dis-int^rated - under or over stocking at aü levels in the systan is not uncommon, 
ordering gets out of synchronisation with usage, merchandising gets out of 
synchronisation with advertising. The problems are usua% crystallised by managers as 
'communications probleins' but they often cannot articulate v\i%ere the exact source of the 
problems actuahÿ are until they can understand the bigger picture of the business.
To make the transition into the next stage of corporate evolution the following 
conditions must be met -
a. a stable cash flow must be established,
b. the sipply chain must be stabilised,
c. the control system must be stable and effective,
d. credit lines and/or finance must be secured, and
e. the management team must be in place and abb 
to grow with the business.
The third phase of retail devebpment is the bureaucratic phase. In this phase continued 
geogr^hbaDy growth, usually projecting the food multpb into regbnal operatbn, 
highlights the need for integrated systems. The basb stand-abne systems of the early 
bureaucratie phase need to be integrated in order to keep the overheads associated with 
data acquisitbn and handling down. Performance feedback needs to be quick and 
accurate, and the physical aspects of the retail network need to be kept under tight 
control if efBcbncy is to be maintained.
Systems integration is a prerequisite for cohesive organisatbnal and operational 
strategies to begin to emerge. During the bureaucratb stage the food retailers begins to
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meet organised opposition in terms of other similarly size groips of traders. Although 
the food retailer may have established a reputation for a characteristic product mix and 
trading style - Sainsbury specialised in dairy produce and bacon and fostered an orderly 
style of trading, Tesco pecialised in tea trading with a "pile it high and sell it chesp' 
^proach to other produce - conpetition with the other organised food retailers begins to 
take place on a wide range of standard produce that is difficult to differentiate in terms of 
quality or content. These nonrspecialist trading lines become the battle ground in which 
price becomes a nxyor differentiator. Which produce to use in these price skirmishes is 
heavily dependent ipon accurate knowledge of current stock movements, changing price 
patterns and an ability to maintain a product mix that generates enough profit to continue 
with the constant theme of expsaasaon. It also requires the trading environment to be 
closely monitored in order to reduce waste and inprove efSciency. Without a 
merchandising strategy that is fed by accurate data fix>m trading activities and from 
environmental events the organisation will be severely disadvantaged. Without a 
distrfoution strategy to ensure that the merchandising strategy becomes a reality the 
organisation wiü be similarly disadvantaged. Finally, unless adequate operational 
performance measurement system is instituted the whole system is unreliable and 
unstable.
This phase, dominated by the need to consolidate the organisation's market position, 
seems to be a long one. Many organisations may never transcend regional status. A 
pattern that has evolved in recent years is fin food multples to consolidate regional 
trading on an area defined by commercial television coverage. For exanple the East ami 
West Midlands IFV area includes Shropshire, Hereford and Worcester, Stafferdshire, 
Derlyshire, West Midlands, Warwickshire Leicestershire, Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire,
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1995, pp. 32-33). The 
move to wider geogr^hical operations is usually acconpanied by an increase in the 
average store size. Smaller diops will be replaced by larger stores and thus it is possible 
that the number of store does not increase much but the trading square footage does.
This mode of operating is very susceptible to changes in the geogr^hical 
micro-economy. However, once established, the regional food multples can be 
remarkably stable but are always liable to predation by the national operators, especially 
if ownershp is diluted and in the hands of institutional investors. The stability of the 
regional mode of operation lies in the closeness of the management of the business to 
their market and the focus of the business on a regional market niche. This focus meang 
that a limited product mk is required and in turn the control systems, although needing 
integration, can remain quite small and be cheap to maintain Once the management 
control systems are integrated with the operational control systems the basis is formed 
for the next phase of evolution if there is the management will to achieve it. However, 
the transition to national coverage is unlikely to take place in one move. With Sainsbury 
and Tesco erqransion took place in a series of waves that spread fiom the London centre 
of operations (Figure 5.2), with each wave taking from 10 to 20 years to conplete. In a 
way this transition bears many of the characteristics already described in the move from 
the entrepreneurial phase to early bureaucratic phase. Wrûi each wave of expansion the 
control and merchandising systems have to evolve to cope with; increasing trading 
volumes, probably an increasing number of products sold, and an increasing need for 
regional trading variations.
By the end of the bureaucratic phase the food retailer wiü be established as a "multiple' 
with a clear market image in the geogr^hical area in which they operate. They wiü own
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around 80 stores (between 15,000 and 25,000 sq. ft.), enpby about 1000 FTE's in the 
stores, enploy 50 to 100 people in the sipply chain, enploy 50 to 100 people at Head 
OfSce, and be turning over between £80m and £150m. The problems that are becoming 
apparent have two basic sources: the increasing volume and variety of produce sold, and 
the need for an integrated system. In the first instance the growth in store size means 
that the supply system has to cope with a much wider variety and greats volume of 
produce, the merchandising system has to manage a larger portfolio, and the purchasing 
system has closed monitor actual sales of produce to avoid over or under ordering, 
^^thout integration of the separate operational systems, sales and control data has to be 
passed between the systems manual^ wdiich is inefficient, e?q)ensive in terms of labour, 
prone to error, and likely to be untimefy. EFTPoS systems will almost certainly be used 
during this phase but it may only be linked to the ordering system internally and the 
clearing banks externally. The EPoS sales data cannot be processed to give sophisticated 
feedback to the merchandising and maiketing systems. The lack of integrated 
operational sy^ems also inhibits longer term planning and the development of the 
systems that are associated with strategic (long term) planning and that require 
consolidated data for activities such as forecasting, identifying new sites for esqiansion, 
and refining the merchandising activities.
Prerequisites for the next phase of development are -
a. the operational systems either have to be integrated 
by connecting them together in some way, or a new 
integrated system needs to be purchased and 
implemented throughout the organisation,
b. the communication systems throughout the organisation
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have to be effective,
c. control systems throughout the organisations have to 
be effective,
d. performance measurement systems have to in line 
with corporate plans,
e. there has to be a technology strategy to ensure that 
subsequent technological developments are co-ordinated.
During the systematic phase of development the food multÿle moves towards national 
operation. This may not Hteralfy mean nationally in the sense of total geogr^hic 
coverage in the UK, but would inçly that a significant area of the UK is serviced ty  the 
trader - usualfy understood to be the majority of England, Wales and the densefy 
inhabited parts of Scotland. In this phase the niultq>le food retailer foces a market that 
has reached saturation with a few well controlled and managed competitors. The greatest 
marketing change between this stage and the previous stage is that of focus. Regional 
operators usualfy compete on the basis of price, a limited number of product lines (circa 
10,000) and a foirfy static formula of trading. National operators usually conq)ete on the 
basts of customer focus and a format of trading that can be quickly tuned to the changing 
buying behaviour of their target socio-economic group - a mode of competition that can 
only be achieved with sophisticated information systems.
'\^thin the national food multiple the wiiole of the organisation becomes systematised 
aib control of everyday activities is almost entirefy ly  con^mter based information 
systems. Excqrtions to the norm are dealt with manually. Ifit has not already hqipened, 
then the merchandising systems are also automated, although the 'creative' aspects may
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not The operational strategies that have been successfiil in previous phases are 
augmented by new operational strategies that are based on more sophisticated data about 
the market and the customer. Customer care and communications operational strategies, 
that require customer behaviour and brging pattern information, are grafted into the 
operations strategy structure. Market saturation shifts the ftrcus of senior management 
towards diversification and/or exploiting overseas opportunities and/or bt^ing 
coiqpetitors. The role of middle and store management is mostly dealing with day to day 
exceptions and problems highlighted by the control system. Although it may have begun 
in the previous phase, the system's boundaries become increasing^ blurred as th ^  
interacts extensive^ with other automated external systems (e.g. banking and suppliers). 
Standardisation of these links and systems allows aspects (e.g. distribution) of the system 
to be subcontiacted without loss of control
As the control system increases in sophistication expert software systems refine the 
system reqwnses. The enhanced information siq^Iied by the advanced systems allow 
management to make better decisions. Towards the end of this phase more sophisticated 
marketing strategies (e.g. relationshÿ matiœting) that are based on detailed analysis of 
EPoS data can be implemented. This greatly increases the effectiveness of the overall 
organisation allowing a more proactive management style to be adopted. The previously 
mentioned efficiencies of scale are likely to trigger a great deal of building activity. The 
old tenets of previous phases have to be replaced with new tenets that are custom built to 
get the benefits of the integrated systems. Wherever possible old premises are 
refurbished. These building activiti^ may also require additional csqntal to be sought 
from external investors. Investment in the system and infrastructure are likely to take a
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long time to complete as the inq>lementation of the changes have to be made in hundreds 
of stores.
At the end of the systematic phase of development the food muk%)le wiU enq)loy in 
excess o f2,000 FTE's, have more than 100 large stores (>25,000 sq. ft.), and be turning 
over around £250m to £500m. E)q)ansion is increasingly a problems due to the lack of 
large sites on ^nch to build stores and the cost of the sites when they do become 
available. Management's ability to respond quickly to mariœt changes becomes 
increasing^ dominated by the flexibility and boundaries of the systems that run the 
operations. New opportunities are as likely to come from internal systems driven 
analyses as from external market changes. Expansion abroad, usually a real option at this 
stage of the organisations development, may be constrained by systems as much as 
anything else.
The fifth phase of retail development is the restructuring phase. During this phase of 
evolution the organisation's boundaries become increasing blurred as non value adding 
functions, distribution for exanple, are sub-contracted. The organisation, whose focus 
during the bureaucratic and systematic phases of evolution was on internal processes and 
efficiency, begins to "rediscover" the customer through detailed analysis of store trading 
The EPoS data coiq>led with loyalty card data gives the retailer accurate feedback 
about custoEoer buying behaviour for tbe first time. With this data the overall system can 
now be optimised at the store level and also the mylementation of just-in-time siqxply 
strategies become possible. As has already been demonstrated in Chapter 4 the internal 
information system hardware and software become highly sophisticated and 
automatically manage many of the operational functions of the organisation.
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With the main food retailing market stagnating the ever present need for growth can only 
be satisfied through e3q)ansion or co-operation in overseas markets, new trading formats, 
or diversification into adjacent sectors of the home market Sainsbury, Tesco and 
Safeway are all actively looking for opportunities in each of these areas. In the home 
market sector in which they operate they aü have broadfy similar product ranges, prices, 
organisations and trading systems. None of the organisations can easily trade iq) or 
down market because their infrastructure is defined by the technology they use and the 
trading profile they have. They have optimised their systems on the trading profile of the 
iq>per quartile market they operate in To operate in another market sector would 
require m ^ r  restructuring that may be prohibitive^ erqrensive and unacceptably 
disnqjtive. Providing they keep their market share they can trade profitably. The greatest 
danger of this situation is a price war on a broad front, but this would be difficult to 
sustain for long enough to bring a conqretitor to their knees; also the buying behaviour of 
customers in this sector is very conservative with customer loyalty high. The tactics that 
Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway have adopted is to conq)ete on price on a limited range of 
produce (e.g. in 1997 Tesco claim that they have the lowest price on a range of 600 
products - and if a customer can find the same product cheq)er they wiü refund twice the 
difference). When this kind of price conq)etition is entered into the range of products is 
very limited (Le. iq> to 1000 products m a 25000 product portfolio) and often includes 
own brand produce to reduces the range of 'conqxirative' discounted produce. These 
market dynamics, coupled with mariœt stagnation, are likely to lead to long term price 
erosion and decreasing profit margins. This he%)s to explain the continued search for 
efiSciency and effectiveness within the organisations as this is the only way to reduce 
costs and maintain margin.<L This becomes the focus for the operational management of 
the business.
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The problems that the food multples have in this phase of their development are mostly 
based in the area of strategy. By the time that the multq>les have reached the 
restructuring phase the management structure will have evolved into two levels - the 
operational level (discussed above) and the strategic level While the operational 
management's focus is on efficiency and effectiveness, the strategic management's focus 
is increasing^ on external activities and opportunities. At this stage of evolution the 
organisations are large and influential. They may have over 300 siçerstores, enq)loy 
around 6,000 to 8,000 people and be turning over in excess of £l,000m and this is a 
position that has to be defended. This defence must, in the first instance, be directed 
towards the other large multples in the market through customer retention strategies and 
initiatives, and in the second instance be directed towards the incursions of foreign 
conq)etitors. If not actualfy instigating new trading format development the dkectors of 
the mult%)les have to be closefy in touch with the way in winch these things are 
developing. There is a real problem in finding new trading options or distinctive 
conqxetences, and most initiatives if th ^  hold any prospect of success are quickly copied 
by cong)etitors. Good exanq)les of tins in recent times have been the customer loyalty 
card and inrstoie banking. Another problem associated with size is that the organisations 
begin to attract political and press attention. A great deal of energy, both strategic and 
tactical, has to be focused on ensuring the public image and policies of the organisation 
are kqrt m line with currentfy accepted ethical standards.
The previously described five phases of evolution are typical of the food retail 
organisations that begin as the result of a single entrepreneur. Safew^, although having 
clear entrepreneurial influences in its early devebpment, grew in a very different way.
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Source: Coaqpany Rqwrts and Accounts 
Figure S3  The growth o f Sttfewt^ (previousfy the Argyll Group) 1978 -1995
The nucleus of control was a small entrepreneurial team who engineered growth through 
amalgamation and acquisition (described in Appendix 2). Unlike Sainsbury and Tesco 
who grew in a "rqpple-out mode from London (Figure 5.2), Safeway grew from the 
regions into London (Figure 5.3). Safeway*s earty acquisition (and diqxpsals) began with 
organisations that were in trouble and who were in the earfy bureaucratic or frdl 
bureaucratic phase of development. Later, the leveraged acquisition of Safewzy enabled 
them to move quickly to achieve something approaching narinnal coverage, and having 
been through the systematic phase are now, along with Sainsbury and Tesco, in the 
restructuring phase of their evolution. Given the relative scarcity of land for building 
stores and the current static growth of the UK retail market, this or grmilar patterns of 
evolution may become a more normal pattern in the future.
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Throughout these phases of evolution technology has played an increasingly important 
role for the operations management, and more recentfy of strategic management of the 
food multiples. As technology has inqproved so it has been able to provide better control 
information for operational management leading to inproved efficiency. For strategic 
management the technology has begun to deliver knowledge rather than sinply 
information, and this has proved to be vital in the long term planning of the enterprise. 
This relationship is worthwhile epqploring in a little more detail as it has a direct bearing 
on this research. A chronological conparison of Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway allows 
Table 5.2 to be constructed. This table gives some valuable insights into the way in which 
technology has affected the management in, and o^ these organisations. Clearfy the time 
divisions do not correpond exactly to the previously described stage of food muhple 
development. Sainsbury's for instance had established a full bureaucratic manual control 
system by the late 1800s and Tesco had a similar system by the 1940s. However, the 
time intervals are of relevance when contextuaHsing the inpact of emerging technologies, 
in particular information technology. It should be iKPted that the percentages used in this 
table are approximate and based on comments made during interviews with tbe sources 
identified at the bottom of the table.
With reference to Table 5.2 the role of technology in management decision making has 
changed quite radical^ since 1950. Prior to 1950 the technobgy used by the Sainsbury 
and Tesco was associated with basb shop and head office operatbnal functbns - 
registering transactions, preparing reports and monitoring events that occurred m the 
store and distribution chain. In practical terms this data was availabb m a useful form 
quite some time after the operational events had occurred due to maniifll informatbn
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Factor By 1950 By 1980 By1990
Rok(^tBchnok%y inops. 
management dcrâion making
■Passive - 100% 
Active-0%
Passive-50% 
Active-50%
Pnsstve-20%
Active-80%
The changing tedaofa^jcal 
balance
Mechanical - 80% 
Electramech - 20%
Mech.-10% 
Ekctremech. -10% 
Electramc-20% 
Conpater-60%
Mech.-5% 
ElectnunedL-5% 
Ebctrenic-10% 
Computer-80%
CoBfmainication methods between 
retailer and the supply chain
Written-80% 
Tdephone-20%
Written-60% 
Tdephone-30% 
Computer-10%
Written-30% 
Tdq>honei^ax30% 
Computer-40%
Comimmication between Head 
OfSce and stores
Manually prepfdrq/s Manually preÿdrcp^ Computer on-line repfs 
-60% -20% -80%
Visits and tdephone Computet repfs-50% Visits A  - 
-40% Visits ft tdqihone- 20%
30%
Technological rnipnct Store-40% 
Distribution-30% 
Head O S -30%
Store-20% 
Distribution-40% 
Head O S -40%
Store-20% 
Distribution - 30% 
HeadOS-50%
r^ iBMfiniMl niMMgMnwrft
undetstandmg of technology
High bfohnm Low
Inoaittnee oftedBHdogy to 
tradn^andopsoootiol
Low Medinm High
Opentfional management 
mflnenoe on tedna^ogicid
High - MatWnin Medinm-Low Low
Rrftwemflncnceof tednndogy 
on ops management of
Low Medium H #
Management sQde of Ops. 
Manners
Autocratic - 100% Autocratic-90%, 
Democratic-10%
Antocratic-80% 
Democratic 20%
Management ofTecfanical 
Managers
uAi Autocratic-70% 
Democratic-30%
Autocratie-50% 
Democratic-50%
(Somoes: Btomyioo, 1993b; Windi, 1993; Randle; 1996; HaoK 1997)
Table SJ2 Developing technology-management reladomships
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processing and as such could only be used in building an historical view of the 
organisations activities. By 1980 ftmctional control systems had been computerised and 
integrated. This speieded iq> the information flow considerably. Prior to 1950 
management control information for the operational aspects of the organisation was 
available on a monthfy or weekly basis, by 1980 the same information was available on a 
weekly or daify basis. This greatfy enhanced the efficiency of the management process 
and the net overall effect of the speeding iq> of control data was to reduce the amount of 
stock in the siqipfy chain and to inqnove the management of individual store 
performance. These in^provements greatly enhanced management's confidence in the 
technology and systems they were using, and further systems enhancements only served 
to increase this confidence.
The period between 1980 and 1990 saw a major change in operations management use of 
technology in their decision making processes. The focus for technological development 
was almost entirely caitred on internal operational functions. During the 1980s this 
focus rififted to external links. EPoS, a m^or internal innovation, proved to be the 
technology that unlocked more effective merchandising, but more inoportantly, along 
with EDI, it was also the key to automating the siq>pfy cbam These improvements 
reduced inventory, speeded iq> the siqiply systems and inqproved general operational 
control The control of money management was also greatly improved as the EPoS 
systems were linked to the banking systems to form the EFTPoS system. Overall, the 
internal information systems became foster and more flexible and the communication 
systems became more extensive and sophisticated. These tra&ds continued into the 
1990s but as the quality of the data inqxroved and the analysis became less operationally
2 0 6
oriented the technology began to dominate the wider management information system, 
and consequent^ much of strategic management thinking.
This shift in the nature of the information system from tnamml to computer was primarily 
due to the changing balance of the technology itself Table 5.2 clearly shows that almost 
as soon as the computer based systems became available they were quickfy flggrniilfltpd 
into the fobric of the conq>anies. By 1997 the conçuter systems dominated the 
technological balance in the food retailers and accounted for a significant percentage of 
their investment This pattern of increasing dominance is repeated in the main routes of 
communications within the food multples - between Head Office and supply chain, and 
between Head Office and the stores.
The pattern of inqpact of the technology varied quite considerabfy and was closefy 
associated with the evolutionary need of the organisation at different times. Technology 
in the stores had the biggest impact up to 1950 as operational efficiency dominated 
managenynt thinking. The 1950s boom created a demand that was difficult to satisfy. 
The stores and the distribution system were under great pressure. By 1980 the emphasis 
had moved to the distribution systems as the food multÿles began to strategkaOy move 
from distributing aü of their produce themselves to sub-contracting a substantial 
proportion of these activities. By 1990 the inpact of technology was most keenfy fok at 
Head Office as systems integration began to move technology into the areas of strategic 
decision making, and many of the manual decision making activities were automated 
through the use of expert systems. This process continued throughout the 1990s as 
technology became more ftxmsed on marketing activities and even more infliiential on the 
strategic apects of the organisation.
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The lower six aspects of the table give some interesting mmgbts into changing 
operational management attitudes. It is clear from this table, and from the previous 
discussion relating to the phase development of the food multiples, that technology was 
playing an ever more important role in the trading and operations. The evidence of the 
interviewees suggested that non-techmcal operations management became increasingly 
remote from the development of the systems (usually a Head Office activity), while at the 
same time being increasingly told what to do by the control systems • a situation thnt 1ms 
led to some operational managers to develop a suqiicion and resentment of the 
information and control systems. Informal discussions with store managers (see 
methodology) would tend to support this point of view. The final two parts of the table 
show the ways in which the management styles of the operational and technical 
management have changed. The operations managers vbose management style is greatfy 
influenced by the Head Office culture have sk )\^  become less autocratic although it is 
still the dominant style. The technical management whose management style is 
influenced more by the technical environment and the need to work with technical 
e]q)erts is dominated by a democratic perspective. These differences do he%) to evplain 
some of the tensions that exist between the operational and technical management
5.7 Change rdationships
The previous^ described patterns of evolution of the food multples of growth folk)wed 
by a crisis of some descrÿtion» realignment and reorganisation  ^and then another growth 
period before the next crisis occurs - is predicted by Griener (1972), Mintri)erg (1967) 
and Johnson and Scholes (1989). Griener argued that as organisations grow they have 
periods of evolution followed ly  short period of revolution, and that the periodicity of 
the revolutionary aspects is determined ly  the growth rate of the industry (these
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relatîoîiîfoips are described in Figure 5.4A). He further suggested that the periods of 
revolution were often precy itated by internal crises (e.g. leaderriiq) problems, autonon^ 
problems, control problems, red tspe problems, etc.). The patterns of change that have 
been observed in this research broadfy agree with Giiener's predictions of corporate 
behaviour in that the food multÿle patterns of growth have typicalfy been a period of 
stability (or consolidation) fallowed by a riiort period of significant change. However, 
this research has also demonstrated that in the case o f the food mtdtiples, technology 
has been an important factor in organisational changes and realignments - a factor not 
highlighted in Griener's analysis. Figure 5.4B describes the broad patterns of change 
that the food multples studied have undergone and how the three food multples have 
converged in change terms as time has passed. T^thin the context of the food multple 
market there are four observations in this research that suggest that Giiener's theory may 
need to be modified:
a  the first is that organisational growth is unlikely to be linear 
and periods o f evolution and revolution may be less predictable 
than he suggests;
b. the second is that as a market becomes saturated and dominated 
by a few large organisations, the organisations periods o f change 
and stability become closely Iniked;
c. the third is that as organisations become larger technology 
plays a greater role in improving organisational efficiency, 
chants to technology are as likely as anything else to 
trigger periods o f ^ revolution-;
d  the fourth is that change is as likely to be triggered by external 
factors (e.g. market factors) as intemal factors.
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Figure 5.4 Griener growth relationships
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In a similar y&n. to Giiensr, Mmtzbetg's (1978) study of many organisations over several 
decades suggested that organisations diq)layed four fondamental change strategies -
1. periods o f stability in i^ dnch few or no strategy changes took place,
2. periods of incremental strategic change (most typical) in v^nch 
organisations changed slowly to reflect maiket changes,
3. periods offlvx in Wdch organisations changed strategy but 
in no clear direction, and
4. periods of tranrformatiorud change in wdiich the v ^ le  
organisation strategy focused on creating a new operational 
paradigm to meet new market conditions.
Whereas Mmtzfoerg believed that the rrugority of strategies were driven by the market, 
Johnson and Scholes suggested that strategy reqx)nded to the viiole organisational 
environment rather than singly the market place, and that strategy must be understood in 
a pluralistic flamework that includes the social systems of the organisation^  the power 
relationships in the organisations and the management t^ams interpretation of past 
activities and events both within and without the organisation. They argued that even in 
periods of stability incremental changes to strat^y wiH be taking place to condensate 
for strategic drift (Le. a move away finm declared strategic or market targets), and as a 
consequence there are probably only three strategy states - incremental change, a flux 
state and a transformational state. The evidence of this research clearly identifies at least 
two of these strategy states at different times in corporate development. The absence of 
static periods in vdnch no strategy changes are in evidence confirms Johnson and Scholes 
ideas. There is little evidence to show that food multdles have been throu^ periods of 
fluxinthepast For the most parts market objectives have been clear and focused most^ 
on growth and efBciency. There have however been periods of transformational change -
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the change to the supermarket format during the 1950s, the integration of systems during 
the 1980s and the current search for new trading formats - and in the latter two changes 
the role of technology has been of great indortance (Figure 5.4B). The influence of 
tecfanobgy may of course be seen as extraordinary in the context of the food multdles, 
but it is more likely that previous general concepts of strategy have not fulfy eiqpbred the 
changing influence of technology on strategy in recent years (especially in large 
organisations), and this is an area that needs further research. Certain^ the strategic 
interplay of merchandising, customer service, customer communications and trading style 
proposed by Waters (1988) [Figure 2.5], is now dominated by information made 
available by the systems technology.
5.8 Condusians
The histories of the three retailers contained in .^d^ndix 2 and discussed in this chapter 
allow three fundamental observations. The first is that to be a major player in the food 
retailing market it is necessary m the first instance to have a clear understanding of the 
market characteristics and customer needs. This understanding is a focus for the 
business and with this understanding food retail operations can be designed and ad^Jted 
to service customer needs and secure a market niche. Secondly, it is vital to view 
operational efBciency as a core condctence sipporting all aspects of the organisation - 
distribution, customer care, merchandising and customer communications. In a low 
gross margin business operational efficiency protects net margins and information 
technotogy prevent operational strategies becoming unsynchronised and dysfunctional 
The third observation is that growth, and ultimate^ size, constantly chaHenges 
management's abilrty to control the organisation The key to maintaining operational 
control is an effective performance measurement system Monitoring and feedback
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systems are vital to this task and it is the information technology that allows this 
feedback to be gathered and processed qnickjÿ.
The relationship between the size of a food retail organisation and the information 
technology it uses appears to be proportional The larger the organisation the more 
information technology it uses and in a wider variety of (dpEcations. This is certain^ the 
case today, it has not always been the case in the past when on^ manual systems were 
available. However, to condare a food multdle to d ^  with one in the 1850s is not 
comparing like with Hke. Condansons can be mi«lAAHing In information technology 
terms there is a clear case to be argued that it is, and has been, a vital element in 
maintaining operational efficiency and control As such it will also play a vital role in 
operatfonal strategies. Whether or not in performing this task information and control 
systems are shaping general food retailer strat^ies is a broader issue.
The patterns of growth, technological and corporate change that have been observed in 
the food multiples are not unique. Similar patterns may be found in manu&cturing 
organisations i^iere both H31 (1993) and Schonherger (1987) vfoo cite several exandbs 
that closely parallel the nature and pattern of change observed in the food multdles. In 
practice the difficulty in the real world is to identic how strategy is affecting tactics. The 
food multdles all have declared strategies of 'growth* and 'efkieocÿ. The reality of 
trading in any market vhere there is competition is that both of these are economic 
necessities rather than strategies. If growth and efficiency were strategies, then aU 
management activités could be regarded as tactics and as enabling the basic strat^ic 
objectives. This way be the reason that technological changes have historically been 
regarded as 'enabling' rather than leading' strategy. To make this statemmt today is a
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mistake. Prior to 1980 the food multdle strategies tended to be dominated ly  physical 
considerations (e.g. the move to the larger store formats, creating and developing the 
distribution network). During the 1980s it was the information technology tW  
mcreasmgfy defined the food multdles boundaries of operations, the tactics tlmt they 
employed and the direction they took in the market place. By defining the boundary of 
operations, is technology defining strategy or tactics? The answer to this question really 
depends iqion 1k )w  strategy is defined. If strategy is defined as long term planning anH 
the domain of visionary leaders (Le. in the unitary tradition described by Chandler, 
Ansof^ and Sloan) then technology, no matter haw sophisticated, is not a stratège but 
an operational tool - no more. I t  however, strategy is defined in the pluraHstic tradition 
(Mintzherg, Johnson and Scholes, et al) then technology, in providing information for 
management decisions o f all types, can be regarded as a major shcper o f corporate 
culture and the organisations response to customers and the environment. As such 
information technology has a significant irflueruie on strategy. This is eqiecially the 
case when it takes on mai^ of die managerial functions as is the case in the food 
multples. Managers and directors use the information supplied by technology to 
evaluate their own activities and those of their conpedtors. The information they have 
collected via EPoS provides the basis for nearly all marketing and merchandising 
activities. And, it is the information that the technology processes and interprets that 
identifies new strategic opportunities in the future. In iden tif^g  and d a r in g  these 
relationships in the case o f the food retail multiples this research demonstrates that 
there is a convincing argument to show that the influence o f information technology on 
corporate culture is not passive but active. In this role technology will help to shape 
both tactics and strategy.
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Chapter 6
Perfomumce Measurement, Emergent Operational Strategies and Core
Competences
6.1 Introduction
In Chester 5 the five phases of food multple development were identified and eaplored 
in the context of the market, tactical challenges and organisational strategic focus. These 
same five phases will now be used to examine the evolution of the performance 
measurement systems (PMS), and the operational strategies in the food multÿles. By 
examining the PMS in the store, in the distribution system and at Head Office, it will be 
possible to demonstrate the inportance of developing the information systems as a core 
conpetence to siqrport other corporate development. The examination of the emergent 
operational strategies and core conpetences wQl allow a fimctional model of the food 
multq>le to be developed, and through this a better appreciation of the role of the 
information system as the dominant technology in the (fynamics of the organisatiorL
62 The évolution of the perfomumce measMtrement systems
Performance measurement (PM) in the modem food multiple is a well developed 
management discpHne. The research identified 35 PMs applied at the store level, 33 
PM*s in the depot and distribution system, and 31 PMs at Head Office. These lists are 
not exhaustive as the vdiole ^rstem of PM is constantly under review as the ftnvjmnmftnt 
changes and the food multples develop. Also, the descrpdon of the historic 
development of the PMs was very much a matter of memory, auH few of the
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interviewees could remember exactly vidch PMs were used and when. Within these 
constraints the following analysis has been undertaken.
The PMS have been analysed using a standard layout that has been ^ lie d  to the store 
(Table 6.1), the depot (Table 6.2) and the Head Office (Table 6.3). Column 1 identifies 
the main functions that the PMs are associated with. Column 2 contains a description of 
the main activities undertaken ly  those functions in the organisatioiL Column 3 lists the 
main PMs that are available in the modem (Phase 5) system and the fiequency of the 
report. It is these PMs that the fimctional managers wiH be judged, and will judge their 
own performance and that part of the organisation they are reqmnsible. Columns 4, 5 
and 6 describe the main method of irputting data into the PMS; the mam way in which 
the performance data is processed and made available for control purposes; and the final 
of these three columns vbere the performance report is delivered. Columns 7 and 8 
indicate vAether or not the report is automatically generated, or alternative if the report 
is delivered oniequest In some instances the report may be automatically generated for 
some of the management (e.g. store management) and be available on request for other 
managers (e.g. general management). In general the reports that are delivered on a dai^ 
or weekly basis are operational and trading reports, the other reports tend to be focused 
on ancillary or secondary activities. The final four columns of data indicate whether or 
not the performance measure was available or used during a particular phase of the food 
multÿle development (Phases 1 to 4). It should be noted that these four columns have 
been evaluated at the end of the phase in question. In practice they would change 
considerabÿ throughout the phase and an individual PM may begm a phase with manual 
iiqnit and manual output but end it with manual irqmt and automatic output due to 
information system enhancem en t.
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If Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 are viewed as a whole dear patterns emerge. Phase 1 
developments are dominated fay manual system of iiqmtting data to the PMS, manual 
processing of the data and manually preparing performance reports. This manual activity 
is expensive and is generally slow to produce output. If a speedy response is required 
then the on^ real option is fragment the calculation process and to use a lot of people. 
For some activities such as cash management or inventory management this is 
worthwhile as this data is essential for control purposes. For other activities that may be 
less critical a delay in getting the performance measure may be tolerated. With growth 
into Phase 2 the dominant way of irqjutting data is still manual. However, performance 
output is increasingly being prepared on the basis of conq>uter ana^rsis and computer 
generated reports. The raw performance data is usually processed on conqmters that are 
dedicated to a particular aspect of the system - the inventory control system for exarxple. 
As phases are progressed through there is a steady migration towards conqmter hqnit 
and ouq)ut. As the information technology becomes integrated during Phase 3 of the 
food nuiltÿle's development, the gtq>s in the performance measurement matrix quickty 
filL By the time Phase 3 has been conq>leted the performance measurement system is 
almost complete. Where the performance measurement system remains with manual 
input or ouQmt throughout the phases of development the reasons are usually associated 
with the qx)radic nature of the events being measured - individual performance appraisal 
for exanqile, or because the information can only be gathered manually to give 
satisfoctory results- market research in the stores would be a good example.
The data in Tables 6.1,6J2 and 6.3 clearh  ^gives some broad idea of the changes that take 
place and the very wide range of performance measures that are used throughout the 
modem food multÿlB. However, more insights are to gained by taking this basic data
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and presenting it in a slightly different format This is illustrated in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 
6.6. In these tables the format of the previous three tables has been smq>lified to 8 
columns and re-focused on phase developments in performance measurement Column 1 
contains an identification of the phase the organisation is iiL  Column 2 identifies the 
focus for the performance measures during each phase. Column 3 identifies the fostest 
time that the reporting system can respond. Column 4 shows the balance of 
manual/automatic nqmt/output, and column 6 the destination of each performance report. 
Column 7 indicates the extent to i^nch each area of performance measurement is 
developed in conq)arison to the fiiH performance measurement range of phase 5. The 
final column indicates which percentage of the conqjiete performance measurement suite 
is used during each phase.
Table 6.4 focuses on the performance measurement activities in the store. An 
examination of column 2 shows that in Phase 1 only three out of the seven jfeci for 
performance measurement are being used. These are the core cash flow  measures that 
summarise each stores performance. It is interesting to note that the only 50% of the 
cash fiow suite and 33% of the personnel suite of measures are implemented at this stage, 
whereas 100% of the inventory control suite are implemented This would indicate that 
management are preoccupied with inventory - a foct confirmed by previous analysis that 
identified getting the right product mix as a key target for Phase 1. Inventory 
management would also be inqwrtant in terms the cash tied iq) in the business. Overall, 
only 47% of the possible PMs are used in this phase due in part to the unsophisticated 
systems being used, arb in part to the relative^ unsopbistkated management styles that 
tend to dominate activities in the organisation during Phase 1.
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TM e6.4 Summarised Store Paformance Measuremem Anafysis
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By Phase 2 Trading Format' and 'Merchandising' have been added to the performance 
measure portfolio. As with the PM*s of Phase 1 these new additions are initially 
inq)Iemented at a basic level and generate information that is required for the control of 
the expanding number of products and stores. The evolution of the merchandising PM's 
in particular are inportant as product mix is much more critical as the food retailer 
makes the transition to Phase 3 and a much wider operating base. The product mix is 
also very inportant in determining the market image of the organisation and in eploiting 
the market platform that emerges from the trading eperiments of Phase 1. During this 
phase the cash fiow PMs are fu% inplemented, 57% of the merchandising PMs and 
50% of the trading format PMs are inplemented, and the personnel PMs implemmtation 
is raised to 66%. Overall the number of the potential PMs that could be used has risen to 
66% of the total The increasing number of personnel PMs refiects the growing size of 
the organisation and the need to control a quickly growing epense. The control focus is 
still very much at Head Office and this is illustrated by the number of reports i^tose 
primary focus is the Head Office. Using conputers speeds ip  the availability of control 
data, and while the stores themselves may remain relative^ unsophisticated in terms of 
data collection, the same is not true of the Head Office functions whose head count costs 
are reduced and response time inproved by using computers.
By the end of Phase 3 the fr>od multple has almost conpkted the PM portfolio with 
94% of all PMs being inplemented. Conputer based data collection has replaced much 
of the manual data collection of Phase 2. If it has not already been installed towards the 
end of Phase 2, EPoS will be inplemented during this phase. EPoS greatly inproves 
check-out productivity and provides the stock usage data for more efficient stock 
ordering. The general move towards conputer based information processing inproves
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the overall response time of the PM system with many individual report times felKng by a 
half
From the point of view of the Store Managers the inprovement in the range of PM's «nH 
the speed of tte feedback is invaluable. Prior to Plase 3 improvenaents the manager haH 
a limited view of what was actually happening in the k^r areas of the store operations. 
To get better information means either waiting for reports or undertaking manual 
investigations. This could lead to poor operational decisions and waste or inefficiency. 
Stock related problems in particular, with peihsps 10,000 to 15,000 product lines, are 
difficult to address without the availability of a timely and reasonabfy accurate stock list 
At the store level the management are operating in real time and this means that there is a 
constant pressure to speed ip  the réponse of the Head Office PM reporting system. 
This inevitably leads to pressure for information system integration at Head Office and 
further automation of hput to the PM system in the store.
An examination of Phases 4 and 5 in Table 6.4 shows that aside from some nrmrginal 
increases in speed of réponse gained from system int^ration and additional 
conputerisation, there is little difference between these two phases as for as the store 
PMS is concerned. This is to be expected as the emphasis on information system 
development has shifted from the operational aspects of the organisation to foe corporate 
and strategic aspects. It would be incorrect to suggest that this is the end of PM 
development in the stores, because the concepts and structures of the PMS are always 
being developed.
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Tabk 6.5 summaiises the development of the depot and distribution system PM 
developments. Viewed as a whole the pattern of PM development is very gimilar to that 
of the store - hmited PM availability in the earÿ phases with hput «nd ouput 
dominated by manual methods, and then by the end of the third phase 97% of the PM 
structure is conpkted. This rate of PM iopkmentation is slightly higher than hi the 
store (94%) at the same stage of evolution. The rate of conputerisation of the hput and 
output in the third phase of development is somei^iat slower than the store system and 
this may be explained by examining Tabk 6.2 depot inventory management section. 
Here it will be seen that the apects of the inventory PM systems that are being 
nnpkmented are those associated with the activities of individuals or delivery operations 
within the depot - percent correct pick per operator for instance. These kind of PMs 
require a sanphng system, usually with manual checking and data entry, and these 
systems are notorious^ difficult to implement and often give indifferent results for 
analysis. This problem has been noted in several distribution and inventory control 
environments by Femk (1990) and 0x1^ (see Cooper, 1994, p. 184). Attacking these 
problems requires a lot of management time and the majority of depot managers often do 
not seem to be inclined to pend energy in areas where they perceive they get marginal 
improvements (Rees, IBJ>R1:05:93). By phase 4, as with the store, the PMS is 
conpkte. Changes that are occurring during this and the subsequent phase are mostly 
associated with increased computerisation of irput and output to the system with 
concomitant inprovements in the response time of the PM reporting system.
The analysis of the Head Office PMS (Tabk 6.6) wink ri&owing a similar overall pattern 
to the depot and store developments, has a distinctly slower start. At the end of the first 
phase oiûy 35% of the PMs have been implemented and these are related to the core
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Table 6.6 Summarised Head Office Performance Measurement Analysis
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operating fonctions of biying, selling, replenishment and the corporate cash control 
fonctions. The product development fonction, responsible for new products and product 
evaluation, may not exist at all for the first two phases, or if it does it is likely to be at a 
very low level During the entr^neneurial phase management focus is on getting the 
right product mix, but of products that almost certainty already exist as proprietary 
brands. By the end of the pre-bureaucratic phase conqietition on the entrepreneurial 
product mix would not yield enough profit to fund growth. The tactics chosen by 
management are usually to develop own brand products, usually a small subset of the 
overall product lines, and then to use these fines to lead their competitive promotions. 
This takes pressure off the branded products conq>etition, leaving them to give a 
reasonable yield i^nle the own brand products encourage the customers to come to the 
shop. These tactics may seem crude but they are effective. In later phases product 
development becomes more inqx>rtant as the range of own brand products is extended 
and may become profitable in themselves. Some conq)anies such as Marks and Spencer 
use this ^iproach not as a tactic but as a strategy, and all food sold is own brand. It 
would not be possible for Sainsbury, Tesco or Safeway to only sell their own brands as 
they have such a wide product portfolio in conoparison to Marks and Spencer.
As the organisation moves into its third phase, and is better able to siqq>ort the costs of a 
more sophisticated PM system and a larger Head Office stafC the reiMimng Head Office 
functions begin to develop. The relativety low level of PM inplementation in phases one 
and two (35% and 55% respectivety) moves tp  to 71%, and while this is still less than 
the store and depot/distribution PMS wfoch by this phase have reached maturity, the 
inportant corporate management and strategic PMs are beginning to evolve. 
Examination of Table 6.3 and the corporate management function PM shows that
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dominant iiput/output methods aie conputer based and that many of the PM reports 
require information to be passed from several sources. These are less of a problem if the 
information systems are integrated which is indeed what h^pens at the md of this phase. 
It may be leasonabty argued that frdhire to integrate the individual systems would 
actualty inhibit frirther growth because the information processing overhead would grow 
very quickty as the product range and trading volumes increase. Historically, Sainsbury 
and Tesco were at the stage in the late 1970s, and as the company histories in Ch^Jter 5 
and Appendix 2 show, system integration was an important foctor in paving the way for 
significant geographical eiqpansion.
Much of the PM development at Head Office in this and subsequent phases of 
organisation change are focused on refining the monitoring processes within the separate 
corporate functions and at an organisation wide level During Phase 4 development it 
becomes possible to get a corporate view of events throughout the wfoole organisation 
and this becomes one of the inportant corporate management tools. Montagnon, 
(1993b) stressed the inportance of this fociHty for corporate management. He indicated 
that Sainsbury's directors convene in the Board Room every working day at 07.30 hrs. 
and review the group performance by store, region and nationally. Montagnon (1993a), 
V^nch (1993) and Harris (1997) aH agreed that during Phase 4 and Phase 5 there was a 
shift in the focus for information anatysis fix>m being mostty for operatioDal purposes, to 
providing information and knowledge to sipport strategic decision making. Winch 
(1997) in a subsequent interview went as for as to suggest the information systems in 
Safeway were now presenting management with future strategic possibilities that they 
were having difficulty in assessing within the current view of the food retailing world.
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Taken as a wfoole this anatysis of PM's in the food multiples clearty illustrates the 
increasing dependence of the operational aspects of the business on information 
processing technology. The PMs throughout the phases reflect both the organisatibn's 
and the management's sophisticatioiL In the earty stages the PMS is focused on basic 
operational functions giving sinple feedback to store, depot and Head Office. By the 
middle stages of corporate evolution the increasing conplexity of the operations requires 
the information system to begin to automate some of the managerial flmctions 
throughout the organisation. The individual managers role begins to include checking 
that reality coincides with the information system's view of the world. During the final 
two phases of development this process continues and there is a very real danger that the 
operational management throughout the organisation begins to feel alienated, 
disenfranchised and possibly confused by the large number of PM reports that they are 
feced with- This danger is recognised by many senior managers who are concerned that 
the PMS, so long the instrument of control and order throughout the system, will be 
deliberately ignored by disaffected operational managers. One initiative ly  Tesco to 
overcome this problem and re-engage their management's enthusiasm for their PMS has 
been to refocus their PMS on the balanced scorecard pproach of Ksplan and Norton 
(1996). In the store this new PMS initiative is called the Store Steering Wheel The 
focus of the PMS has moved away fix)m fonctional aspects of the store to four basic 
categories of PMs called Customer, People, Operations and Finance. This simplification 
of the store PMS is designed to -
"create a balanced set of measures to manage store 
performance in a simpler, more effective way."
The Store Steering Wheel is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1 The Store Steering Wheel
(N.B. In the actual reports the traffic lights are coloured making the presentation more 
effective.) This diagram presents the control data in broad conceptual terms and in the 
previously described categories. The categories are subdivided into four or five 
sub-catgeories each of which has a single PM focus. So for instance the Finance group 
of PMs has Sales Growth, Cost Control, Profitability and Driving Extra Sales to the 
Bottom Line as it’s sub-categories. Each of these sub-categorks has a traffic light that 
indicates wiiether or not that sub-category is within it's target range. These target ranges
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are calculated on the basis of the overall average of the conqxnator grotq) and of the 
coiporate performance otgectives. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2
Looking back helps learning ' Ixiokmg forward
the traffic lights
Red 
light
Individual Teams 
action ,  action 
point
and sets future targets
(Target
—— Store performance 
—  Average all store performance
(Source: Adiqrted from Tesco staff presentation material, 1997)
Figure 6.2 How the traffic light mechanism works
This is a sinqile mechanism that illustrates past performance on one side of the date line 
and target foture performance on the other side of the date line. In this particular 
instance the store actual performance is off target and an individual manager, who is 
reqx)nsiWe for managing this aspect of the store performance will see the amber traffic 
light This should trigger action to try to remedy the problem. Should the problem get 
worse then team action is triggered and more store management resources are dedicated 
to trying to solve the problem. The thinking behind this changing sq>proach to PM is 
rooted in the Deming Cycle of Plan - Do - Check - Act' and the Total Quality 
Management team problem solving activities. With the Tesco adqrtationofthese ideas it 
is the 'Steering Wheel' that identifies the problems. This is a very good example of the
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way in wdikh food multdles like Tesco are trying to change the inherited autocratic 
culture that tended to use the performance measure Hke a stick, and that often foiled to 
enable managers understanding of the PM systenL
63 Operational strat^ fes, core conpetences and strategy
The subject of operational strategies is poorly eaqilored in service industries research. In 
conq)arison manufacturing operational strategies attract for more interest Why this 
should be is not clear. One possible explanation is that manufacturing organisations are 
more stable and behave in more predictable ways. A more likely explanation is that the 
variety of service industries is very large and therefore trying to arrive at a universal 
definition of operations strat^ies is consequentially much harder. Also, it is only in the 
past twenty years or so that serious r^earch has been undertaken in the service sector. 
Therefore the accumulated body of knowledge is still rather limited. Whatever the 
reason, it is inportant for this research to examine the role of operational strategies, their 
relationships with the core and distinctive organisation conpetences and how these 
factors interact with the strategy making processes in the fi>od multples.
Bearing in mind the problems of finding widely accepted definitions of strategy and 
conpetences pecific to the service sector, the analysis of the organisation control 
structure wiU use the following definitions of strategy and conpetmce. At a broad 
conceptual level Johnson and Scholes (1993, p.ll) identified three levels of strategy. 
These were the corporate strategy, concerned with financial market; competitive and 
business strate^, concerned vdth how to conpete in a mariret; and, operational strategy 
concerned with how the functional activities of an organisation contribute to the other 
levels of strategy. The fixod multple core competences are defined as those cpabiHties
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that are necessary to conpete and survive in the food multple market place (Teece, 
1992), and the distinctive competences are defined as those conpetences that give the 
fix)d multple a market edge (Grant, 1991).
The earty part ofthischpter has expbred the relationshp between the evolution of PMs 
and the phases of corporate evolutbn of the food multples. This analysis not only 
showed which PMs evolved and vfbea they evolved, but also how they have been used 
as a control mechanism in the food multples. These PMs are a vital clue as to how the 
control ystem of the food mukpk works, and "«mg them together with the other 
information already discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 it is possibk to create a model of how 
the overall control ystem works.
To begin with the three strategb levels predicted by Johnson and Scholes exist in the 
food multpb. The corporate functbns in the Head Office, the conpetitive functions in 
the Head Office and the operational functions in the stores and distribution chain.
The Phase 1 corporate functions at Head Office include overall monitoring of the money 
positbn and catii fiow forecasting, gross profit anatysis, general stock and trading 
activity monitoring (Tabb 6.3). These are the core corporate conpetences for Phase 1. 
Strategy formulation may not actually be a formal fimction at this stage of the corporate 
évolution. As the organisation devebps through phases 2 to 3 new corporate fimctions 
are added. These include refining the monitoring procedures of the store and distributbn 
chain, conpetitor evaluation as a basis for strategy formulation, productivity analysis of 
different parts of the ystem as the basis for efficiency evaluation and future investment, 
and cbser evaluation of expenses and costs in the system. The strategy function of the
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food retailer evolves quickty throughout these two phases. It does so for two reasons: 
the need for external investment requires long term strategies to convince institutional 
investors that the management understand their business and can plan for the foture; and 
the need to develop operational strategies that aid operational managers to control the 
rpidty expanding volume and variety of produce sold by the organisation. The 
operational strategies that will evolve most quickty are those associated with the by now 
estabHifoed core conpetences of effective merchandising, a well organised sipply chain 
and an efficient trading style and format Phases 4 and 5 add the sophisticated anatysis of 
customer generated data from EPoS and loyalty card schemes that permits the 
organisation to devise detailed strategies that are frxcused on individual, groip or 
geographical buying behaviour patterns. These developments are critical for the 
customer care and communications fonctions in the organisation and for the formulation 
of operational strategies related to these functions.
The conpetitive stiategiBs of the food multples work within the general corporate 
s tra t^ . These strategies are generated by fonctional pedaHsts within Head Office and 
include the buying fonctions, the selling frmctions, the replenishment functions and the 
product development functions (Table 6.3). The conpetitive strategies are influenced by 
the phases of evolution of the organisation in the same way as the general s tra t^ . In 
the early phases of evolution the conpetitive strategies are focused on survival in the first 
instance, and subsequently on market position consolidation. It is critical to have 
produce at the right place at the right time and at the right quality. All of the conpetitive 
stratèges have to be co-ordinated to ensure ecomxny in the use of resources, ^ficiency 
within the distribution and selling activities, and effectiveness in satistying the customers 
needs. Long term planning in the évolution of these conpetitive strategies becomes
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ÎDcieasiDgjty important in order to ensure that the market aspirations of the organisation 
can be achieved. This will almost certainly include the acquisition of technology, 
premises, and the long term development of people with the correct skills to manage 
different parts ofthe organisation in the future, MjinMdon for this long term planning 
needs to be processed and co-ordinated in an effective way and this is a msqor driver for 
the development of information processing focused on Head OfGce activities rather than 
the operational activities of the organisation. This information processing will include 
data analysis packages, forecasting software and possibly mathematical modelling 
software. To enable these activities to be undertaken data is required from the business 
environment, from operations and fix>m the actual effectiveness of the previously 
described operational strategies. Therefore it seems that the activities that generate the 
con^)etitive strategies progressive^  ^ enable the creation and maintenance of the core 
operational competences. Wrûm the context of the food mult%)les therefore, the Head 
Office functions that are not associated with corporate functions may reasonably be 
to generate enabling competences, and these may be either core or conqietitive 
conpetences as they have been previously identifie^
The operational strategies are effective in the operational aq)ects of the organisation. 
The he%) to set the operational performance targets and the PNfs of the operational iwntg 
th ro u ^u t the distribution chain and within mdividual stor%. The operational strategies 
set broad parameters for the diort term planning aspects of the system. The diort term 
planning of the operational activities also takes information fo>m the market and trading 
errvironmoit and feedback from actual operational perfonnance. An example of this kinH 
of control has already been discusses and illustrated in Figure 6.2. During the early 
development of the organisation the operational feedback may be direct to the short term
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planmng function, but as the organisation grows this information needs to be processed 
through an information processing focOity. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate the way in which 
thePMS evolve in the operational aspects oftheconqxD^ during Phases 1 to 5.
The relationshÿs between general strategy, conq>etitive strategy and operational strategy 
effectively set the control structure for the whole organisation. These relationshô>s and 
the control structure previously described are illustrated in Figure 6.3. This diagram 
clearÿ shows how the information system is the main link between the operational 
strategies, the operations data, long term planning and short tenn planning. Without the 
information system it would be inqx)ssible to correlate, process and co-ordinate the 
information necessary for both long and short term planning activities of the food 
multÿles. These activities are essential for control of operations, and via the long term 
planning functions for the determination of the general strategy of the organisation. 
However talented the management is, their effectiveness win be limited by the quality, 
scope and timeliness of the information they have to work with.
6,4 Conclusion
By linking the phased development with the evolution of performance measurement, 
operations strategies and core conq)etences, this chapter has shown that information 
technology has changed it's role throughout the eorporate development of the food 
multÿles. At first it was sinq)ly a basic core competence that processed operational data 
for basic control fimctions. Then it began to assist the long term planning fimctions 
within the organisation and it’s role be^m to d^wlop as a distinctive competence. Once 
the technology became fuBy developed and the information system was an apportant 
driver for strategic activities it became the identifier and developer of new core or
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distinctive conq)etences by providing knowledge rather than singly data to the 
management of the company. In this role it can be reasonably claimed to be leading 
corporate strategy rather than simply enabling corporate strategy, a feet that can be 
easily overlooked if the overall corporate control system is not examined in some detail
In a broader academic context the influence of technology in general, and information 
technology in particular, on operational and corporate activities has been the subject of 
much research (see Charter 2, Part 2). It was Johnson (in Voss et al, 1991, p.270) 
identified "the development of technology and a differentiated service" as one of three 
main operational strategies in the service sector. And in broad terms this research would 
support this contention in the context of the food multÿle retailers. There are however 
differences to be observed between the conventionally accqrted view of the operational 
q^Hcation of technology in the management of volume and variety. One of the 
interesting issues that emerges fix)m a conparison between the results of this research 
and the previous research is how much of this previous research has been based on a 
'snapshot' ^preach. That is several organisations may have formed the basis of the 
research, but the investigation is only focused on the current state or recent history of the 
organisation (e.g.Woodward, 1958; Pugh, 1976; Matthews, 1989). This approach is 
important for looking for patterns or grouping of organisations or flmcdonal 
pheraomenon (or both). In turn this hel^ to codify different aspects of organisations or 
relations within organisations. However, by tracing longitudinal development and 
change, i^diatever the problems of the accuracy of data and reliance ipon qualitative 
approaches, a different view is formed of the way in i^hich the dynamics of organisations 
change thro\]gh time. These trends and dynamics, together with the insights gained flx>m
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other approaches, are likely to give a better basis for understanding future options and 
determining the scope for realistic action than steady state classifications alone. Also this 
investigation clearly demonstrates the Hnk between technology and organisational 
behaviour in that as technology has changed so the organisations have adq)ted to the 
opportunities presented to them by utilising the new technology. This suggests that 
technology, particularly in the context o f the latter half o f this century, has had a much 
larger influence on retail organisational change than has been previously thought. 
Althou^ not an objective of this research, this finding has a bearing on the research of
For cxplanatioii of these 
see notes « 1  the fidhnwh  ^p%c.
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Figure 6.4 Volume / variety dispositions of organisations
Hayes and 'Wheelwright (1984) vho suggested that taking volume and variety as axes, 
the majority of organisations would lie on or around a line that was defined at one end by 
high variety / low volume, and at the other by low variety high volume (Figure 7.4). In 
this twdel the techoobgy used by the organisation and Ae dominant management st}de
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depended ipon where the organisation was in the volume/variety pectrum. InpHed in 
this model is that as organisations grow in size and conpkxity their characteristics wBl 
follow a predictable pattern. Using this gr^h  Hayes and Wheelwright developed a 
typography of organisations and their diposition (N.B.. position numbers refer to those 
in Figure 6.4):
Position 1 : - Project orgcmisations, one off volumes / v. high variety.
Typicalfy civil engineering or professional services.
Project managanent style. Multi-purpose technology.
Position 2: - Jobbing organisations, low volumes / high variety.
Typicalfy a small pottery or groip therpy services.
Informal management style. Multirpurpose technology.
Positions:- Batch organisations, medium volume / medium variety.
Typically contract engineering or educatioiL Semi-formal 
management s t^ . Mixture of general purpose and 
' pecialised technology.
Position 4: - Mass production organisations, low variety / high volume. 
Typicalfy motor car manufacture or banking. Formal 
management st^ de. Special purpose technology.
Position 5: - Continuous production organisations, no variety / very high 
volume. Typicalfy chemical plant or sewerage diposaL 
Semi-formal team based management s t^ . Highfy specialised 
technology.
This typography originally used to describe manufacturing organisations has once been 
adpted to describe organisations in the service sector (Slack et al, 1995). In these 
contexts this theory is widely accepted and has been used to define the operational
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characteristics of the repective classifications (Evans, 1993). This research indicates 
that the food multiple retailers, with organisations that handle very high volume o f 
products and a very high variety o f products, exist in one o f the prohibited regions o f 
the graph in Figure 6.4 (Le. top right hand comer). Statistics regarding the retail market 
identify a significant number (albeit declining) of small comer shop configurations that 
have low volume and low variety trading characteristics (Nielsen, 1997). This 
configuration is also in one of the prohibited regions of Figure 6.4. There is a coincidence 
between middle volume / middle variety in both manufacturing and retailing 
organisations. Assuming that the definition of h i^  variety in the Hayes and Wheelwright 
model is met by the food retailing multÿles, in that they not only sippfy a large nuniber 
of individual items but also offer a wide range of ancillary services, then these conflict 
conditions gives rise to four propositions.
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Figure 6.5 Volume / variety dispositions of retail organisations
Proposition 1
Retailing is totally different from every other kind of organisation and it requires a
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different typogrphical diagram that predicts the volume / variety distribution of retail 
organisations as axiomadcalfy different fiom the Hayes and Wheelwright model (Figure 
6.5).
Proposition 2
The original Hayes and Wheelwright theory is unique to manufacturing and that 
subsequent attempts to fit services to this model have been mistaken. The npHcation of 
this is that sectors of the economy (e.g. manufacturing, health service, retailing) should 
not be treated collectivefyandeachwillhavetheir own volume/variety characteristics. 
Proposition 3
That Hayes and Wheelwright were wrong in suggesting that organisations could be 
classified to use the volume / variety typology and that as a consequence the concpt 
riiould be abandoned all together.
Proposition 4
The original model in which there ace prohibited zones be rplaced with a cluster model 
in which there are no prohibited zones (Figure 6.6). General observations would suggest
VARIETY
Chuter: of 
organuatkms
VOLUME
Figure 6.6 Suggested volume / variety dispositions of oiganisations
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that proposition 1 is not correct as retailing configurations can be found that operate in 
one of the prohibited zones in Figure 7.5. For exanple in the upper left hand comer a 
specialist retailer of cheeses would have a high variety/low volume characteristic. In the 
lower right hand comer a fast food retailer would have a high volume/low variety 
characteristic. Propositions 2 and 3 are difficult to comment on as further research 
would need to be done to confirm which of these are true or not. Proposition 4 does 
satisfy the Hayes and Wheelwright position in part, and the results of this research in 
part, and may therefore be a more valid model to adopt when considering a wide variety 
of manufacturing and service organisations. Certainfy there is evidence that in the 
manufacturing sector the development of the concpt of 'mass customisation', based on 
sophisticated control of high volume production with corputer systems, supports the 
need for finther research focused proposition 4.
In conclusion to this chpter it is worthwhile quoting V%ch (1997) who neatfy 
Summarised the Current state of the information technology, control systems and the 
feelings of nearly aU of the managers that were interviewed.
"We are just beginning to ppredate the opportunities that the 
systems are offering us.... We have moved fiom being store 
focused to being product fi>cused..... We have completefy 
reorganised the store management structures to respond to 
customers.... We had a mass market business in the 1980s
and now we can repond to individuals and we are now
far more effective in our marketing and efGdent in our operations."
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C luster 7 
Sunmuay, Condusions and Reflections
7.1 Summary
Chapter one of this thesis began by examining the reasons that information technology 
has become so nportant to the food multples and idaitifies the objective of the research 
as-
**(seekingl to demonstrate that in the case o f the m u ü ^ food retaUers 
as weU as enabUngretmlmgstraiegieSj in f orrtuttion technology 
is runv beginning to lead retaita^ strat^ ies as it transcends the 
role o f processus operational performance datOj andm ovesto 
providing ktunidedge upon which numagement are basing 
their future strategies.''
The chpter continued by examining the broad market and demogrphic issues that 
affected the food mukples during the 1980s. This period was particuWfy sigmficant for 
the food multples in terms of information technology change as EPoS, the key that 
unlocked much of the potential of retailing information systems, became widely used. 
This was also the period in which information technology began to make the transition 
fiom an enabling phenomenon, focused primarily on operational issues in the food 
multples, to a conpkx phenomenon that influences the operational boundaries and 
corporate strategies.
Chapter two contains the theoretical underpinning for the research. The chpter is 
divided into four sections that reviews the literature on strategy, technology and 
orgpisations, performance measurement and distribution. The literature on strategy
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begins by tracing the way in iriiich the thmkmg about the strategy process has changed as 
our understanding of organisations has inproved. Initialfy strategy took many of its 
precpts fiom müitaiy thinking and a deterministic or unitary view of life. Today the 
view of the strategy making process is more opportunistic or pluralistic. The di^ferense 
between these approaches an organisation can adopt being closefy related to the extent to 
which an organisation can manipnlafA its environment, the management can manipulate 
their enployees and the rate of change of the market place or market niche it services. 
The other apect of strategy examined was that of the internal strategy and the way it 
interfaced with the global strategy of the organisation. Here the concepts of conpetitive 
strategies and operational strategies as a hierarchy was feund to be important in the 
establishment of core conpetences as a competitive tool Core conpetences were 
particular^ ioportant in the context of the food retailer where conpetition and high 
standards of service were particular^ critical
The literature that explored die relationshp between technology and organisations. 
examined the issue of technological determinism from several points of view. These 
ranged from the inpact of technology on management systems and organisation 
structure, to the divisions that exist between technology management and general 
management In many ways this was an area where discussion about technology and 
strategy was epected to be feund. However, although it was alhiHeH to in several 
publicatbns, it was not discussed pecificalfy in the context of the food retailers.
The literature about performance measurement was heÿfol in two specific ways. The 
first was in establishing the link between performance measurement and strategy - a key 
issue explored more fulfy in Chapter 6. The second was the evolution of performance
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measurement from a rather crude retropective financial tool, to that of a balanced 
system of measures that examined the performance of an organisation fiom several 
perspectives. This new perpective has been particularly inportant for the food retailers 
in the development of more proactive and effective management.
The final part of the literature review fi)cused on the distribution systems that are such an 
essential part of the modem food retailing mukple. This apect of the literature review 
was to be rather enigmatic as the literature seemed to lack much of the clear thematic 
structure that other apects of the literature search had. In broad terms much of the 
literature had a fairly pragmatic origin and was problem centred, asking questions such as 
- What is the best route for a lorry to take in delivering to stores? What is the best 
dipositions of depots to reduce distribution costs? How can stock ordering be planned 
to reduce or eliminate stock holding in various parts of the distribution chain? 
Collectively these loosely connected questions form a body of literature that are 
inportant for the retailers but which lack a clear focus at a macro level
There were two outcomes of this literature review. The first outcome was to confirm 
that this research would make an original contribution to the academic literature 
associated with food retailing multiples. The second was to identify the key issues that 
the methodoloQf needed to address and to give an indication o f the structure that the 
methodology should take.
Chapter three, the Methodology, described the pproach taken to the research, the 
reasons for taking that pproach, the structure of the research programme and the main 
sources of information used in the following three results chpters.
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Chapter four (read in coiÿmction with Appendix 1) is the first of the results chpters. 
The focus for this chapter is the structure and fimctionality of the food multple retailer 
information system. This data in itself makes an original contribution to knowledge 
about multple retailer information ^sterns as no independent survey of this nature exists 
at the time of writing this thesis. The chpter has three basic elements - the functionality 
of the information system, and the hardware and the software structures of the 
information systems. Taken as a whole this dnpter demonstrates the pervasive nature of 
the information systems that are used to monitor and control the food multples. There is 
virtualfy no apect of the food retailer that is not measured or monitored in one way or 
another. To achieve this requires detailed data collection, processing in a timefy way and 
reports sent back to the management at all levels of the organisation as soon as possible. 
The information systems are very large and process millions o f transactions daily. 
Some o f this information is used to control the siqfply chain and globed merchandising 
activities within the retailers. Other customer purchase transaction data is stored in 
data warehouses and subsequently used for geogrcpfdcal analysis, customer buying 
pattern arudysis and to optimise the store merchandising profile. It is in these latter 
explications where the transition from enabling food multiple activities to leading 
strategies is most in evidence.
Chpter five (read in coiqunction with Appendix 2) focuses of the development pattern 
of the food multples. In the first instance the histories of Sainsbury, Tesco and Safbwiy 
were examined in order to better understand the issues that drove the developing food 
multples to choose the opportunities th ^  did. The chpter identified two inportant 
issues. The first issue, already identified a little earlier, was the impact that EPoS and 
information technology had on the food multples. For the first time the open loop of the
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distributk)n system could be closed in a meaningful way with information feedback fix>m 
the EPoS system, and this had a profound effect on the efficiency of the systenL The 
second issue, also related to EPoS and the evolving information systems, was the 
identification of five phases of evolution - the entrpreneurial phase, the pre-bureaucratic 
phase, the bureaucratic phase, the systematic phase and the restructuring phase. Each of 
these phases have distinctive characteristics that are reflected in the increasingly conplex 
control systems and enlarging geogrphical areas of operations. These phases are 
strongly connected with the evolution of the performance measurement systems that are 
considered in Chapter six.
Chpter SK draws together the threads of Chpters four and five, and correlates this data 
with that collected about the development of the performance measurement systems. As 
indicators of evolving strategy the examination of performance measurement provides 
some useful insights into the relationships between the core operational conpetences, 
opmtional strategies and overall corporate strategy. Collective^ this data was used to 
develop a model of the retailing information system and this provided a usefiil concptual 
view of the evolving information system and described its pivotal role in the control of 
the multiple retailer.
7.2 Conclusions
The primary objective o f this research was to explore the changing relationship between 
information technology and strategy in three food nndtiple retailers. In doing this, the 
thesis makes an orignal contribution to the understanding o f this relationship in the 
food multiple retailing environment, and adds to the existing body o f knowledge
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associated with technologicàl relationships in organisations. The research demonstrates 
that the information technology systems in the food multples now exert a great influence 
on the nature and scope of the strategies that the food mukples adopt And, whereas it 
had been a commonly held view in retail and «caflemir circles that information 
technology onfy enabled (or followed) strategy, the thesis demonstrates that information 
technology is increasingly leading strategy. It does this by -
a. increasing^ influencing managers view of their business
by being the dominant means by ^ faich they can effective^ monitor, 
control and understand their operational activities;
b. becoming the most influential source of customer information 
(e.g. data gathered through EPoS technology is analysed and 
used for maricet and customer analysis);
c. defining the limita of managerial action (Le. the opportunity 
costs of working beyond the currently defined system limits
may be too high, and changes to systems may take an unacceptably 
long time because of system conplexity); and,
d. dominating the organisational paradigm as operational managers 
increasingly find their role to be one of ensuring that reality 
coincides with the information systems' view of the operational world.
Evidence for these conclusions is found in the way in w hi^ the three food retailing 
multiples have evolved and how they are now configured. The case histories of 
Sainsbury and Tesco in particular illustrate that growth beyond a certain size is difficult 
without the systemisation of operational control elements, and subsequent growth is 
constrained without the integration of those systems. The Safeway case study clearfy 
demonstrates that establishment of appropriate technology systems is an essential
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prerequisite if an organisation wishes to trade (and succeed) in the middle - upper 
quartiles of the food retailer nunket. In this respect technology may also be regarded as a 
significant barrier to entry in this market
As these retail systems grow in size and conplexity a stage is reached beyond vdiich 
individual managers cease to exert significant control This is not a sudden event The 
process ppears to begin i^ien individual information sub-systems are integrated, and 
continues as systems are extended to include more managerial decision taking and further 
aspects of the business. Whilst these enhancements are usually made in the interest of 
inproving efSdoicy and with the best of intentions, the senior managers who drive these 
changes seem to be unaware that they are also increasing dependency on the system. In 
doing so they are decreasing the flexibility of the overall system and Imfamg its ability to 
cope with sudden and unepected change in the operational or trading environment ? 
something that human beings are quite good a t
The evolution of food multple systems is a function of changes in geographical 
coverage, volumes of transactions and of the variety of products sold. It has been 
demonstrated that the food retailers, as th ^  grow, go throu^ five basic phases - 
entrepreneurial, earfy bureaucratic, bureaucratic, systematic and restructuring. Although 
technology may be in evidence in the first two phases, it is the key that unlocks the third 
phase and ipon vdnch the final phases are dependent This is a kind of technological 
determimsm that all food retailers are subject to, and through which they must go on 
their path to national and international trading. Howevar, during the systems évolution 
they graduaify absorb the ideas and epertise of managers and systems designers. And 
vhOe they ppear to be alike at a broad functional level, they have quite distinct
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characteristics when viewed in greater detail Ultimate^ the systems begin to define the 
organisation itself One outcome of this assimilation is that the prospects for mergers 
and take-overs are conditioned as much by the ability of different systems to be 
integrated as by commercial or market considerations. Another is that replacing the 
whole information system becomes increasingly traumatic as time goes on.
The second objective of this research was to examine and describe the evolution, 
structure and content of the modem fi>od multiple control system. By doing this it was 
possible to gauge the extent to which the technological systems influence the 
management systems - and ultimate^ the stratégies of the food multples. Historically the 
food multples have always been prepared to invest a great deal of money in technology 
in general and information technology in particular. It was not possible to determine 
precisely how much these systems have or do cost A guesstimate for buying the 
hardware and software for a modem retail system, with full Head Office and store 
implémentation, would be in the order of £200m to £40Qm. The final amount would 
dpend to large extent ipon the number of stores in the organisation. The cost of 
ipgrading and maintaining current systems is in the order of £2Qm to £35m per year, 
^ th  such large sums of money involved in capital equipment and maintenance, and the 
reliance of flie multples on technology, it might be epected that the food multples 
would seek to develop new technology to inprove operational or strat^ic apects of 
their business. The sole ownershp of such technology could establish a conpetitive 
advantage. The reality is that the food multples have not been great technological 
innovators * preferring to follow rather.than lead. With few exceptions most innovation 
in retail hardware and software has been centred on the USA. The result of this is that 
historical^ the UK systems have lagged behind US developments by 5 to 10 years.
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There is some evidence that this time delay is riK>rtening but there are still few 
technological reference points in the UK. The extent to i^nch this is due to a lack of 
investment in technological research in the UK, the greater wBfingness of US retafters to 
innovate, the inherent conservatism of the UK retailing manager, or a combination of all 
three of these factors, is not clear. The dangers of a lack of investment are clear however, 
and are likefy to become more evident in a fixture increasing^ defined in technological 
trims.
During the 1980s there were three inportant technological milestones that are stOl 
influencing the way in i^nch the retailing systems are developing. The first, and 
historically probabfy the most inportant single technological innovation, was the 
development of EPoS. This proved to be the foundation that enabled the development of 
active systems rather than the passive systems of the pre 1980s. EPoS data became the 
driver for accurate store stock control; better control of the distribution chain; proactive 
merchandising; direct stppHer communication; and, in more recent years, relationshp 
marketing strategies. The extension of EPoS into EFTPoS forged the link between the 
store and the hanking system, and more recently it has allowed the food retailer to take 
on some of the banking fimctions.
The second technological milestone that had a great impact on retafler systems was the 
use of open systems architecture in the design of the retail systems. The UNDC based 
systems fireed the food multples fiom the tyranny of the single systems supplier, and of 
the systems suppliers fiom having to provide a conplete package. These developments 
made technical innovation sinpler and quicker to implement
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The third technical milestone of significance in the 1980s was the improvement of the 
public telecommunications network. Computer based switching systems replaced the old 
Strowger electromechanical systems. This change eliminated electricalfy noi^ lines that 
were a significant barrier to communications between Head Office and stores (e.g. for the 
collection of transaction data and the distribution of management information). Once 
established, it made distributed processing a practical possibility, and this capitalised on 
the increased processing power of the conputers used in the stores and the distribution 
chain.
Today, the opportunities that technology are opening ip  are challenging existing 
management thinking and will present new and unanticpated opportunities for the food 
multples.
73 Reflections
The design of this research programme - defining the structure of the technological 
systems and constructing the subsequent histories of the retailers - was sound in that it 
produced enou^ information to achieve the basic objectives of the thesis. However, 
with hindsight, the investigation could have been inproved and the insights into the 
organisations refined. The inprovements may be conveniently considered in four areas.
To b^in  with the research focused on the upper levels of management and their 
perceptions of information technology and strategy. With hindsight it is clear that a lot 
could have been learned if the store mam^ers attitudes were systematically investigated, 
because it is at the store level that many of the technical and strategic innovations 
succeed or fitfl. Informal conversations with several store managers throughout the
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research gave some usefiil insights into the internal managerial relationships in the food 
multples. In particular these conversations provided clues about the use of the systems 
to generate information about the performance of the stores; and, about individual store 
managers attitudes about the validity of this data. These conversations also provided 
some useful insights into the relationship between the technologists and the store 
managers. There seemed to be evidence that some hostility existed between the 
technologists and the store managers, and that this hostility seemed to be rooted in the 
different focus of the two parties. The technologists were always keen to inprove the 
system, the managers were always keen to manage the store environment without 
interference. Neither side fiilfy understood the direction and constraints of the other. An 
interesting situation of inportance for the future and one that deserves a more formal 
investigation.
Another area that could provide additional msighte was that of the design of the systems. 
The initial pilot study mdicated that very little documentation about the systems existed 
in the public or academic domains. Once research had begun to collect this data it 
became clear that there was a great deal of commonality in the systems and that the 
descrption of a generic system was a feasible option. Such a descrption was likefy to be 
about 90 to 95% correct in both function and form. As such it would provide a 
reasonable background against which to judge the relationsbips between information 
technology, management and strategy. Again, as the researdi proceeded, it became clear 
that many of the variation in the systems design at a micro level were of interest in 
tbmselves. Why were there variations in the fimctionality of software structures 
designed to do the same job? Were they due to cultural, historical, managerial or
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technical reasons? Given the histoiic bias of the investigation, answers to these questions 
would have provided some useful conparative data.
Finally the design of the research deliberately chose three organisations who operate in 
the same market sector, and in doing so reduced the influence of economic and trading 
variables. This sinplifled the analysis of historical events, the interpretation of present 
market manoeuvring, and the evaluation of Hkefy futures for the food multples. 
However, vdnle this decision undoubted^ ensured that the research programme did not 
become unmanageable, it also constrained the general valMity of the results. It is clear 
that a broader investigation into a wider selection of food multples would either confirm 
or modify the results of this investigation. It would also make a significant addition to 
the broad understanding of the relationshp between technology and strategy. This must 
be the subject of further research.
This research has added to the understanding of the relationshps that exist between 
technology and strategy, ^^th technology increasingfy dominating the operational 
aspects of organisations this understanding needs to be extended, epecialfy among the 
managers and directors who control the destiny of organisations. There are still too few 
managers who are conputer and system literate and this is epecia% evident in the fi>od 
retailers. The gsp between technologist and nonrtecboologist is too wide, and Mure to 
close this gap is likely to lead to serious problems in the future. The basis for this 
inprovement must be a better understanding of the dynamics of these complex situations, 
and this will onfy come fiom the systematic investigation of past and current activities 
and fiom progressive management training and development.
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Appendix 1 
Hardware and software configurations
A1.1 Hardware and software ardiitectures
The fiiDy integrated multple retail sy s t^  not only has a conplex fiinctioDal requirement 
but also a conplex hardware and software architecture. The systems are physical^ large 
in terms of numbers of pieces of equpment It is not unusiMl for a food multple to have 
over 300 geogr^hicaBy dipersed stores in the UK and more stores abroad. Each store 
win have an internal network conprised of several sipervisory conputers; 30 to 40 
checkout EPoS systems; several papheral systems; one, or possibfy two, master file 
serving conputers and an internal and external communications system. There may be 
ip  to 15 geogrphicaBy dispersed distribution centres in the UK and abroad each with its' 
own conputers and goods s to ^ e  and retrieval systems, and sipervisory conputers and 
internal and external communications systems. There may also be several administrative 
centres with their own internally networked hardware and software. And finally, at the 
centre of the pstem wiB be the Head Office system thsit m addition to having aB of the 
systems maintenance operations, wfll also have the executive hardware and software and 
of course internal and external networking commumcatipns hardware anH software. 
Because these are very large systems they are best examined in terms of their conponent 
parts, which are -
a. the communications system,
b. the software platforms on viiichthe ppBcations are based,
c. the database systems and their structures,
d. the store hardware antLsoftware,
e. the warehouse hardware and software,
£ the head office hardware and software.
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Items a, b and c constitute the foundations that sipport and integrate the conplete 
system. Items d, e and f  are the more obvious and visible apects of these systems and 
have already been touched ipon elsewhere in this chpter.
A l.L l Communications systems
While conputers are vital to gather and process data within the retail system, the data 
has to be sent fbom one conputer to another to create an integrated system, and this 
requires pme form of communications network. This need has led to the development 
of the Local Area Network (LAN), the Wide Area Network (WAN) and the adoption of 
standard Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) protocols.
Historically the evolution of the LAN has been driven ly  cost reduction, data integrity 
and data peed requirements. The first eperimental network was developed in 
Cambridge University by Maurice Wilkes during the early 1970s. The early eperiments 
so u ^  to find ways of establishing hardware and software protocols that would allow 
several users to communicate "ring one loop (usually copper conductor coaxial cables). 
Eventual^ this research refined techniques of synchronous data transmission and 
acquired the name of the Cambridge Loop (Needham, 1979). At about the same time 
other eperiments were being conducted at Massachusetts Institute of Technology with 
different connection configurations and asynchronous data transmission systems. These 
early systems were slow (data transmission speeds of hundreds of bits per second) and 
expensive because of the use of conventional copper cabling. They were also prone to 
electronic noise interference, and the system performance deteriorated significantly if the 
distance between stations or the loop were too long (usually not more than a few 
hundred metres). Also the number of users was restricted. Continuous development
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during the 1980s and 1990s has led to the modem LAN system in vrinch dat« is 
transmitted at very high peeds (KBo bits per second) and copper cables have been 
replaced by optical fibre cables, wireless transmissions, satellite or infiared in
modem systems electrical noise problems have been reduced to the point at vshich a LAN 
may contain several miles of optical cabling that operates without significant rignal 
deterioration and may have 300 to 500 PCs connected to iL
From the earfy research three basic LAN configurations were developed and these are 
illustrated in Figure A l.l. Which of these is chosen for a particular pplication dpends 
ipon primarily upon the peed of transmission required and the volume of data being 
transmitted. In general the loop and busbar configurations are most commonly found in 
food retail systems. All of these LAN configurations have three operational elements - 
the LAN manager applications software, the LAN network hardware and control 
software, and the LAN protocol The LAN manager pplications software allows the 
user (either as an individual or as a part of another applications package) to interface 
with the communications system and to send, manipiilatc smâ data To all intents
and purposes this management software makes the communications system transparent 
to the user. Some of the commonly used LAN management packages in the fix)d 
retailing environment are Novell NetWare, Sinply LANtastic, POWERLan (Performance 
Technology) and SRN (Shap Retail Network). The LAN network hardware forms the 
physical connection to the network and the control software controls this physical 
connection. The hardware is usualfy in the form of a printed circuit card and associated 
electronics that is plugged in to tl^ motha" board of the conputer terminal This 
physical connection allows parallel connection of the terminal databus to the network.
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Figure Al l  The three bask LAN connection configurations
The associated software controls data transmission / reception of the synchronous or 
asynchronous signals. Commonly used hardware and software control systems are 
Storeloop (International Business Machines), OSLAN (International Conputers Ltd.), 
DECnet (Digital Equpment Corporation), Ethernet, RS232 and RS242. The protocol is 
an instruction set that maintains data integrity by defining how file data is divided into 
"packets' suitable for transmission. A "packet' conprises of a header containing the 
destination address, the data, a terminating string of data and a parity check bit to ensure 
data int^rity. The protocol checks for errors during transmission and initiates error 
correcting procedures if required. If required the protocol may aric for data 
retransmission. In Aort the protocol does the liousekeeping' for the LAN. The most 
widely used protocol in the retailing environment is the Transmission Control Protocol / 
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) although others do exist (e.g. NetfiUEI, NFS, IPX/SPX
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(NovelQ). If these systems are too slow, as may well be the case with some of the 
hyperstores with very large volumes of data being transmitted, then wireless transmission 
m ^  be chosen as the communications media within the store. There are two types of 
wireless transmission - the narrow band system and the switched band system. The 
narrow band system uses one frequency for transmission between elements of the store 
system. The switched band system uses several different radio bands simultaneously with 
the receiver automatical^ switching between the different bands.
While LANs are used within stores, warehouses and head ofGce WANs are used to 
connect remote parts of the system together. Although there are many options available 
for the transmission medium, the most popular in food retailing is the use of the public 
switched network to connect individual stores to head ofOce, and leased line network to 
connect the bead ofBce congmter to the backup head ofBce conputer. IbstoricaHy 
WAN links have been made via modems (modulator / demodulator) that convert the 
digital signals generated by foe corryuiers to analogue signals suitable for transmission 
on the public telephone networks. However, more recenth  ^the public networks have 
introduced Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and this allows very much higher 
transmission speeds. For comparison, the typical transmission speed of a traditional 
analogue system is 9,600 bit per second and of an ISDN system 64,000 bits per second. 
Current^ the two systems offered by British Telecornrriuwatioxis are ISDN 2 that offers 
2 - 64,000 bit synchronous channels, and ISDN 30 with 30 synchronous channels.
The other parts of the WAN system ^ e  the management software and the protocol 
These have broadly the same function as the corresponding elements of the LAN system. 
The management software controls the polling activities of the systems, resolves system
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and polling con&ts, logs activities on the system and provides the inter&ce with head 
ofBce software. The protocol q>lits the data into packages for transmission, reintegrates 
incoming data and checks for data integrity. Popular WAN management packages are 
Systems Network Architecture (IBM), X-MODBM (Microsoft), CROSSTMJw (DCA), 
CMS (XceDent). The most popular protocol is TCP/IP although the IBM 2780 and 3780 
protocols are still widety used.
The development of so many different LAN and WAN packages is a refection of the 
way in which food retail systems have developed. In the poiod between 1980 and 1990 
food retail systems were usually designed, manu&ctured and installed by or^ of the large 
computer conpanies (e.g. IBM, ICL, DEC, Siemens NixdorQ, and the communications 
hardware and software was not readily available off-the-shelf Consequent]  ^each of the 
system manu&cturers developed their own 'standard' that became an integral part of their 
preferred solution for the retailer. As time has passed the large computer companies 
ceased to manufacture the perpheral equpment and software (e.g. EPoS terminals, 
weighing madnnies, scanners), and instead have concentrated on providing the central 
processing power, communications processing, and integration of the systems. They 
hâve been able to do this because of the rspid growth of pecialist hardware and software 
organisations that can sipplÿ cost effective perpheral equpment to the large systems 
integrators. At the time of conducting this research on^ 40% (value) of a typical food 
retailing system will be made by the systems integrator.
Although EDI is not a part of a LAN or WAN, it still forms the basis of a standard 
communication between the food retailers and their sipphers. EDI is used to place 
orders directly from the retailer's conputer to the supplier's computer. In doing this the
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expense that is associated with processing psperwoik is avoided. The only requirement 
to make EDI work is that both conputer systems work to an agreed communication 
protocol This protocol must establish the format and sequence of the data sent, and if 
the data is sent in £Qe format, the £Qe structure. The moves to establish these standards 
were begun in the UK by the Dq)artment of Trade and Industry in the early 1970s vhen 
they established the Sinpler Trading Procedures Board (SITPRO). SITPRO developed 
GTDI (General Trade Data Interchange) and eventually this was adopted as the 
European standard (UN/GDTI). At about the same time the American National 
Standards Institution (ANSI) developed a similar standard (ANSIJC12) that became 
adopted throughout the North American continent.
Coaatry EDI standards No. of a tm  1991 No. of atcrl992
Aiotim SEDA 200. 300
EANCom 15
Bdgmm ICCHtf 73 95
EANCom 15 30
Dennmk EANCom 50 200
HANCOM
Ranoe ŒNCOM 400 SOO
EANCom 15 30
Gennany SEDAS 605 705
EANCom 6 20
Ireland EANCom 30 100
Italy EANCom 40 150
Netheriands TRANSCOM 500 1000
EANCom 10 150
Spain AECOM 102 300
Swimlaiid EANCom 10 35
UK TRADACOMS 4000 8000
EANCom 100 300
(Source: EAN)
Table Al l  Retailing EDI standards in the EC
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Because of foe increasing international nature of retail trading and sourcing throughout 
the 1980s these two standards gradual^ merged to form a tru^ international standard 
adopted by the United Nations that is called UN / EDIFACT. More recently this has 
been streamlined by the EC called EANCom Although these standards are widety 
accepted and used there are still a variations on the basic theme to be found in different 
countries. These are summarised in Table A l.l. Clear^  ^there is still a way to go before 
the EANCom standard is completely adopted, however, the evidence in the table 
suggests that the iptake is rapid and accelerating.
A1.L2 The UNIX software platform
One of the problems in the design of early food retail systems was that the bespoke 
solutiori offered by the ma|or systems manufacturers proved to be a straig^ jacket in 
terms of systems development, and expensive in terms of systems maintenance. The 
reason that the bepoke system was a straight jacket was that ariy change could only be 
effected through the software language and hardware conventions of the system sipplier. 
To try to use any other software or hardware required extensive and eaqiensive interfoce 
programmes or electronics. In many cases it was sinpty not worth doing. The food 
rettalers who pioneered the early systems found themselves at a distinct disadvantage to 
those who followed them and who adopted more flexible hardware and software 
conventions. Maintenance was also to prove expensive as there was in effect on^ one 
srppherofthernaintenance service vfoo was inaposrtion to  charge prerrnum prices.
In foct this problem was endemic in all earfy conputer systems and in 1964 a 
collaboration between Bell Laboratories, General Electric and MJ.T. in the USA was 
established to investigate attemative approaches to building conputer systems. The basic
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target for this programme was to develop a universal software platform that would work 
on any hardware and casïy interftice with any software. The outcome of this 
collaboration was a software operating system that was known as Multics'. This was a 
large suite of software that was powetftil but very conplex and ftur ftom the aspirations 
of the commercial partners in the collaboration. By 1968 Bell Labs became disillusioned 
with the development programme and withdrew. However, the need for the new 
software platform had not dis^peared, and Ken Thonpson and Dennis Ritchie (the Bell 
Labs personnel associated with the development programme) the experience they 
had gained fix>m the Muhics project, designed a sinpler system that subséquente  ^became 
known as UNDL
When desigmng UNIX Thonpson and Ritchie decided to build into the software some 
key features. The ftrst was that programs written for UNIX should be sinple and 
effective. The programs should be easily linked together so that the output ftom one 
program could be the iiput to another program - in this way more conplex systems 
could be built ftom simpler smaller elements. The second feature that was built into the 
design of UNIX was that the "kernel' of the programme should be as small as possible and 
optimised around the essential functions that the programs were required to perform. 
Other tasks, such as interfttdng with other software, should be undertaken by the 'shelT. 
Fortunate^ for Thonpson and Ritchie a new high level hnguage called 'C had just been 
developed, and being a high level language was machine independent Consequently 
UNIX was developed in C and by 1973 had been tried on several machines and found to 
work. From 1973 onwards Bell Labs timed to a collaboration with the University of 
CaHfomia at Berkeley to inprove the functionality of UNIX In time UNIX became a 
multi-user, multi tasking platform that became commercial^ available in the mid 1980s.
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In foct the core UNIX system took two paths during the development process. One lead 
to the commercial version of UNIX that became known as System V, and the other a 
development version of UNIX used in universities and known as BSD (Joy 1994).
By the early 1990s System V had been developed by many other organisations and had 
acquired several 'dialects'. In an attenpt to rationalise the dialects' the IEEE in the USA 
estabhfoed a set of interrelated standards working under the overall name of POSDC 
The standards for POSDCl and POSDC2 have been published and these cover the library 
functions defonng the Icemer and the 'shell' and standard utilities. In time, other 
standards will be issued for test methods and conformance (P0SCC3); real-time 
extensions (P0SIX.4); ADA language bindings (P0SIX.5); security (P0SIX.6); systems 
administration (POSIX.7); transparent file access (P0SDC8); and, FORTRAN language 
bindings (POSIX.9). In theory, when these standards have been completed they will 
define the system. In practice, the current commercially available UNIX derivatives form 
the basis of what are commonly known as open systems. Currently there are several 
consortia of manufacturers vfbo are trying to establish open systems standards - UNIX 
International (promoted hy NEC, U n i^  NCR and Sunsoft); Common Open Software 
Environment (promoted by Hewlett-Packard, Santa Cruz Operation, IBM, Sun 
Microsystems, Univel and UNIX Systems Labs); and. Open Systems Foundation (IBM, 
Digital Equpment Corp., Olivetti. ICL, Siemens Nixdorf and others).
In the UK the retail systems sipphers offer a wide choice of UNIX derivatives. The 
evidence gathered during this research programme indicates the choice tends to be driven 
by the hardware sippher rather than by the user exqnessing a preference. So for instance 
of the three largest food retailing systems developers build their systems on A£X (IBM),
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SCO UNIX (ICL) and UNIX (Siemens NixdorQ. However  ^the other significantly sized 
food retail systems sipphers (Alcatel, AT&T GIS, BIT Microridl, Datafit, IDA RIS, 
MHG Systems, Matra Systems, Olivetti, Omron Systems, Pennine Conputers, PSI 
Software, RTC and RBS), offer UNIX platforms such as HP-UX, SINIX-V and 
AVION. Savage (1995), suggests that on the basis of annual licences sold in the UK 
SCO UNIX appears to becoming accepted as the de facto standard.
The structure of a typical UNIX based package is iUiistrated in Figure Al.2. The kernel 
of the system contains the core software whose ftmction is to talk to the hardware
platform and to manage the internal system communication fimctions. The shell handles
1
the low level housekeeping fiKng and system functions. It is the shell level that the user 
is connected to and through the shell that the user accesses the application software and 
database structures. The application software is accessed through a conventional
User
User
External
Comm's
DATABASE
User
User
APPLICATIONS 
SOFTWARE
^Root
^Directory
!-► Sub-directory
Figure AlJt The UNIX system structure
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directory based tree structure. Functionany, UNIX can be considered as a very fast 
multplexer that can be programmed to resolve the problems that are inherent in a 
multiruser, muM-tasking environment
Although some of the systems builders use the UNIX base throughout their system it is 
most commonb  ^found in Head OfBce and distribution operations. At the store level, PC 
based multiuser systems such as IBM OS/2 and hftcrosoft Windows 95, in corgunction 
with LAN software performa similar fonctlon to UNIX.
A1.13 Other softw rn platforms
The most commonly found software platforms in food retailing are Windows 
(hficrosoft), OS/400 and OS/2 (IBM). The windows software has been continuous^ 
developed since the early 1980s. It started as ^Tndows version 1 that was a basic 
Gr^hical User Interface (GUI) designed for nonrexpert users of conputer systems. 
Since then it has evolved and currently used systems are T^ndows 3.1 (designed for 16 
bit processors), and T^ndows 95 (designed for use on 32 bit processors). Both 
Windows versions are single user muti-tasking operations systems. Throughout the 
development of'V^ndows the designers have taken great care to retain the user ftiendfy 
image, and no doubt this has led to its popularity and position as the premier PC 
operating platform. In the food retailing environment l^ Tndows is almost exclusively 
used on the store user te rminals. ^R%dows 95 wiü almost certainly become the new 
standard for PC users and has several features that inprove its usahKKty in the retailing 
environment The most inportant of these features are it supports aH of the common^ 
used network protocols (e.g. TCP/IP, IPX/SPX); and. inproved management of the 
configuration files and systems parameters afiows the control of access to applications
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software and terminal management (e.g. data poDing) to be undertaken ftom a remote 
LAN manager.
VTndows 3.1 and Windows 95 are in fact onlÿ a part of the Microsoft offering used by 
the retail sector. The limitation of these software platforms is that they have been 
optimised on the Intel processor and either work poorlÿ on other proprietory processors, 
or will not work at all To overcome this problem and to «qploit the needs of the retail 
sector in 1994 hftcrosoft launched Windows NT and ^^ndows for Worl^roips. 
A^ndows NT is a family of multi-tasking client serving software platforms that wiH woik 
on most hardware platforms . It also has a software plications development package 
based on the WIN32 API programing language. The Windows NT Server is a 32 bit 
muth-tasking operating systems with centralised management tools for controlling the 
client-server networic. This operating systems is configured to sipport the control of 
large RDBMS (Relational Database Management Systems - e.g. Oracle, Informix, 
Ingres, Progress, Sybase), message systems, systems management and host connectivity 
fimctions required by Head OfBce and Distribution systems. It also has good 
interconnectaWlity with other software platforms and protocols, LANs and WANs or 
video plications. Windows for Woikgroips (together with Windows 95) is designed 
for use on fiont of store operations such as the EPoS terminals. In essence it is Windows 
3.11 that has been enhanced to include 32 bit disk access resulting in significantly fiister 
response times in a LAN environment. It also sipports Ethernet system connections and 
a full range of security management features to prevent unauthorised access to central 
store conputers fiom the store workstations. As with Windows 3.1, V^ndows for 
Workgroiq) wiH on^ work on Intel based processors.
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The final level in the Windows suite is called Pen Windows. This operating system is 
designed to work with the minimum of RAM (Random Access Memory) and disk 
capacity. It primary fi>cus is on hand-held units used for stock taking and price checking 
/ iqxlating in stores however, it is also suitable for the control of a variety of other 
conqmter percherais and ofiBce equCment (e.g. intelligent photocopiers, facsimile 
machines, printers). The use of these hÆcrosoft packages is summarised in Figure Al.3.
The second type of operating systems commonly found in retailers are those developed 
by IBM. S/400 is a multi-tasking, multi-user operating system that is very like UNIX in 
structure and splicatioiL It was developed by IBM to operate on the IBM AS/400 
mmiconpter system - a popular hardware system in the retailing environment. The 
nuyority of ^ ^lications that have been developed in the OS/400 environment use the 
IBM DB2 database and the 4GL programming language. IBM also developed a GUI 
called GUI400 to make the systan more user fidendb^  (and to some extent mimic the 
features of the Windows environment). The OS/400 operating system is being enhanced 
by IBM to become an 'open' system and reflect the general move in the retailing sector 
towards more flexible software and hardware configurations.
While OS/400 is used on the AS400 mimconqniter and head ofiOce systems, OS/2 is used 
on the store pihcations. It is similar functional^ to the Wmdows 95 software platform 
(wfaich is hard^ surprising as Microsoft and IBM joint^ developed OS/2 until late 1992), 
and its GUI is similar to the familiar l^ Tndows program manager screen. The earlÿ 
version of OS/2 was a basic operating system package, but this was soon enhanced by 
IBM to include database management and communications software facilities. The most 
recent development of OS/2 is OS/2 Warp, version 3, that i^ien cotq>led with AIX
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(IBM’s version of UNIX), provides a system that is slightfy siq)erior in performance to 
the Windows NT package (Savage, 1995). OS/2 Warp is a single-user, 32 hit 
multi-tasking environment It contains many features that are desirable in the 
construction of a retailing system:
- a range of bundled software including an 'ofke' suite of 
worcCrocessing, spreadsheet, presentation, small database, 
e-mail, multi-media and message system,
- communication software for Internet connection.
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- the IBM LAN Manager system that works with the 
m ^rity  of the LAN protocols and will work with 
Novell Netware, Microsoft LAN Manager and SNA 
networks.
One area of distinct advantage that the IBM OS famify of operating systems has over foe 
\Wndows environment is the IBM inheritance of working with large systems. OS/2 for 
SMP (Symmetrical Mnltple Processor) is available and wiH currenth  ^work with iq> to 16 
multple processors in the same system. Also the OS/400 (version 3) operating system is
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Figure A1.4 The IBM OS operating system structure
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to scHxie extent downward conqiatible and can use previously developed DB2 
plications as well as other database pilications developed in Oracle, Informix, 
Progress, and SQL Server. The use of these IBM systems is illustrated in Figure A1.4.
IBM clearly have a vested interest in retaining and enhancing their current customer base, 
and Microsoft are agressively trying to become the industry standard in operating 
systems. In the UK these operating system suppliers undoubted^  ^have the m^oiity of 
the market In the USA they do not have such a dominant position and are confronted 
by many more independent software systems designers who can survive and even thrive 
in a much larger market place. Being indpndent, designers vbo are working on the 
design of retailing applications tend to work using the 'standard' version of UNIX, 
POSDC In doing so they avoid the problems of dialects and have established a wide 
variety of interchangable plication packages. QNX and Novell are two products that 
claim to create a fault tolerant LAN operating system aimed at the store rather than the 
Head OfBce market However, given the concentration of the food retailers in the UK, it 
seems unlikely that these other systems are likeb^  to gain a gigmfirjwit foothold in the near 
ftiture at least.
A1.L4 Database systems
Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS) are the heart of ftxrd retailing 
information systems. In the retail store they hold information about the management 
functions and sales transactions; in the warehouse they hold information about receipts, 
deliveries, spH ers and stock location; in Head OfBce they provide information for all of 
the control ftmcrions of the business, for planning, for anabasis, for rp rtin g  structures 
and for ftmctional activities such as purchasing and merchandising. When they are
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connected through the LAN and WAN networks and the various hardware and software 
platforms a composite picture can be built iq) that enables accurate control of very large 
food retailing enterprises that have hundreds of stores, employ thousands of people, have 
ten of thousands of stock items and millions of pounds (sterling) worth of stock. Not 
unnaturally therefore, the development of RDBMS has been a critical part of the the 
development of food retailing Management Information Systems (MIS).
An RDBMS is a system in which data that is contained in different «plications (e.g. the 
personnel attendance database and the personnel pay database), may be shared. The 
RDBMS is very flexible in nature and can be quiddÿ adapted to changing needs and 
environments, new fields can be quickly added to existing data structures without 
compromising the data structure, and new applications quickly developed uring a 4GL 
(fourth generation language) query language. 4GLs are high level languages (near 
English syntax) and programmes written in them are tranprtable and may be easily 
int^rated with existing software packages. RDBMS are central to the functionality of 
UNIX systems. RDBMS have two basic configurations and these are illustrated in 
Figure A1.5.
In the iqjper half of Figure A1.5 the traditional RDBMS structure is illustrated. The PC 
based users (EPoS terminals or management system terminals) are connected via a LAN 
to the store minicomputers. In turn these access the main disk server technology and 
througb this the dWcs. With this configuration the PC based users can access the 
relational database that may be pread throughout several physical disk drives, a 
configuration common^  ^ found in Head OfBce systems. In an individual store it is 
unusual to find more than one disk drive. For large systems such as may be found in
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Sainsbucys, Tesco and Safewzy, the mini conputers would be rplaced by a Tnamftame 
conputer.
PC based own Mmicompaters PC based users
i f f ^
i i7 is r4 i ’
Parallel server technology lets cluster systems access a single database 
pread across multiple disks
Databases
PC based users
Parallel processor array
Parallel server technology cm massivdy parallel machines gives 
enormous database power
Source: Savage, 1995, p8S 
Figure A1.5 RDBMS parallel technology configurations
One of the great problems with this kind of systems configurations is that the réponse 
time of the system deteriorates as the databases get larger and as the number of users
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increases. To overcome this problem the system configuration shown in the lower half of 
Figure A1.5 has been developed. In this system the bottleneck inposed by single disk 
server and two mimconputers has been overcome by nring parallel processor arrays 
(PPA). These PPAs allow rapid access to the RDBMS and this facilitates the very large 
database system (VLDBS) searches that are now being used to analyse the data gathered 
ftom historical sales (EPoS) and customer information. This kind of technology has 
already been developed for sdentfic and defence research systems. These VLDBS may 
be terrabytes in size and require new data interrogation techniques. The PPA is likely to 
be the pattern of fiiture large retail system development
Whatever the configuration of future systems it is clear that current RDBMS must be 
cspable of working under several operating systems. The most commonly ft>und 
RDBMS packages in retailers are DB2 (IBM), SQL Server (Nficrosofi), Oracle 7, 
Informix and Progress. The conpatabOityofthese RDBMS and the operating systems is 
shown in Table A1.2.
RDBMS Wndows
NT
UNIX OS/2 OS/400
DB2 No Yes Yes Yes
SQL Server Yes No No Yes
Oracle? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Infixinix Yes Yes Yes Yes
Progress Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adpted from Storqr, 1995, p84 
Table AI.2 Open Systems RDBMS compatibility
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In addition to open operating systems conpatabOity many of these RDBMS have similar 
features. These would normally include -
■ pacification of files, fields and standards records for 
the creation of the database
■ record updating with additional fields or field size changes
■ relational file identifiers and associated index files for 
sorted records .
■ menu and screen layout tenplates and generator 
" a rport generator
■ search and report facility for for exact match or embedded 
string (text or numeric)
" drill down facility for sequential key searches to refine the 
list of field matches 
" a form generator
■ an
" proprietary interpretive programming language (e.g. C++)
■ conpOer and hnker for interpretive code 
" proprietary 4GL with Structured Query Language (SQL)
with a program debuger 
" grphicalpreadsheet for analysing the contrats of the 
database
" inport - eport facility for record field exchange 
In addition the RDBMS should have general environment features-
■ direct LAN / WAN access (e.g. TCP / IP connectivity)
■ fax and data communications software (e.g. e-mail)
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■ multi-media interfaces for grphical data processing
■ fail safe features that allow the system to continue to 
operate if one part malfunctions
" access to a development library to avoid rewriting procedures 
" direct linking to other RDBMS products 
" utilities that enable access to .and actuation of remote 
pphcations software 
" a scheduler for routine data and system management tasks
■ an access route to the UNDC operating system 
" an ipward migration path for old programmes
" an tpward migration path for current programmes
■ VLDB epandabPity and PPA access and conpatabPity
Although these lists may seem long, the majority of the RDBMS have «HHîrinnfll features 
that relate to the dialect of UNIX being used, the hardware platform being used and the 
system developer's previous e^perience. Much of the conpkxhy in the retailing RDBMS 
stem ftom the need to use software structures that were developed during the 1980s. In 
time this conplexity should give way to sinpler more powerful systems with standardised 
software.
A1.LS The store hardware and software configitration
The store has four quite distinct elements in its system. These are the back of store 
systems; the fiont of store systems; the mail and messaging systeno^  and, the data 
communications system.
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The back of store systems are -
" master data maintenance system
■ Tport generation
■ stock control (including raw materials for peciaHst 
functions such as bakeries)
■ stock handling (including goods received, quality defect 
returns, excess stock returns, out-of-date returns and 
transferred stock)
■ customer orders and accounts (many of the large stores 
will take pecial orders ftom customers for parties, etc.)
■ local purchases (such as vegetables, flowers, specialist 
products)
" sales ana^rsis and reporting 
" financial control system (cash handling and banking)
” personnel systems (attendance register, productivity 
register, training register).
The firont of store systems are -
■ point of sale transaction records (working phis backip)
■ point of service (mpackaged produce data, plarmacy records, 
cafeteria, cheque handling / printing system, etc.)
■ EFTPoS (banking service link)
■ promotion control (special offers, e.g. quantity pricing, deal 
reward, table pridng, etc.)
■ customer relationship system (Toyaky' card administration  ^
special loyalty* promotions
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" hardware and software interfacing and misceHaneons systems 
The electronic mailj messaging and data communication system are the elements that 
allows intelligence (in terms of internal memo's, letters, etc.) to circulate among those 
enployed in the store, and data to flow between equpment within the store and between 
the store and Head OfBce. A typical hardware coniBguration is shown in Figure A1.6.
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Figure A1.6 Store hardware system layout
This hardware configuration is designed to be robust The two central store computers 
are connected back-to-back so that if one fails the other can take over immediately. This 
avoids loss of sales and control data that would be expensive and difficult to replace. As 
well as having two central store conputers the wiring is also dipHcated so that there is 
always more th a n  o n e  data route in case of accident. The external communication system 
is connected to the Head Office and EFTPoS systems. Each terminal (EPoS or PC) in the 
store is connected to both primary and secondary control loops using standard Ethernet
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connections. The auxiliary systems are usually associated with peciaHst functions within 
stores (e.g. pharmaceutical records, dry cleaning, butchery). The auxiliary system 
interface is often used to evaluate new technology or new approach to efSciency in the 
store (e.g. automatic shelf edge pricing system, customer scanmog foeir own products). 
Eventually many of these auxiliary systems become subsumed into the standard system 
configuratioiL It should be noted that as conputer technology has inproved and become 
more reliable, the r^ed for a second back-ip store conputer has diminished. Some 
modem systems now have only one conputer at store level
TO SIORE CONTROLLER
CASH DISPENSER AND 
KEYBOARD
CARD READER 
AND CHEQUE PRINTER
PROCESSORAND
CONTROLLER
BARCODE READER
AUTQUtnC SCALES
Figure A1.7 EPoS workstation configuration
In themselves the EPoS work stations are almost *minf conputer systems. A typical 
system is illustrated in Figure A1.7. The core of the woikstation is the processor and 
workstation controller. This contains a CPU unit, hard disc storage and Ethernet 
communications card. Each of the other fimctions (cash dispenser, card reader and 
cheque printer, automatic scales, bar code reader) are connected to the main controller
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through a standard interface card that plugs in to the processor mother board. The 
controller software contains a price information database that is regularb  ^ipdated ftom 
the main conputer. It also contains transaction data that is gathered throughout the day, 
stored and downloaded to the main conputer for transmission to HOC at night. Other 
than these two ftmctions most modem systems run indqiendently of the mam store 
conputer for the majority of the day. As far as possible the check out functions are 
automated. However there are still many manual functions that have not as yet been 
eliminated - keying in pricing anomalies and discounts, dealing with poüed bar codes, 
handling and weighing loose products (e.g. vegetables), 'swpmg" the bar coded products 
throu^ the checkout, swping credit and debit cards and getting customers to authorise 
transactions, and he^sing to pack carrier begs.
The EPoS workstation is now the dominant customer / store interface technology. From 
the customer's point of view its advantages are obvious - faster service, quality of service, 
greater accuracy, inproved system responsiveness and in the longer term these 
inprovements wiH lead to lower prices for the consumer. From the retailer’s point of 
view it provides accurate usage data and allows more precise merchandising, accurate 
rqilenishment data, accurate data for sales and trend anajÿsis, and in conjunction with 
customer data gathered through store cards, data about the buying habits of difterent 
sectors of the buying public (Euromonitor, 1985). Since its introduction in the early 
1980s its use in fi>od retailing has grown rpidly, and it is estimated that by 1997 86% of 
all grocery sales will be across scanners. In 1993, 97.5 % of Tesco sales, 100% of 
Safeway sales and 99.7% of Sainsbuiy's sales were scanned (Nielsen, 1995).
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Figure A1.R Store software architectare
The store software architecture (Figure A1.8) cbsefy follows the pattern discussed earlier 
in this charter with the main store conqiuter having an operating system of UNIX (or 
UNIX-like) software as its base. This drives the system data interchanges through the 
LAN Manager. The external conmiunicatioiis with the system are driven thm ngh the 
WAN Manager. The main RDBMS consolidates all of the data gathered ftom the system 
each day. On a bu^ day this can amount to a large amount of data (over 1.5 Gigabytes). 
The utility and Hbrary programmes perform the system housdceeping for the central 
computer, and remote housekeeping functions for the woricstations. Communications
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with people are handled through the perÿheral driver software. This sorts out the various 
software protocols that different hardware device sometimes need.
A1.L6 The warehouse hardware and software configuration
A  vital part of the ftx)d retail system, and one Wiich receives little academic attention, is 
the warehouse system. In part this is understandable as many of the large food retailers 
now subcontract this aq)ect of their operations to external organisations. In this case the 
warehouse is treated as another external sxqyplier with on^ an EDI link required to 
register delivery and despatch data. However, a substantial number of the food muhÿles 
still have their own warehouse systems that are an integral part of the overall architecture 
of their system. A typical warehouse configuration is illustrated in Figure A1.9. Goods 
are delivered ftom siq)pliers and unloaded into goods inwards and inspection. The order 
is checked and conq)ared with the delivery note to ensure that there are no shortages. 
Shortages are roistered on the conqnxter system and HOC is notified. A random sample 
of produce inspected to ensure it has been delivered to specification. Failure in inspection 
can mean return to the sxq^lier, or if the goods are not periAable put into
quarantine until HO contact the siq>plier. Assuming the produce is acceptable it will be 
allocated a location in the store. This can be either a cold automatic store, a room 
tenq)erature automatic store, a cold manual store or a room tenq)erature manual store. If 
necessary produce will be bulk bar coded prior to tranqx>rtation into the store. This bar 
coding will include the store location, and this will be used in all subsequent transactions 
although PPA architecture is likely to form the basis of future systems. Broadty speaking 
the software structure ft)lk>ws the functional requirements of the business.
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Figure A1.9 Warehouse control system
withm the warehouse. Normally the warehouse control system allocates locations. When 
a stock order is required by a store it is generated by the HOC and sent to the warehouse 
conoputer via the EDI link. This order will then generate a picking list «nH this will be 
transmitted to the automatic asd manual stores. The order is Aen assembled at goods out
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ready for loading onto the buy  and subsequent despatch to the stores. Before despatch 
the relevant paperwork is generated and passed on to the driver of the btiy. In some 
systems, where cong)Hcated routes and multi-deliveries are required, the conqnxter may 
even generate a route plan. It ^ u ld  be noted that although this system is designed to be 
as automatic as possibb, paperwork is still used at many of the human/conqmter 
interfoces and for audit trail purposes. The software architecture is very similar to that of 
the store (Figure A1.8). The main difference would be the inchisbn of the automatic 
store controller as a separate sub-system and this may have a separate UNIX base of its' 
own. Even so, the data connection would still be established over an Ethernet LAN link.
A1.L7 The Head Office hardware and software cof^lguration
At the hub of the retail control system lies the Head OfiSce system. The rob of this
system is to co-ordinate the activities of the stores and distributbn system, to monitor the 
financial activities of the organisation, to analyse the data gathered throng the overall 
system and to provide intelligence to gmde management dedsbn making at a tactical and 
strategic level Vlth the wide range of fimctions performed by this aspect of the system, 
and with the da% need to process miHbns of transactions, it is hardfy surprising that the 
Head OfSce conputer system is large in size and high in processing power. Figure Al.lO 
illustrates a typical Head Office computer system structure. This system will be grafted 
onto a UNIX(or open system) software platform and be based on singb large processor 
or PPA hardware platform. Historically the singb large processor has been dominant, 
although PPA architecture is %ely to form the basis of future systems. Broadfy q>eaking 
the software structure foftows the ftmctional requirements of the business.
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Figure Al.lO Head OfBce control system
The core of the software system is the RDBMS in which the data for the management 
control and reporting systems is stored. The data is normally partitioned (virtually if not
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physicaDy) in the ftmctional databases. Data access ftx>m external systems to these 
databases is checked and validated once it has been processed through the 
communications hardware / software system Data egress to the external systems ftx>m 
the databases will be checked and processed to ensure the correct protocol is used to suit 
the system receiving the inft)rmation. It is umisual ft)r direct access or egress to take 
place ftom external systems because of the need to maintain data integrity within the 
system The main software suite, containing database translation software, etc., wQl be 
under control of the IT department T h^ alone will be responsible for the maintenance 
and development of the hardware and software systems. This main suite siqyports the 
rqx>rting and decision systems that HO users will access via the HO LAN, and store win 
access via the system WAN. Normally access restricted a security system with various 
levels. The lowest level is read only, the highest level is complete access to the vhole 
system Very few people (even on the systems development staft) have access to the 
i^hole system Two important features of the system are the archive database in i^iich 
historical EPoS and trading inft)nnatbn is kqjt, and the strategic back-iq> system The 
archive database is used ly  the merchandising and customer service departments ft>r trend 
analysis and customer behaviour analysis. The strategic back-iq) system automatical^ 
takes control of the system should the main system ftdL As with the store, it is necessary 
to maintain system integrity and a main system Mure could have a disastrous effect on 
the business as a whole. Most ofthe large ftx)d retailers consider they can recover ftom a 
systems feilure within hours and maWam data integrity.
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Appendix2 
Retailer Case ^ stories
A Z l IntroducOan
Considenng the events Aai have surrounded the evolution of retailers in the past fifteen 
years it is difficult to be sure of the extent to i^nch the large food multiples have been 
shtped by, or have shaped, the environment in ^nch they operate. However, an 
understanding of the histories of Sainsbury, Tesco and Safeway gives some valuable 
insights into the dynamics of the organisations and provides a background against vhich 
to examine evolving food multqple strategies and Ae technologies they have used.
The following case histories have been congpiled using a combination of epdsting 
historical data, interviews with senior epcecutives either in or recent^ retired fixpm the 
organisations, and from siqpphers of technical equipment and systems to the food 
multiples. The first part of each case study is a brief history of the three organisations up 
to 1980 summarised in ten year periods. The second part of each case study examines 
events that took place between 1980 and 1990 - a period of great technological change.
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A2J2 X Sainsbury pic
(Extracted from Williams, B., 1994, A Histoiy of Sainsbmys, Ebury Press, London and interviews with 
company executives.)
A Z Z l The earfyyears
On the 12th June 1884 John James Sainsbury was bom at 5 Oakley Street in Lambeth, 
London. He was the fourth and last child of Elizabeth and John Sainsbury. John 
Sainsbury Sr. was an ornament and picture ftame maker. Little detail is known about the 
early life of John Sainsbury Jr. He took his first job at the age of fourteen with a grocer 
whose shop was near to Oakley Street in New Cut After a v^iile he moved to a new job 
with Henry Jeans, an oil and colour merchant of Green's End in Woolwich. In 1863 John 
Sainsbury Sr. died of pneumonia and shortly after in 1866 Elizabeth Sainsbury died of 
Tuberculosis. In qpite of these events John Sainsbury Jr. seems to have learnt a lot about 
the retail business during his stay with Henry Jeans. Towards the end of the 1860's John 
Sainsbury moved to another oil and colour merchant, George Giftet, and it was there that 
be met his wife Mary Anne Stales. Mary Stales fem% were already owners of a gmaH 
chain of dairy dmps (later to become branches of Sainsburys). At some time shorty 
before their marriage in 1869 John Sainsbury rented a small grocery shop at 173 Drury 
Lane, and with his savings of £100 set iqp in business.
A2.2.2 1869 to 1880
On the 20th April 1869 James Sainsbury married Mary Anne Sttq>les. They both worked 
in the grocery business in Drury Lane. Shortly after acquiring the shop John and Mary 
made a shrewd decision to convert their groc%y shop to a dairy shop and were able to 
take advantage of the growing demand for dairy products. With a growing femily the 
premises in Drury lane was becoming crowded and the couple moved to another shop at
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159 Queen's Crescent in Kentish Town. They left a manager in charge of their original 
shop and concentrated on building iq) their new dairy shop. The new shop did well and 
by 1875 John Sainsbury was able to open a third shop four doors away ftom their 
existing shop in Queen's Crescent (no. 151). He extended his range of produce to cover 
mqxpited Irish and Danish bacoiL Once again Sainsbury seems to have judged the 
market well for by 1875 he bought yet another shop in Qiieen's Crescent, this timft at 
number 94. It should be remembered that these shops were all small nnit<g (probably 
under 500 sq. ft.) and by having three in one locale Sainsbury was able to mayimise sales 
and meet an established demand.
A2.23 1880 to 1890
This period was one of steady growth for John Sainsbury. In 1881 he took over a 
cheesemonger's shop in Watney Street, Stepney. This shop had been previously owned 
by his brother-inrlaw Edward Staples. The produce (cheese and bacon) was mostfy sold 
to the local dodcM% and lightermen. Two further Stsqples's shof» were bought at Hoxton 
in Northreast London, and in Chalton Street, S t Paneras. These acquisitions w m  not 
without challenge ftom other already established local traders. To avoid confiontation 
and the possibility of price wars Sainsbury often had to resort to subterftige to hide his 
success. In one instance he bought a house that backed on to his shop so that he could 
have produce delivered without his opponents knowing. In 1882 Sainsbury acquired his 
first shop in Chapel Street, Islington. This was one of the first shops he was later to 
acquire fix>m members of a 'retailer pact'. The pact was formed fix>m several retailers in 
London and its purpose was to combine their buying pow^ to gam addiffATMl discounts, 
avoid confix>ntation (congietition) with existing members, and he%) each other to expand 
by offering premises on a first refusal basis to pact members. It was a kind of cartel
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based on related families or on femflies that had some form of close connection. By 1890 
this pact represented between 70 and 80 shops and exercised considerable buying power. 
The arrangement worked well for Sainsbury and it was to be central to his eiqpansion 
during the 1890's.
As his business grew Sainsbury had to ingxrove the management of his stock, and in 1882 
he obtained a wardiouse in AUcroft Road near the three Kentish Town shops. This was 
nqndly converted into ofSces and storage areas. A part was even converted into a bacon 
smoking stove. He delivered the stored produce to his shops by horse drawn carts. At 
almost the same time Sainsbury acquired retail premises at London Road in growing 
town of Croydon. This was the first ifoop to open outside London. By 1890 Sainsbury 
owned 16 shops and enqxloyed qxproximatefy 180 people. He had expanded his produce 
range to include pork sausages, eggs, poultry in addition to the original dairy produce, 
and had broadened ins geographical coverage to include Balham, Brondesbury and 
Lewisham. He bad established this business on good quality products at reasonable 
prices.
A2.2.4 1890 to 1900
Aithou^ Sainbury had grown considerabty from his single shop in Drury lane during his 
16 years of trading, he was acutety aware of the growing threat of the national food 
mukples of Home & Colonial, Lptons and the International Tea Conpany posed in 
1890. They were all numerically larger and geogrsphicaiy widey based. Home and 
Colonial had over 100 drops. Thomas Lpton vho started ins business in 1885 in 
Glasgow already had 100 shops. The International Tea Conparry had over 200 shops. 
Sainsbury realised that these conpanies had been more successfiil at eaploiting the
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erqxanding food supply that had resulted ftom the mproved transport inftastructure and 
ftom food inports ftom the continent Their size enabled them to pursue more 
aggressive purchasing strategies and also allowed them to trade profitaby on lower 
margins with higher turnover.
To enable him to conpete with this threat Sainsbury hW to grow quicky. However, he 
was astute enough to realise that this growth would have to be accompanied by an 
inprovement in conpany systems. On the 22nd Juy 1890 he took a lease on 11 
Stamford Street, Blackftiars and on the adjoining building at 10-13 Bennet Street and 
converted these buildings into a new depot to replace the now ineflScient Allcroft Road 
depot. This new depot was more centraiy located in the London conurbation and was 
close to the msyor wholesale markets and rail temdnL At the same time Sainsbury 
standardised his "house style' in terms of shop presentation and organisatioxL He included 
ice boxes in his shops to extend the life of his dairy products and set stringent standards 
of cleanliness. By 1900 m aoyofh is shops had electric lighting installed and mudi of the 
new dqxxt produce was delivered by steam powered lorries.
The conpany neary trebled in size (to 47 shops) between 1890 and 1900 by 
consolidating their position in the London markets and by moving out into towns that 
were on good rail Hnks with London. By 1900 Sainsbury was trading in RedhiH, Ilford, 
Enfield, Ealmg, Harrow and Watford. Williams (1995, p45) suggests that this limited 
growth was due to the wider range of products on offer to customers which in turn made 
the logistics more conpHcated and difScult to control This may be true, but it is also 
likey that Sainsbuiÿs own cautious nature and insistence on close managerial control
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had a great effect as well This conservative pattern of growth can be observed 
throughout the Hfetime of the conpaxy.
A2 1900 to 1910
A process that began in the late 1880s and which continues to the present day was that of 
ensuring a consistent sipply of ftesh products to the shops. In part this was achieved by 
inproving the methods of distributing produce from central storage. It was also 
achieved through control of the sippy chain. Sainsbury was among the first food 
retailers to inpose stringent quality controls on his sipphers and at aH stages throughout 
the sippy chain. AU ofthese activities were fixcused on achieving consistency of quality 
in aH aqxects of the business. This attitude extended to the staff who were all enployed 
on standards terms, conditions and work practices. These were 'policed' by the local 
inspectors.
The process of expansion had continued unabated. Building on a strong base in London, 
Sainsbury continued to buy premises in the home counties. In 1910 Sainsbury had 106 
^ p s  and was turning over £1.3m. The shops were a mixture of his traditional London 
shops, and vWxat became known as 'country branches' in towns such as Brighton, Hove, 
Eastbourne, Bournemouth, Folkestone, Guilford, Ipswich, Timbridge Wells and Oxford. 
This continued expansion presented severe problems m terms of produce cfistribution. 
The railways were inconsistent and were soon to be eliminated as a means of distribution 
to the outying stores.
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A2.2.6 1910 to 1920
The four years before the First World War were ones in which Sainsburÿs consolidated 
their position after a period of rp id  growth. The distribution inftastructure that had 
been inproved during the 1910s needed ftnther inprovement. Distribution of foodstuff 
ly  rail was proving more and more problematical as delays of two to ftve days in delivery 
were not uncommoiL This of course rqxresented a serious problem for perishable 
products. Fortunatey the road network was inproving rspidy at this time and when 
new Daimler delivery lorries became available, Sainsburÿs were among the first to use 
them. This switch ftom rail to road, conpleted by 1915, increased the choice of places 
to expand. By 1920 Sainsbury had 129 shops, a turnover of £5m and enployed 2,800 
people.
Sainsbury cleary had a great belief in management control systems. He had already 
established common terms and conditions for enployees, standard store layouts and 
standards of ftxxi presmtation, storage and hygiene. By 1914 Sainfoury had issued a 
"Management Rule Book". This book laid down the communications protocols for the 
organisation, training procedures (there was an apprenriceshp to be served to become a 
shop assistant), and some practical hints on human resource and retail management
The First World War proved to be great challenge to retailing in general Once war had 
been declared panic buying ensued. The price of commony used products soared, butter 
by 2d a pound, sugar ftom l%d to 4)W a pound and inported ftxod supplies were 
threatened. This overall uncertainty generated mauy problems for ft)od retailers as prices 
often ftuctuated npidy ftom one day to the nexd. To some exctent Sainsburÿs foresi^it 
in securing a good internal sippy network for key commodities paid dividends. Initiaiy
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food retailers inposed their own rationing system so that regular customers were served 
first. Eventuaiy the government inposed general rationing.
Food sippy was not the ony problem that Sainsbury had to deal with. Once the war 
had started many Sainrimiy enployees volunteered to join the services. Others became 
conscrpted as the war proceeded and took a terrible toll in human life. As Sainsbury 
was almost totaiy staffed by men before the War, the shortage of labour to run their 
stores soon became acute. It extended to all levels within the company structure. At 
first Sainsbury overcame the staff shortages by enploying and training women as shop 
assistants. Often these women were the wives of the men who had worked for them As 
the war continued it became necessary to enploy women as managers of stores. By the 
end of the war there were thirty nine female store managers. In general, the war 
probaby did more than anything else to break down the male oriented view of employers 
in the retail trade.
Once the armistice was signed demobilisation quicky took place and the returning men 
were qukky re-enployed. However, many previous enployees had been killed and their 
wives were retained in many stores. In fiict several women managers were to keep their 
jobs for a considerable period of time after the war. Rationing was lifted in 1919 and the 
country returned to a more normal pattern of life.
A2.2.7 1920 to 1930
The war had had a profound effect on the UK econony. After a short post war boom a 
severe recession followed leaving many people out of work. In an attempt to iuprove 
the economy the Government took protectionist measures to try to reduce the massive
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trade deficit The pre-war fiee trade atmosphere was abandoned and Ramsay 
MacDonald introduced subsidies for home produced foods and quotas that fovoured 
Empire produce. From Sainsburÿs point of view this was good news as most of their 
produce was sourced within the UK. The same was not true for their coxrpetitors who 
relied to a greater extent on imported produce.
In 1922 Sainsburÿs became a private limited conpany. John James (the founder) 
became Governing Chairman, John, Arthur and Alfred all became directors. The 
company was valued at £1.3m, but as the conpany remained privately owned Sainsbury 
had the freedom to continue to plough his profits back into the conpary. On the 3rd 
June 1928 John James Sainsbury died and all of the conpanÿs shops closed as a mark of 
respect and to allow enployees to join the funeral procession fixxm Stamford House to 
Putney Vale cemetery.
A2J2.S 1930 to 1940
The restrictive economical conditions continued to fovour Sainsburÿs during the 1930s. 
Williams (1995, p74) point out that by 1934 bacon quotas alone were costing Sainsburÿs 
conpetitors £150,000. To add to these overall problems many of the old frxod retail 
shops were now in need of rplacement or refurbishment This problem affected all food 
retailers and at this point in time many food retailing ^ p s  were little larger than a 
conventional terraced house. For Sainsburÿs conpetitors this foctor was to be crucial as 
refurbishment costs were very high. In 1934 Home & Colonial had 798 shops, Lpton's 
had 449 shops and Maypole Dairies had 977 shops. At this point in time Sainsburÿs had 
some 225 stores many of which were reasonably modem. The relative^ slow expansion 
rate of Sainsburÿs meant that they had less to refurbish than their conpetitors and
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consequently more to invest in new properties. They continued to expand throughout 
the 1930's and by the end of this period were established in the MBdlands, East Anglia 
and the South.
By 1939 Sainsburÿs were outperforming many of their rivals on a much smaller trading 
base (Sainsbuiÿs turnover was £12.5m on a 225 store base. Home & Colonial's turnover 
was £9.9m on a 798 store base). Sainsburÿs stores were all arranged in a standard 
format. Each store had dairy, bacon & ham, poultry and game, cooked meats, fresh meat 
and groceries departments. Sainsbuiÿs own brands were well established in all 
departments, their use placed leverage under brand manufacturers to be competitive in 
pricing. The number of products sold had risen from 5 in 1870 to 600 in 1939, the 
number of employees risen frrom 2 in 1870 to 8500 in 1939.
A2.2.9 1940 to 1950
When WW2 had been declared many of the male enployees of Sainsburÿs were in the 
conscrpdon age range. The compara quickly reacted and contacted all female 
ex-enployees who had been previousy trained by Sainsbury s^ing that a job was 
waiting for them While considerable nunfoers of women returned there was still a 
considerable ^ rtfa ll that could ony be overcome a more general recruitment This 
had to be done as a matter of urgency so that training could be done while the orignal 
staff were still on hand to complete the training. As exqxected, the male staff were soon 
leaving to join the armed forces and throughout WW2 the conpany continued to fight 
whh the problems of staff shortages.
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Inevitably rationing came with the War and families were required to register with their 
normal retailer. The large number of migrations around the country, especiaiy away 
from London, required a large bureaucratic effort on behalf of conpanies like 
Sainsburÿs. While the m^ority of other staff were moved away from Stamfrxrd Street, 
the staff who co-ordinated the rationing bureaucracy and the repair teams for bombed 
stores remained. Rationing was in fact a very conplex process as not everything was 
rationed in the same way at the same time. Conpounding this conplexity was the fact 
that many people were illiterate or semiliterate and had to rely on shop staff to he%> them 
to get their ration cards sorted out. Distribution channels became disnpted as roads and 
railways were bombed - again causing more work for the staff of Sainsbuiÿs. There is 
no doubt that WW2 inposed severe problems on the conpany. At one time the 
conpany almost went banknpt as the costs associated with training, premises repair, and 
paying for working longer woridng hours could not be offeet by increasing turnover.
A2.2.10 1950 to 1960
At the end of 1949 Alan Sainsbury visited America to study the changes that had taken 
place in frxod retailing. He was inpressed with the sipermaiket self-service fixrmiat and 
with the large open plan stores. In 1950 the first of the modem format stores was piloted 
at SelsdorL This store was used to try out different ideas that became standard in fixture 
stores (the first of the modem stores was built at Croydon and had a floor space of 
3,300 sq. ft.). These ideas included updating the conpanÿs facia, using refiigerated 
cabinets fixr meat and dairy products, innovating in packaging, fluorescent lighting, uring 
perspex instead of glass, self service, and inprovements in hygiene methods. Product 
innovations were to have to wait until rationing was lifted and normal trading with the 
outside world was resumed.
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During the following five years more were converted to the self-service format 
Wherever possible new stores were purpose built to the new format. This process 
continued slowly until Sainsbury opened the largest self-service store in Europe in 
Lewisham (7500 sq.fi.) in 1955. During the late 1950's the pattern was one of building 
new stores rather than refurbishing old stores. By 1960 Sainsbuiÿs had 256 stores 
(conpared with 244 in 1950) and enployed 15,000 people. Turnover had risen to £68m 
(conpared to £15.8m in 1950) and the average number of stock items had risen to 2000.
A2.2.111960 to 1970
This was a period of infinstructure modernisation for Sainsbuiÿs. The distribution of 
produce was decentralised and warehouses in Bruntingford, Basingstoke, Hoddesdon, 
and Charlton were opened. Sainsburÿs became the first retailer to co-ordinate stock 
operations at Head OfSce with an EMIDEC 1100 conputer. Over 1000 own brand 
products were introduced during decade and by 1970,4000 different products were sold 
in their stores. In 1961 many non-fbod items such as kitchenware, cleaning requisites 
and toiletries were introduced. In 1963 Sainsburÿs became the first to sell wines and 
pirits in their sipermarkets. The company also continued to experiment with new 
methods of packing produce and new packaging materials to inprove handling w ithin the 
stores and the distribution chain.
Throughout decade smaller stores were either replaced or extended and the average store 
size rose from 539 sq.fi. in 1960 to 948 sq.fi. in 1970. However, the total number of 
stores dropped from 256 to 225. The EMIDEC computer was replacé by a much larger 
ICL 1906E to keep pace with changes in the company. This period was also one of 
management change as several non-fomily directors were ppointed.
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A2.2.12 1970 to 1980
In 1973 Sainsbury became a public limited conpany. 10,000,000 shares in the conpany 
were sold to the public, institutional investors and enployees. Most of the mon^ raised 
from this flotation was earmariœd for friture expansion.
In pite of the vagaries of the economy Sainsbmy trading performance inproved during 
this period. Turnover rose frx>m£187.5m in 1960 to £1226.6m in 1980. The key focus 
of this decade was efficiency inprovement Conputer systems were enhanced to 
improve ordering performance and extended to other apects of the conpaiy, for 
excample merchandising and planning. Innovation at store level included Plessey data 
cpture units to rqplace manual stock check techniques and product innovation continued 
as delicatessens, in-store bakeries, petrol stations, freezer centres and wines were 
introduced.
In the late 1970s the first o f  the price wars took place. Sainsburÿs réponse to the Tesco 
price reduction challenge was to reduce over 100 items ty  ip  to 15% in price. It was a 
battle that was to fought again and again in years to come - each time with a negative 
effect on conpany profits.
Eary in the 1970s Sainsbury began to seriousy consider diversiGcation. Its dominant 
market position m food retailing was being constanty challenged by Tesco et al and the 
conpaxy wanted to broaden it's xnarket base. The conpaxy was cadi rich and the 
possibility of buying out a major conpetitor was considered. However, Sainsbury 
thought that a broader portfolio was a more ppropriate fbrxnat for the future. In 1975 
Sainsbury formed a joint venture with BHS to form Savacentre - a bypennaiket based
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conposke retailer. In 1979 Sainsbury formed a second joint venture, with Belgian 
retailer GIB, to form Homebase.
By 1980 Sainsbury had 231 stores with an average size of 17,700 sq.fi. It's turnover was 
£1226.6m, it had 37,300 staff and it sold 7000 items.
A2.2.13 1980 to 1990
The end of the 1970s saw the conpany growing consideraby in terms of conplexity. 
The sippy chain was growing rspidy in conplexity due to the continued expansion of 
the product range and the move away fiom manufacturers delivering directy to the 
stores. The number of sipphers was increasing and the customers demand for fiesh 
produce such as salad vegetables throughout the year meant that many of these sipphers 
were overseas conpanies. Because of these intemationjal sources the conpany (and 
other food multples) had a virtual summer throughout the year. The stores were also
mftreagmg in gftphigrifattftn The change Anm fhm iraditinnaî ^irmll/nyrii^TTp
high Street store was picking up momentum as larger sites became available on the edge 
of cities and towns and the planning regulations were relaxced.
Sainsbury were ideahy placed for growth as they entered 1980 with a large cash reserve 
that bad been retained fiom the flotation in the mid 1970s. They had a good customer 
profile with high customer loyalty, an experienced management team lead by David 
Sainsbury, and strong financial performance (Sainsbury gross margin was 3.66% 
conpared to Tesco 2.32%). Between 1980 and 1990 turnover increased firom £1227m to 
£7257m; gross margin from £45m to £471n^ the nucfoer of stores increased firom 231 to 
420; and their share of the food market rose firom 6.2% to 9.6% (Source: Conpany
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Reports and Accounts). However, this growth was to tenpered by the traditional need 
for control and efficiency, and these are themes that recur consistenty through the 
1980s.
In technological terms the move into the 1980s presented several challenges. Although 
Sainsbury had been the first retailer to buy a mamfi-ame in the 1960s the fimctional use of 
the system had been restricted to isolated subsystems that supported manual performed 
management activities. For exanple the purchasing system was co-ordinated by the 
conputer but orders were still placed manuaiy. By the end of the 1970s it was 
becoming evident that the manual ystems could not cope with the increase in conplexity 
and volumes. Graduaiy the isolated head office systems began to be merged into 
integrated suites of programs and many of the manual systems were automated. These 
changes inproved efficiency in fimctional terms and also reduced the armies of clerks 
that ran the old manual system. The other fronts on vriiich technology began to make an 
inpact was the distribution dpo t and at the store.
In the distribution system the underying problem that Sainsbury faced was one of 
control By the eary 1980s conputer technology was beginning to become cheper and 
it became a practical and cost effective proposition to have quite a powerful conputer at 
each distribution node. However, to make this conputer effective the cpture of data 
about the progress of produce through the system had to be automated. For this to be 
done accuratey produce had to be bar coded at several levels - in the packing case, in the 
pack multples and on each individual product Initiaiy problems were encountered 
because of different bar code standards, but once the BAN (European Article 
Numbering) system became universaiy adopted these problems disappeared. The
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transition fiom manual systems, to semi-automatic, to automatic systems was more or 
less conplete ly  1985. The other issue that had a big impact on the distribution systems 
was the automation of communications between the head office conputer and the 
distribution conputers. Once this becan^ reliable it was possible fixr the purchasing 
fimction to accurately know what stock was in the system on a day by day basis, 
previousy this had varied fiom a week by week to a month by month basis, and in turn 
this hefoed to reduce the stock levels through more accurate ordering. These 
developments were taking place at a time when Sainsbury was moving away from 
owning their own distribution system to a partiaiy subcontracted distribution system. 
This policy was adopted as a result of an extended drivers strike at the Hoddesdon, 
Bruntingford and Basingstoke depots that b^an in June 1977 and which lasted several 
months. During the strike Sainsbury had to resort to using subcontract distributors to 
sippy the stores. However, the internal bitterness caused by this episode and the 
effectiveness of the subcontract system, caused Sainsbury to revoke a previousy held 
view that th ^  should control the r^iiole of their system. As a consequence during the 
1980s the growth in the distribution system was not based on Sainsbury owned units but 
on the use of subcontractors. By the end of the 1980s Sainsbury even shared distributors 
with other food multples. l^ Tthout the conputer based control systems and conputer 
based communications these developments would not have been possible.
WhOe the depots and warehouses systens were developing similar progress was being 
made in the stores. The challenge at the store was to collect transaction infixrmation and 
to pass this on to the central systems. While Sainsbury knew what went into the systems, 
arid broady speaking vriiere it was at any given time, once produce went into the store 
the infi>nnatk>n train stopped. Bxactiy i^iat was in the store at aiy point in time, what
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was and what was not selling, was still a mystery to the buyers. As a result much of the 
merchandising was unfocused, and the stock lines a store carried took little account of 
local tastes and demand patterns. Wastage was high at the store level and stock turns 
slow. Of course these problems became more acute as the number of product lines 
increased. Sainsbury approached this problem in two ways. In the late 1970s, because 
of the inconsistency of product labels, they introdiæed bar code scanning of shelf edge 
labels. This was not particularly popular with the store staff as th ^  were required to 
haul around a large scanning unit about the size of a suit case, scan the dielf edge with a 
wand and then enter product/stock level information into the unit by hand. Whatever the 
inconvenience of these units at least allowed the company to develop the systems for 
store data cpture and the data was accurate to within a day or two. In time these hand 
scanning units became smaller (the Psion scanner), and these smaller units are still used 
during stock checks. The second pproach to the problem was to use EPoS at the check 
out Initially Wien EPoS was introduced in 1980 it was a half way house between 
manual checkouts and automated checkouts. The data gathered by the EPoS terminal 
was only used for cadi management purposes. The products that couldn't be scanned 
had to have their codes manually entered. This was difScult for the check-out operator 
as she or he often had to remember hundreds of product codes. Again this was a 
transient phase and ly  1985 it was possible to scan nearly all of the store lines at the 
check out.
The great value of the EPoS terminal was that in addition to providing cash management 
information at the check-out, when processed the same data could be used for stock 
control purposes. By polling this data overnight Sainsburÿs gained an accurate 
knowledge of stock movements and improved the ordering system efSdency, effectivey 
closing the information loop. Through this system the average stock turn increased from
305
about 8 weeks at the beginning of the 1980s to between 4 and 5 weeks by the end of the 
1980s.
The other technological innovation introduced by Sainsbury in 1988 was EFTPoS 
(Electronic Funds Transfer to Point of Sale). This move was pronpted by the increasing 
use of plastic credit and debit cards by the public. The banks had encouraged the use of 
the cards as a way of reducing their own cash handling costs and increasing security. It 
soon became widey adopted by the retailers for broady the same reasons. The EFTPoS 
system operated throu^ the central store conputer and the head office central conputer 
to the hanks central clearing conputers. These activities are described in detail in 
Chpter4and^pendix 1.
The 1980s was a decade of appying technology for J. Sainsbury. Throughout his period, 
in addition to the specific technfeal innovations mentioned above, the head office systems 
were being nfiegrated and continuaiy enlarged. The need to maintain control throughout 
the Sainfoury enpire and to be as efficient as their opponents drove these developments. 
By the end of the decade Sainsbury had moved from a predominatey manual run 
business to a business conpletey dependent upon conputers and technology.
The history of Sainsburÿs is reaiy a history of re ta il^  in recent times. T h^ have been 
dominated by one femiy who ppear to retain the founder's trading sense throughout 
three generations. They have maintained their market position and growth by keeping 
the needs of their customers cleary in view. Th^r have innovated in all apects of their 
business Wnle keeping focus on the two key variables in any business - quality and 
liquidity.
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Table A2.1 is a brief summary of Sainsburÿs history.
Ycar[l] Number of 
brandies
Tunover
£m
New store 
average sales 
area (sq. ft.)
Approx. 
number of 
products sold
Number of 
employees
number of 
customer 
visits 
fOOOs)
1870 1 - 500* 5[2] 2P1 -
1880 3 - 500* 10* 9* -
1890 16 - 1,000* 50* 180* -
1900 47 - 1,000* 130 950* -
1910 109 2.4[4] 1,000* 200 2,000* -
1920 124 5 1,500* 400 2,800 25[5]
1930 189 9.9 1,750* 500 6,500 -
1940 249 12 2,000* 600 8,500 250[6]
1950 244 15.8 2,000* 550 8,500 -
1960 256 68 5,800 2,000 15,000 1,000*
1970 225 187.5 10,200 4,000 32,000 2,000*
1980 231 1226.6 14,800 7,000 37,300 4,000
1990 291 5644.8 32,300 14,000 75,500 6,750
1994 341 8864.6 30,200 19,000 93,500 8,000
(Source; Williams, B., 1995, p 219)
Table A2.1 Sainbaiy's key statistics, 1870 to 1994
Notes: * Sainrixurÿs estimates
[1] AH figures relate to Sainsbuiÿs financial year, exclusive of subsidiaries.
[2] Based on 3 products - butter, milk and eggs
[3] Two members of the Sainsbury fiuniy
[4] Figures relate to 1912, the earliest year for winch records are available
[5] Based on 1912 reference to serving 10,000 customers daiy
[6] Number of customers holding accounts with Sainsburÿs in 1939
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A23 Tesco pic
(This has been compiled from interviews with managers and executives, from extracts of a company 
publication entitled The Growth of die Tesco Organisation’ and company reports and accounts.)
A23.1 The euty years
Jack Cohen left the Royal Fying Corps in 1919 at the age of 21 with a gratuity of £30 
and found himself looking for a job in a Britain with over 3 million people uneroployed. 
Faced with almost certain unenptoyment he took a gamble and used his gratuity to buy 
some NAAFI surplus stock. This he sold at a local market in Hackm^. On his first day 
of trading he sold £4 worth of goods and made £1 profit With typical entrepreneurial 
flair Cohen was soon selling goods at six local maricets on different days of the week. In 
one of his transactions he managed to buy some tea fiom an inporter called T. E. 
StockweR However, before he could sell it on the maricet stall he had to think of a 
brand name. Cohen added the first two letters of his own name to the initials of the tea 
svppher and the name Tesco was created. This name stays with the conpany to date and 
it was Tesco tea that was Cohen's most successful line in the early days.
A3.2.11920-30
Having gained a foothold in local market trading Cohen quicky added a small 
distribution operation selling a «maH range of wholesale products (including tea) to his 
follow maricet traders. Although details of this period in Cohen's life are limited, it is 
clear that he must have been quite successful for by 1928 he was considering the 
problems of moving from his market trading base to high street shops. In 1929 Cohen 
acquired his first leasehold lock-ip riiop at Burnt Oak, Edgware in North London and 
the name Tesco Stores Ltd. was registered. At that point in time the traditional way of
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selling products was essentiaiy one of auction and the trader sold the customer what he 
wanted to sefl. Cohen realised from his experience in open markets that customers 
preferred to choose their own produce and so he experimented ty  arranging his shops 
with the produce laid out on counters. In the week he made the change to the new 
layout his turnover doubled frrom £150 to £300.
A2J.2 1930 - 40
Throughout the 1930's Cohen rode the wave of population growth that was occurring in 
London. Building on the success of his first shop format, he bought and opened shops 
throughout the London suburbs. He astutey acquired the freehold of marry premises - a 
sound inflation proof investment for the future. In 1934 (in a similar way to Sainsburÿs 
during their eary development) Cohen acquired the freehold of a plot of land at Angel 
Road, Edmonton in North London and built a new headquarters and warehouse. This 
warehouse was vital for the efficient distribution of food to the conpanies 48 stores. 
The warehouse also gave Cohen an opportunity to develop some of the ideas he had 
been working on to inprove stock control
Cohen's success continued throughout the 1930s and by 1939 he owned 100 stores. 
These were situated in prominent positions on the High Streets of North London forming 
a substantial retailing chain turning over £2m a year. However, this success was 
ovashadowed by the war the country was about to be plunged into.
A 233  1940-1950
In common with Other retailers, the Second World War slowed Tesco exqxansion 
propects for several years. At first Cohen had to concentrate on repairing damaged
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premises and later he found that profitability (fiom winch he fimded his acquisitions) was 
restricted due to a general lack of produce to sell Rationing and restricted food sipplies 
meant that the price of fiosh vegetables soared, and with an eye to a business opportunity 
Cohen extended his operations into production. He b o u ^  land in Chesunt with 
extensive glasshouses and pasturage. From this investment was aWe sipply his own 
shops with fie^  vegetable and firuit when other sipplies were limited or unavailable. 
This was the first and last venture that Cohen made into primary productioiL It was not 
profitable and production was abandoned after the War although the conpany kept the 
site which subsequenty became the it's headquarters.
Lnmediatey after the War Cohen visited the USA and came back enthused with the idea 
of self-service shops (as did John Sainsbury). He even ran a pilot scheme at a converted 
shop in St Albans. It was a limited success for the time it ran, but restricted sipplies 
prevented full exploitation of the idea. By 1949 the sippy of fi>od had eased and Cohen 
reputed the Gxpsnmsat, this time with ^eat success. Self service proved to be the 
pattern for fixture multple shopping formats and all subsequent Tesco stores were 
designed with this in mind. This method of shopping also he^ed Tesco to contain costs 
in a period of high wage infiatioiL By the end of 1950 Tesco had 68 self service stores.
A23.4 1950 - 60
The Cohen philosophy of "pile it high, sell it cheap" proved to a formula for success in 
the 1950s. Post War austerity was relaxing and people had money to pend. Cohen was 
committed to growth and large sums of money were pent each year on larger and more 
modem stores. By the end of the decade a new Tesco store opened every 5 weeks. 
However, the London market was becoming saturated and sites increasingy difficult to
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find. Cohen realised that if he was to conqpete with the other large multÿles he would 
have to grow even larger, but he wished to keep within his London distribution area if 
possible. The only way this could be achieved was to biqr other smaller retail chains. In 
the mid 1950s Tesco acquired a chain of 18 Bumards Stores in London and a controlling 
interest in l^Hiamson Ltd. with a further 70 grocery, hardware stores and restaurants 
was acquired.
A 23.51960 - 70
This decade was maiked by a significant growth in non-food consumer spending. Tesco 
followed this trend and in 1961 opened the largest store in Europe (at that time) on the 
outskirts of Leicester. Over half of the 16,500 sq.A. was devoted to non-food products. 
This move was significant in two respects. The first was that of a commitment to 
diversification, and the second was the move away fix>m London into the home counties. 
In &ct the move out of London was in part due to the lack of sites within the 
conurbation for the larger stores. Throughout the 1960s the acquisitions continued as 
Tesco pushed further North. They concentrated on existing fi>od retail chains but did 
occasionally consider other food businesses that could form part of the siq^ly chain for 
the main stores (see Cadena below). In 1960 they bought John Irwin & Sons in the 
North West (200 grocery shops), in 1964 Charles Ph31%)s & Co. (97 self-serve grocery 
shops), in 1965 Cadena Cafes (66 cake shops, bakeries and restaurants) and Adsega (32 
Northern siq)ermaikets). But the most ambitious take-over of aU took place in 1967 
v^ien Tesco's acquired the Victor Value chain with over 280 stores. By the end of this 
decade Tesco owned 834 stores making them numerical^ the fourth largest grocery 
chain in the UK after the Co-op, Fine Fare and Allied Siq^liers. In 1965 the cong)any 
administration and distribution network was reinforced vdien it opened a large ofOce and
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warehouse in Winslow in Cheshire and inT969 Cohen was awarded a Knighthood for his 
services to retailing.
A2.3.6 1970 - 80
The trend towards larger stores continued throughout this period. Most of the new 
siq>er and hyper stores were edge of town developments. Land on these developments 
was che^ and local authorities were l^ upçfy to buOd roads and provide services to attract 
the stores.
During this period Retail Price Maintenance (RPM), a system vdierely suppliers fixed the 
minimum price for their goods, was stiU in force and tins prevented retailers fix>m 
ofEering the public lower prices. For multÿles like Saiosbuty who sold a large amount of 
'own produce' this law had a limited efEect Traders like Tesco, who bought and sold 
most of their produce on the open maricet, found RPM very constraining. Trading tactics 
among the large retail chains largely revolved around ways of avoiding RPM. Tesco and 
other food multÿies (with the exception of Sainsbury) used Green Shield Stamps as a 
vfay of efifectiveh^  discounting food. However, this was an expensive operation to 
maintain and as soon as RPM was abolished in 1964 Tesco began aggressive price 
cutting. This action sparked what has now become known as price wars.
The 1970s saw quite significant changes to the conq)any infiastructure. In 1973 after 55 
years of controlling Tesco Cohen retired and handed over to Leslie Porter marked 
his appointment 1^ opening a head offîce extension at Chesunt and a new Home *n' Wear 
warehouse in Milton Keynes. In 1976 a new firesh food processing and packaging plant 
was opened in Ashton under Lyme. In its time it was one of the most advanced plants in
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Europe. In 1977 Tesco upgraded their first conqmter system, an ICT 1300 bought in 
1966, to an IBM 3033 and in 1980 this congmting power was supplemented with an 
IBM 4341. 1978 saw the acquisition of Cartiers Siperfbods of Kent (16 stores) and the 
first major expansion of Tesco south of the Thames.
A 2J.71980 to 90
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Tesco had grown through acquisition, and although ia 
1980 they had the largest number of stores of any food multple (552 compared with 
Sainsbuiy's 231), th ^  were not as profitable as many of their competitors. The reasons 
for this lack of profitability lay in the number of small centre of town stores they 
continued to operate. At the start of the 1980s it was clear that the trend in store format 
wasawayfiom the small town centre store towards the large edge of town store. Tesco 
diposed of over 200 of their smaller stores between 1980 and 1987 and rationalised their 
structure around the edge of town format. This is not to suggest that acquisitions 
ceased, for fix>m it  In 1982 Tesco bought Catteau, a French sipermarket business based 
in the Nord-Pas de Calais region (92 food stores).
Because of the peed of this restructuring it was inevitable that Tesco were slower than 
Sainsbury in developing the powerfiil central control systems that underwrote Sainsbuiy's 
superior profit performance. It ^ u ld  be pointed out that Tesco had similar tedmofogy 
to Sainsbury at the start of the 1980s, and they had also eperimented with EPoS, but the 
cost of rolling out the centralised control philosophy to the proliferation of small stores 
was prohibitive. Instead they coix^entrated the technological innovation on the new large 
stores as and when they were commissioned. This meant that it took quite a long time to 
rplace the manual systems at head ofSce - a finther drain on profitability.
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Another issue that was important in the evolution of Tesco during the 1980s was that of 
management culture. The change began in 1984 vhen Ian MacLaurin was appointed as 
Chairman. He sought to establish a more progressive management style based on 
modem control systems. Up to the late 1970s, because of the variety of store size and 
configuration that Tesco operated with, and because of the relative^ underdeveloped 
central systems, Tesco allowed their store managers a great deal of fieedom in store 
l^ u t ,  pricing and stock control Up to this point in time it was the only practical 
pproach to be taken at the store level even though guidance as to minimum pricing, 
merchandising and stock control were given by head ofBce. Cultural]  ^they were a very 
difierent company fiom Sainsbury who had always been subject to strict centralised 
control But if Tesco were to cope with the ever increasing number of product fines, 
reassert the strong central control MacLaurin perceived it needed and not drown in 
inventory, it needed very a different spproach. However, until a universal measuring and 
control mechanism could be inposed on their stores such a move could not be 
contCTplated. Just such an opportunity presented itself when EPoS technology unlocked 
the finks between store stock control accurate central purchasing and efficient 
management of the stock in the supply system. Tesco had been watching Sainsbur/s 
efforts during their introduction of EPoS led systems integration and began to develop 
their own systems. Shorty afier Sainsbury began to inplement their int^rated system 
Tesco followed. By the time Sainsbury had conpleted their roll out in 1987 Tesco were 
oh^ a year behind. In 1987 the conpany began using TRADANET which allows 
electronic finking to suppliers. By giving their suppliers more accurate information 
Tesco reduced ordering time, out-of- stocks and wastage. Once these processes were 
complete the foundations of the old managerial attitudes were eroded, and by end of the 
1980s the vhole of the Tesco system was under a central control system.
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The history of Tesco, Hke that of Sainsbury, is dominated ly  one man. Shorty before 
Cohen died he said: " The lesson that I learned in the early days of my career still %)ly 
today, no matter how much society changes: in good times and bad, the conpany that 
works hard, that insists on offering value for money, and is not afiaid to experiment and 
make changes, will always prosper."
While the official history stresses the gains and progress the conpany made, it has also 
made some foirly nsqor mistakes and once or twice required major surgery at board 
level (The whole episode i^ren Dai^ Hyams ran the conpany has been omitted fiom 
the ofBcial history.) The sanitised version has been written ly  the survivors in much the 
same way that history is rewritten by the victorious.
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A 2.4 Safeway pk (The AigyO Group)
(This has been compiled from interviews, two company documents - 'Safeway Conpany Hishxy and 
'Company Histofy of the Argyll Group', and Claike-Hil] and Robson's Argjdl Crop Case Study in 
McGohidcl994)
A2.4.1 The early years
Of the three case studies examined in this research the Argyll / Safeway is the most 
complex. There are two strands to the Safeway history. The first begins in the UK in 
1962 whoi Safeway Stores inc. of the USA decided to eapand into the UK market. 
They acquired 8 supermarkets and a warehouse fix>m J. Gardner Ltd. and formed the 
conpany of Gardner and Prideaux Ltd, When the stores of Gardner and Prideaux were 
subsequently converted to the American store format, they traded under the name of 
Safeway.
The second strand of the history is that of the Argyll Groip. The Argyll Group can be 
traced back to 1971 vAien James Gulliver, Alistair Grant and David Webster formed a 
conpany called Oriel Foods vdio manufactured foodstufife for retailers. Oriel Foods 
attracted the attention of the RCA Corporation and was bought out in 1974. Gulliver, 
Grant and Webster remained with RCA until 1977. They then lefi to form the base of 
vshat is now known as Argyll Group pic with money that was retained fix>m the original 
RCA take over. In 1987 the Argyll Group bought Safewzy fix>m its American owners. 
At this point the two strands join and continue as the story of the Argyll Group.
316
A2.4.2 Safeway 1962 - 70
Building on fhe previously mentioned Gardner & Prideaux chain it acquired in 1962, 
Safeway opened their first 'own built' store in 1963 in Bedford. At 20,000 sq.fi. it was 
the largest supermarket in Britain and was modelled on the American format of wide 
aisles, large chiller units and self-service finit and vegetables. In 1965, Safeway opened 
their first store in Scotland. By 1969 Safeway were turning over £20m but were still a 
small player in the UK food retail market
A2.43 Safeway 1970 - 80
A new distribution centre was opened in Ayiesford and within a year this was enhanced 
to include a new meat preparation plant Terry Spratt was appointed Chairman in 1975 
having worked with the conpaiy since 1962. By 1980 the conpaiy was enploying over 
8,000 people and profits were approaching £10m.
A2.4.4 Safeway / Argyll 1980 - 94
In 1982 Safeway enployed 10,000 people and profits were £20m. They had also opened 
their 100th store. In 1985 the conpany began a modernisation programme by 
inplementing scanning technology in ifs stores (EPoS). By 1987 Safeway had 86 store 
in London and the South, 25 stores in the Midlands and the North, and 22 stores in 
Scotland.
On February 27th 1987 Argyll bought Safeway for £681m and acquired 133 stores and 
with them about 3.4% of the UK food retail market Considering that Safeway were 
tunning over in excess of £lb at this time, it was a chesp purchase. In 1987, 7 large 
Presto stores (the trading name of stores Argyll already owned) were converted to the
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Safeway fermât and showed an increase in profits of more than 75%. The process of 
conversion of Presto stores continues throughout 1988 and ly  the end of the financial 
year 176 were operating under the Safeway banner. By the end of 1988 Safew^ had 
opened its largest store ever in Sutton (50,000 sq.fi.) and had over 200 stores in total
At this point in time the separate identity of Safeway became rather bhnred. The 
majority of stores owned by the Argyll Group operated umder the Safeway banner. 
However the group produiced consolidated accounts and it is not possible to separate 
Safeway trading performance fiom the Argyll Groups puiblished figures. However, the 
Safeway identity was a strong one in the market place and the store management 
inplemented significant inprovements in the application of technology, in environmental 
issues, in equal opportunities and in a serfes of social initiatives that resulted in several 
prestigious awards.
A2.4.5 AigyD Group pk 1978 -1980
In 1978 the Argyll team took over the loss making fixxi distributor and retailer Morgan 
Edwards Ltd. of Shrewsbury. They rationalised Morgan Edwards operations ly  closing 
many of their Supavahi stores, revising discounting policies, and inproving financial 
control systems. At the same time Arg}dl took over a small food retailer called Paddys, 
based in the North Midlands. These two conpanies formed the basis of the A rg^ 
Group pic.
In 1979 another highly g^red loss malring conpany, Louis Edwards & Sons 
(Manchester), a meat-processing and wholesaling conpany with retail butcher shops, 
was taken over and sulgect to the same rationalisation process as Morgan Edwards. In
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this year the Arg^ dl Group also acquired two successful biscuit manufacturers, Yorkshire 
Biscuits and Fuumiss & Co. for £3m.
In 1980 Arg>il Group (through Louis Edward & Sons) took over Cordon Bleu with 46 
fieezer centre outlets in the northrwest Midlands and Dalgetty Frozen Foods with 33 
fieezer ouxtlets in the souith east Their penetration of the freezer centre market was 
consolidated vfaen th ^  bought Freezer Fare and Bonmmart adding another 51 outlets. 
AU of these freezer centres were integrated to work under the name of Cordon Bleu. 
Argyll then merged the Morgan- Edwards and Louis Edwards conpanies to form the 
Argyll Group. The biscuits interest was enlarged with the acquisition of Patersons 
Shortbreads.
A2.4.6 1981 to 1994
During 1981 Oriel Foods was reacquired from the RCA Corporation for a price of 
£19.5m and with it came Lo Cost Discoumt Stores, Mojo Cash and Carry and Snowking 
Frozen Foods - a good fit with the growing Argyll portfolio. Total Argyll Group sales 
reached £10QirL In September Argyll took a 20% stake in Linfood Holdings (now 
known as Gateway) who had sales of over £lb. In an attenpt to increase its share 
holding in Linfood Argyll fell fouil of a monopoly commission enquiry and subsequently 
withdrew fix>m the acquisitiorL In 1982 Argyll acquired Allied Suppliers for £101m 
raising money through a share issue. Allied Suppliers, owned by Cavenham, was an old 
conpary that had been created through various amalgamations including those of Home 
& Colonial, Lpton, Maypole Dairies, Galbraith and Templeton. (All of these conpanies 
played a significant role in the evolution of British retailing and in one way or another 
have influenced the evolution of Sainsbury's and Tesco.) This gave the Argyll Group a 
critical mass in the food multple market place. They had 128 Presto Stores and 795
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other stores vfaich came as a part of the Allied take-over, and a total sales revenue of 
£847m.
In the earty 1980s Argyil began to think serious^ about buying into the U.S. retail 
market and as a first stq> bought Barton Brands of Chicago. Barton operated in the 
liquor trade. This was an uneasy relationshp and within 3 years Argyll sold off Barton 
and concentrated on their UK grocery retailing business. In 1984 Argyll extended their 
retail grocery influence by taking over Hintons, a fiun% owned supermarket chain that 
operated in the North East of England.
By 1985 the Argyll group had a very wide portfolio of conpanies trading under maiy 
different names. They decided to rationalise their trading facia. At the beginning of the 
year the Group had Presto, Lptons, Tenpleton, Galbraith, and Hintons facias. Argyll 
reduced these to Presto, the firms princple large shop trading identity, and Lo-Cost far 
all small shops. This process took abouit 2 years to conplete. However, Presto and 
Lo-Cost had a middle to low end of the market image and Argyll now wWied to acquire 
an up-market trading group.
In 1987 Argyll bought Safeway Stores Ltd., a subsidiary of Safeway Stores Inc., far 
£65Im  Safeway operated at the quality end ofthe retail market and had a reputation far 
good management and innovatiorL At the time of the take-over Safew^ had a wide 
geographical coverage and was ranked 6th in the UK retail league. Argyll faumd the 
Safeway trading was more profitable than either Presto or Lo-Cost, and within 6 months 
of the take-over Argyll announced that Safeway would become the princple retail 
identity. In making this move Argyll were repositioning themselves in the retail market.
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directly challenging Sainsbury and Tesco. In 1988 Alistair Grant became Chairman of 
the Argyll Group..
In late 1989, earÿ 1990 Argyll formed an Alliance with Casino of France and Ahold of 
the Netherlands. Having had a bad experience with the USA market they were cautiouis 
abouit acquiring conpanies in the EC. This Alliance was called the Euiropean Retail 
Alliance (ERA) and through it Argyll inproved purchasing power. ERA was soon to 
link to the Associated Marketing Services (AMS) \^iich also had links to a farther 9 
affiliated members. The combined membershp of AMS represents abouit 11% of the 
total EC faod maiket with over 13,000 retail outlets and 130,000,000 customers. 
Throughouit the evolution of the Argyll Group prior to the Safeway acquisition the 
technology strategy had little structure or farm. The key facus of the systems was 
financial control hacking %p tight management practice. The systems that were in use 
were not integrated. To a greater extent Argyll allowed the individual store chains to 
continue to use their own pundmse and stock control systems. However, once the 
Safeway take over had been conpleted and the Argyll Group management had an 
opportunity to see how professionally it had been managed, it became obvious that it 
made sense to standardise on the systems they were uising. As the various groups 
gradually became merged into the Safeway trading format so their individual systems 
were replaced with the Safeway control system. While this systems was quite substantial 
at the time of the Argyll take-over in the late 1980s, it was eiqianded in the early 1990s 
and couild be considered to be similar in size to that of Sainifauiy and Tesco.
In two repeats the development of the Safeway system was different fiom that of the 
Sainsbury and Tesco systems. It was the first to standardise on OSA (Open Systems
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Architecture), and the first to move away fix>m the BOS (Batch Operating System) to 
OLS (On Line Systems). It seems most fikely that the OSA move was needed because of 
the wide variety of different systems that had to be integrated due to the way in which 
Argyll epanded. OSA would have permitted this integration with the least cost (it 
would have minimised the cost of program conversion). The explanation of the use of 
OLS is more problematical It seems likely that the tight financial control exercised by 
the Group executives could only be achieved through the use of OLS. (It should be 
pointed out that this is coqecture and has not been substantiated.) Whatever the real 
reasons for these developments what is certain is that it created a very flexible system 
upon which the subsequent growth of Safeway has been built. Functionally, the Safeway 
system performed the same fimctions as the Sainsbury and Tesco systems.
In 1997 the Argyll Group changed their trading name to Safeway pic. Their consolidated 
1994 balance sheet posted a turnover of £6,000m and a profit of £365k. This gave them 
ahout 6% ofthe retail market in the UK, placing them third in the retail peddng order. It 
is clear tiiat maiket saturation in the UK is causing them to look abroad, and the press 
are constantly hinting at acquisitions in Europe. The only way they can grow within the 
UK would be to acquire another large food or drinks group. However, this would cause 
duplication of geographical coverage and it is difficult to see how this is like^ to increase 
the performance ofthe Group.
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